# The Handing Down of Culture, Smaller Societies, and Globalization

Jean-Paul Baillargeon, Editor

The Handing Down of Culture, Smaller Societies, and Globalization

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Proceedings of a Colloquium held at Université Laval,

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with the cooperation of

the Canadian Cultural Research Network

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Foreword

Jean-Paul Baillargeon

There are several questions raised in the pages that follow about the effects of globalization on our lives. The questions that give rise to the most serious concerns relate to culture, which seems to be the most vulnerable area. Smaller societies, in particular, worry about the future of their identities and their ability to create alternatives. They fear being swept away by a globalized culture, whose main flavour is American entertainment. Are we doomed to live in a uniform culture that gradually overshadows all others?

The *Chaire Fernand-Dumont sur la culture*, attached to the *Institut national de la recherche scientifique – Urbanisation, Culture et Société*, in Québec, studies matters related to globalization and the handing down of culture. English Canada and Québec are two relatively small societies, living next door to the United States of America. For historical reasons as well as linguistic ones, their relationships with that neighbour are different. Does globalization make them similar? Or given that phenomenon, what if anything makes them distinct?

Cultural researchers, both francophone and anglophone, from Québec, English Canada and elsewhere spell out in these pages what the question of the handing down of culture in a small society means in the context of globalization.

Opening Remarks

Sinh LeQuoc[*]

O n behalf of Urbanisation, Culture et Société and of the Chaire Fern-and-Dumont sur la culture, I welcome you to this colloquium. This Chair, established in 1998, is in honour of Fernand Dumont, founder of the Institut québécois de recherche sur la culture, now called INRS-Culture et Société. Those who have approached his writings consider them not easy to categorize. Among other reasons, this is because of their interdisciplinary nature, which is one of the main features of his major theoretical syntheses and his penetrating analyses of Québec society.

In the spirit of his work, this colloquium approaches a subject that has a multiplicity of facets; culture is of interest to the whole range of social sciences. More than twenty speakers will deal with the theme of this colloquium. They come from two of the major linguistic spheres of the world — English and French. They come from six Québec and from eight English-Canadian universities. One comes from a Belgian university and another from a Romanian university. These people are all doing research on culture in eleven different disciplines or fields of study. We can expect a broad diversity of approaches, reflections and analyses. If Fernand Dumont were still with us, he would draw out of all this material an original synthesis. That was his special gift.

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[*] Director of Science, Institut national de la recherche scientifique.

But more modestly, we hope the content of these papers will be useful as raw material for further thought, to initiate research, and create joint projects. The theme of this colloquium is broad and complex. It has strong links with one of the basic trends of human nature: to perpetuate itself not only biologically but culturally. If culture is a heritage, it is also a starting point. Different from genetic transmittal, the handing down of culture can be a process of returning to, discarding, or opening up. Smaller societies, like Québec or English Canada, have never been in complete control of what they wished to preserve, to throw away or to modify, nor have they been in a position to completely materialize their dreams. Their heritage consists of a diversity of elements coming from various places, which give rise, from time to time, to a mixture whose internal coherence is not always obvious. Thus, it is not easy to discern the forms the handing down of culture takes, especially since their internal dynamics are affected by economic, cultural and technological globalization, which intermingle and interfere with those dynamics, if they do not in fact alter them in depth.

As a counterweight to globalization, cultural diversity has been enhanced. Canada is a country whose definition approximates that of a society which includes a diversity of cultures: first, there are the two linguistic groups, English and French, each of which has more cultural relations within its own linguistic sphere and the world outside, than between themselves; second, there are freshly landed immigrants who gravitate towards one of the two official languages groups; and third, there are numerous First Nations communities, whose rich and original cultures are only now being rediscovered.

Facing the American giant, the small English Canadian and Québec societies feel that they are in the shadow of that giant hanging over the rest of the world. Two researchers from smaller societies in the European francophony, who are less in the shadow of that colossus, will comment on what their colleagues in English Canada and Québec have to say. Both of them, on the other hand, have experienced what it means to live in the neighbourhood of a culturally hegemonic society: France in the case of Francophone Belgians and Romania endured the daily and heavy overpresence of the USSR for about 45 years. The last two speakers come from a younger generation of researchers, one from English Canada, the other from Québec. It will be interesting to see how they perceive the handing down of culture in a smaller society, in the context of globalization, i.e., to see how they see the ways in which their elders think about this subject.

I would like to thank the organizers of this Congress for having accepted our colloquium as part of its

major activities. I would like also to thank the Canadian Cultural Research Network, which helped us greatly in recruiting our speakers. And I want to thank also CRSSHC, Heritage Canada, and several ministries and organizations of the Government of Québec, especially the Ministry of Culture and Communication. Without their financial help, it would have been impossible to bring together so many speakers, and to have interpreters at our disposal.

What is the Future for Smaller Societies at a Time of Globalization?

Fernand Harvey[*]

Every society on the planet is facing a tremendous challenge in dealing with the future of culture. Pessimistic and optimistic views conflict with one another as researchers try to see what type of culture will emerge in the twenty-first century. Are we living in a new technological and economic context which will favour more than ever the expression of cultural diversity and difference? Or are we caught in a process of cultural homogenization generated by transnational cultural industries, which marginalize the diverse local or national cultures born out of a different tradition, history and geography? This question is not new; one can trace its beginnings to the philosophical debates of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, where the opposing forces were those preaching on the one hand for a universalist conception of culture derived from the Enlightment and embraced by the French Revolution, and on the other for a territorialized conception of culture, promoted by German philosophers such as Herder, and taken over by the romantic movement, as a reaction against the disembodied universalism of the Enlightment.

This opposition between universalist and particularist culture had essentially been a debate of ideas, even if it did have an impact on the asserting of nationalities in the nineteenth century. The Second Industrial Revolution, which was born at the end of the nineteenth century and which opened the door to mass

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production, using electricity as a new source of energy in place of steam, has had a major impact on the production and distribution of culture, making possible the cultural industries of the twentieth century, including mass culture. Cinema, recorded sound and radio were part of the avant-garde of a new culture with the ability to cross national borders and become internationalized. Fears of the Americanization of culture began to appear in various countries, from the 1930s on; they indicate the emergence of a new reality.

If the relationship between universality and the specificities of culture is not a new discourse, how does one explain the fact that this debate has become so widespread since the 1990s? What does the notion of cultural diversity, which is being widely debated here and elsewhere on the planet, mean? These questions raise others; it is important to begin a process of surveying a complex field that is full of contradictions. One has to be accurate if one intends to clarify things when talking about culture and its handing down in the context of the globalization of culture.

1. ABOUT THE CONCEPT OF CULTURE: SOME CLARIFICATIONS

Everyone knows that the term culture can be used to designate different aspects of reality, even if those aspects are intermingled. Since the end of the nineteenth century, anthropologists, following Tylor (1871), have led us to see culture as a set of ways of thinking, feeling and behaving, which make it possible for individuals and collectivities to define their relationship to the world. This perspective, which implies that there are a multitude of cultures, is marked with continuity and is closely linked to tradition or history. These traditional cultures can be described by the way people live. Modern societies have marginalized the place of tradition in favour of multiple interpretations of events, whose meaning is no longer derived from religious or cosmologic visions. According to Fernand Dumont (1994), our societies will henceforth interpret the world, its history and its future in the light of actual uncertainties. It is easy to understand, then, that culture, seen through an ambiguous relationship to the world, sets the problem of the identity of individuals, of communities and of societies, as being about one's relationship to others. In a world of deep changes, culture deals more than ever with the question of the meaning of existence. This inclusive definition of culture, which integrates the notion of identity, goes further than the notion of *ways of living* adopted by some sociologists and anthropologists in their study of contemporary material culture. That

inclusive definition was used to define culture in The White Paper on Cultural Development, released by the Québec government in 1978.

Another definition of culture refers to arts and letters. This was the definition used by the Massey-Lévesque Commission in its 1951 Report (Canada, 1951). For a long time literary and artistic practices were considered the domain of cultured elites or the bourgeoisie. But since the 1960s, cultural policies put forward by several states, including France, Canada and Québec, have favoured a democratic approach to culture, supported by vast programmes of infrastructure development such as museums, libraries and interpretive and cultural centres. Other factors of an economic or social nature have also favoured access to culture, such as the advent of mass consumption, the rise in years of schooling, and the professionalization of cultural trades. Along with the multiplication of the number of creators in arts and literature during the second half of the twentieth century, several surveys have demonstrated that the constellation of cultural consumption was widening (Donnat, 1994; Baillargeon, Ed., 1986; Québec, 1997). This concomitant evolution of creators and public, fostered by the cultural policies of various governments, have encouraged the consolidation of that side of culture referred to by some as institutional.

A third facet of culture is mass culture, born out of industrialization; it gave birth to a widely circulated press, popular books and magazines, cinema, a record industry, and radio and television. As suggested by its name, mass culture was meant from the outset to reach as many people as possible, [but opposite to popular culture coming from tradition and investigated by anthropologists, to be profit-earning, at least in liberal democracies,[1] even if tied with other objectives, like promoting cultural expression of individuals or asserting community or national identities, with the help of communication policies of States. As suggested by its name, mass culture was meant from the outset to reach as many people as possible. But unlike culture linked with tradition, even state-mandated mass culture that promotes individual expression, community or national identity must turn a profit, at least in liberal democracies. It is well known that Canada has a long tradition of intervention and control in a specific sector of mass culture: that of telecommunications.

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[1] During the twentieth century, totalitarian regimes of the left and the right have used the mass media for political propaganda.

2. THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL CONTEXT

Technological and economic changes since the 1990s have deeply upset the dynamics of the three types of culture mentioned above; this happened in such a way that they are more intermingled than ever. Generally speaking, culture has become a sort of locomotive of the new economy, which puts the emphasis on knowledge and creativity. Not only have new jobs in the cultural sector in Canada have increased more rapidly than the overall creation of jobs (Luffman, 2000), but there are new sectors, which were not regarded until recently as part of arts and letters and are now taken into account, sectors such as clothing, gastronomy, leisure, tourism, etc.

This widening of the cultural economy is directly linked to the question of cultural industries, a subject much discussed since the end of the 1970s, although this term was first used by the philosopher Theodor W. Adorno of the Frankfurt School in 1947 (Warnier, 1999; Lachance *et al.*, 1984). From that point of view, culture has become a *commodity* to be marketed. Initially restricted to mass culture, this economic approach to culture as having the market in mind has been stretched to include institutional culture. "Only if one is triumphant in the market place can one have access to cultural glory," writes French journalist Ignacio Ramonet, who sees in that a radically new phenomenon (quoted in Brunet, 2001). The success of stars of song and screen is measured primarily in terms of income generated for the industry rather than from the intrinsic quality of the content. This phenomenon is spreading through all the cultural domains. As a result, we find a three-tiered structure of distribution of cultural production: a so-called international production imbued with strategies brought into play by the American multinationals, and taken over by big European or Japanese consortiums; a national production, financially supported by the cultural policies of the state and by national media, even though there may only be a very small audience outside a country's borders – national feature films, for example; and, finally, regional cultural production, which does not succeed in catching the attention of the national media and cultural institutions of large metropolitan areas, but which endow with life local and regional communities, and are often used as a stepping stone for future national or international stars.

The marketing of culture has also an impact on cultural aspects of identity. Several cultural events coming out of tradition are taken over for leisure or tourism purposes. As an example, the record industry offers us collections of folkloric music from Africa, Latin America and Asia; Europeans can devote them-

selves to traditional activities in First Nations reserves of Canada; the historic heritage of ancient Egypt or of Florence is sold as a cultural product by tourist agencies. The rules of the liberal economy are invading culture at all levels. And, it is not because a cultural production is national rather than international that it makes it more "noble," or that it tends to escape the profit earning logic.

Two views are clashing as to the meaning of this globalization of culture, which seems to gain speed because of the new technologies of information and communication. The first, as well critical as pessimistic, sees in the merchandization which is invading different dimensions of culture an irreductible evolution towards a standardized and impoverished culture, dominated by the American cultural industries. What is not in this dominating stream is relegated to marginality. Opposite to it, optimists are considering that the idea of a unique and globalizing culture is utopia and derives from a wrong reading of the situation. For the latter, the oligopolies of the world of cultural industries are not all American; one can find the same phenomenon now in Europe and elsewhere in the world. Multiplying supply would contribute to favour cultural diversity and to render universal cultural expressions from motly origins. "The horizon, for generations to come, wrote Jean-Marie Messier (2001), chief executive of the European group Vivendi Universal, will not be the one of hyperdomination of the USA, nor the one of the French cultural exception, but that of accepted and respected difference of cultures." If that optimistic way of seeing cultural diversity may triumph, one can suspect it will not be because of the profit earning logic, but because of the implementation of world wide cultural policies, that are for now in their very infancy.

So we are here at the core of a fundamental stake, as far as the future of cultures of smaller societies in a context of globalization is concerned. Facing the uncertainties of the future and the lack of perspective as for those competing ideologies regarding the globalization of culture, one must be careful. Instead of trying to guess what the future will be, which is a way that has always given hazardous results, why not trying to invest the great cultural stakes smaller societies are facing; this would help orientating research and reflection in universities, in government agencies and in the civil society (Harvey, 2002).

3. SOME STAKES FOR THE FUTURE

Among the stakes which are emerging for the future, three are, in my opinion, much worth to pay atten-

tion to: how to situate handing down of culture vis-à-vis cultural innovation; the dialectics of local and global; and the role of cultural policies.

3.1 HANDING DOWN OF CULTURE AND CULTURAL INNOVATION

In societies preceeding modernity, tradition had a central role in the process of handing down of culture between generations. From the time when the relatively coherent visions of the world which were animating those cultures of tradition were shaken down by the philosophical current of modernity and the succeeding revolutions born of technology, industrialization and urbanization, innovation, associated with the ideology of progress, has become a substitute to tradition. But this did not mean a complete breaking off with the past. It is very difficult to conceive a national or a community culture without some anchoring in history and a given original location.

Even in modern societies where the idea of rupture with the past has been an incentive for creation, as it has been the case with the avant garde in arts, concern for handing down of culture has always been present in institutions. The main mediating channels for handing down have been up to now family, school, associations and a mottle of cultural institutions like museums and public libraries.

The faster and faster movement of change initiated by the new technologies of information and communication, and the requirements of the new economy have summoned those actors of handing down of culture. It is then paradoxical to see in our advanced industrial societies the place left to memory and history. On the one hand, historical information is more prolific than ever for the public at large, thanks to a multitude of popular publications, specialized television channels and information available on Internet or CDroms; without mentioning the existence of numerous interpretation centres meant for schoolchildren or tourists, or else popular festivals with commemoration purposes. On the other hand, new ideologies valorizing innovation as the driving force of culture have a propensity to consider irrelevant the recourse to the past. Henceforth, there is the danger that history becomes a mere cultural commodity, that the individuals build up an "à la carte" memory, following the surrounding fashions. Will the handing down of humanist, community or national culture generate the same interest in the new generations, those who have access to all the cultures of the world in the same time as well as to a global mass culture? In sum, how selection will be carried out? Using what guideline?

In any case, it is obvious that the traditional agents for handing down of culture are not alone any more. To the school and the family, we have to add up now medias, publicity and a good deal of groups of adherence that are to be found in urban milieus and the new society of networks. How the new generations are going to appropriate the cultural heritage of their society? One is bound to believe that the handing down of culture will not be suspended, but that is may take new paths which will not be only vertical, between generations, but also horizontal inside the generations themselves, through the combined support of new technologies of communication and information and of the intensification of intercultural exchanges between nationalities and States.

3.2 THE DIALECTICS OF LOCAL AND GLOBAL

If the process of handing down of culture has become problematical and uncertain, the territorial anchoring of culture is at stake. It has been amply talked about the network society initiated by the new technologies, and also about the recent trends to globalization of exchanges; they would accelerate the deterritorialization of culture and, henceforth, its delocation. This is a highly important question for the future of smaller societies and the upholding of their cultural autonomy.

It is possible that the phenomenon of globalization has been up to now exaggerated, as it is above all financial, and has a concern mainly with business milieus. Certain signs of uniformity attached to a minority of individuals travelling the world over and visiting the same airports and the same chains of hotels are not to be generalized. The cultural hinterland of the societies of the planet is far from showing a picture of uniformity, quite the contrary. The tourist who dares adventuring aside the beaten tracks can bear witness of it. Of course, it can be said that television, Internet and other means of communication can allow people of different parts of the world to be in touch with images and messages that may change their representations of the world and their ways of doing things. It should then be taken into account the fact that the Third World countries are not all having access to the same tools of communication as the wealthy countries. In 2000, 60 % of the users of Internet were living in North America and in Western Europe, and 24 % in Asia-Oceania (mainly Japan and Australia), compared to 6 % in Latin America, 6 % in Eastern Europe and 4 % in Africa and Middle East (Miège, 2001).

Whatever the way we look at it, it must be remembered that the relationship between globality and locality is not a one way process; the local, regional or national communities are not passive when facing

the informations and the cultural models coming from authorities of globalization, whether they are American or from somewhere else. There is such a thing as the phenomenon of reappropriating and reinterpreting the cultural world fluxes at the local, regional or national level, through the filter of diverse traditions and cultural diversities (Tomlinson, 1999).

This new ability of cultural reappropriation and autonomy, in the context of globalization, has not been yet very well examined by researchers, as it would need a multitude of field work, is a sign of hope for the future. It is obvious that this ability can be very different between societies and social surroundings. We can support that a distinction should be drawned between penurious societies which will resist the cultural globalization in taking refuge in marginality opposed to the main streams, and the wealthy societies which will have at their disposal certain tools to develop their ability for cultural creation and its spreading internationally. The case of English Canada and Québec, whose some of their new literary and artistic creations are benefiting a foreign diffusion, are examples of smaller societies with human, technical and financial resources needed for such a diffusion, in spite of the neighbourhood with the American giant.

3.3 THE ROLE OF CULTURAL POLICIES

During the second half of the twentieth century, cultural policies have had a growing importance in the Nation States. The relevance of those policies which, in the same time give privilege to the accessibility to general culture and to the protection of national productions, is now questioned under the rationality of freeing international trade, as culture has become also an industry, as the neoliberal supporters proclaim. It seems that it must be looked more closely at different dimensions of those policies, as they are not all directly linked to the actual economic dispute. I shall base my reflections on the cases of Canada and Québec. I am more familiar with them than with others.

In Canada, one can find a diversity of cultural policies, not only because of the size of this country, its history, its cultural diversity, but also because of the relationship between these policies and their relationships with the dimensions of culture mentioned above, that is identity culture, instituted culture and mass culture. The three levels of government have put up their cultural policies: the federal government, the provinces and municipalities. It is for the time being almost impossible of having an overall picture of those policies, as they are so numerous and often water tight; this gives and idea of the amplitude of the field they cover. A first reconnoitring of the field shows five main categories of cultural policies: 1. poli-

cies devoted to the promoting of identity, 2. policies supporting literary and artistic creation, 3. policies supporting cultural industries, 4. policies trying to have a control over telecommunications and 5. policies of cultural leisure activities. Can be integrated with cultural policies, policies of touristic development which have more and more a cultural flavour, and foreign policies which are henceforth including an angle of cultural diplomacy whose purpose is to make known abroad our cultural productions.

In Canada, policies related to the promoting of identity are referring to the anthropological and inclusive definition of culture; they are based on the valorization of identity patrimonies of the First Nations, of ethnocultural communities and of Francophone minorities, but above all those specific communities, the Canadian and Québec cultural policies are inspired by what we convene to call *nation building*.

On the other hand, policies supporting literary and artistic creation are looked at with less controversy and with, generally speaking, unanimity in their respective spheres, especially when there are increases in budgets, whatever the level of government. But those supportive policies are not directed only towards isolated artists such as painters, they can be also for groups or enterprises as in the case of cinema. This is why policies supporting creation and policies supporting cultural industries intermingle. This is the case of *Cirque du Soleil*, born out of a regrouping of artists originating from the Charlevoix region, east of Québec, which has become an international cultural enterprise; this is an example of how interdependent now can be a small scale sector of creation emanating from a locality and cultural industries.

Those policies devoted to supporting cinema, book, song, public television and other national cultural industries are the ones more in danger of being challenged in the future, under headings like free trade, "unfair competition," rather than the ones meant for theatrical companies playing on local or regional scenes. Can one see in the implicit support of the Canadian and Québec governments for the building up of large national multimedia groups a sort of replacement solution for the future? One can be doubtful about that as those private firms, in spite of their declarations on the diversity of cultural supply they intend to pursuit, are driven by the economic rationality, which is far from the search for meaning, which is the essential of a real cultural process. And this is without saying about the possibility that those firms, Canadian, French or else, could be taken over by foreign interests. That those firms are trying themselves to penetrate the American market and to find allies over there through acquisitions or mergers shows that their interests are not national any more.

When looking at the policies of telecommunications which are supposed to guaranty a minimal Canadian content, we can see they are less and less efficient and realistic, when technology of satellites and Internet makes it possible for consumers to overrun the control measures. We should look more closely to the channels used for the handing down of culture — be them traditional or new —, which may orientate the individual choices. But this would mean that the actual cultural policies — in particular those of the federal government — should climb down from their pedestal and examine what is going on at the ground level. This ground can be found at the local and regional levels, where are unfolded policies of public services touching cultural leisure activities and accessibility to culture. Public libraries, leisure centres, local cultural festivals and the other local cultural institutions, including schools, could supply revealing indications on what sorts of cultural activities can be found within the civil society, and on the future degree of cultural autonomy of communities in the new context of globalization. Canada is made, apart from the Québec specificity, of a mosaic of cultural regions that have been largely underestimated in favour of a disembodied *nation building*.

…

We are back to the initial question: what future for smaller cultures at the time of globalization? The fact for smaller societies to have lived under the shadow of powerful countries or empires is a constant phenomenon throughout history. We could pile up examples where smaller societies succeeded expressing their own vision of the world in reappropriating their history and in filtering or in amalgamating foreign influences. The original character of the present situation is not to cope with a powerful neighbour geographically well identified, as in the past (Vietnam and China, Bulgaria and Russia, Belgium and France, Canada and Québec and the United States of America), but to wrestle with economic forces which operate at the level of the world or of a continent, and whose activities may render common place cultural expression, as well identity s esthetics, to the sole profit of mass consumption culture, regardless the refined marketing techniques used for multiplying crenels or targeted publics. We have to distinguish between cultural diversity, the only way for maintaining humanism at the core of culture, and diversity of cultural supply, which is nothing else but a profit seeking strategy. If cultural diversity and its legitimacy are not taken into account in the process of globalization of exchanges, it may lead to an explosive situation, especially when considering the relationships between the West and the Third World.

The future is going to be a fearsome challenge for smaller cultures — this includes the whole of Canada

in spite its geographical dimension. They cannot rest only on cultural policies coming from the second half of the twentieth century. A time of reflection is necessary. This could benefit from the lights of research: the one interested in cultural practices of individuals and communities, also the one made of comparative analyses between regions of the same country or between smaller societies at different steps of economic and cultural development. This reflection should come out with the sketch of a new cultural democracy, world wide, in weaving, in a first row, networks of alliances between smaller cultures pursuing similar objectives. From that point of view, smaller cultures of wealthy countries have a duty helping the smaller cultures of poorer countries, taking into account the great civilizations which gave birth to each of them.

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Changing Contexts of Culture:
Implications for Canada

John Meisel[*]

The known European culture harbours within it another unknown culture made up of little nations with peculiar languages, such as the culture of the Poles, the Czechs, the Catalans and the Danes. People suppose that the little countries necessarily imitate the big ones, but that is an illusion. In fact they're quite different. A little guy's outlook is different from a big man's. The Europe made up of little countries is *another Europe* (Kundera, 1985).

The question of Canadian identity, so far as it affects the creative imagination, is not a "Canadian" question at all, but a regional question (Frye, 1971).

When, in a hundred years, scholars identify the principal legacies the previous century bequeathed to the present one, their list will inevitably include globalization, the information revolution, the decline of the state and the rise of transnational organizations, massive human migrations, the shift in the demographic equation of the West towards an aging population, the hegemony of marketeering and neo-liberal ideology, and genetic engineering. Of these seven factors causing the stunning revolutionary character of our times, only the last, genetic engineering, has so far had little impact on culture. Ideally, an exploration of "The Handing

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Down of Culture, Smaller Societies and Globalization" should, therefore, trace and map the effects on these themes of the first six variables just listed. This, alas, is much too lengthy and complex a task for a single paper.

Part of the complexity is caused by the ambivalence and multi-dimensionality surrounding each of the factors. In some eyes, one or another of them is seen as a welcome element; in others they are deemed to be undesirable. The dispassionate analyst must seek to steer a course somewhere between demonization and idolatry, between exaggerating their effects on culture and underestimating them.

Likewise, it is necessary to confront the obvious but all too frequently overlooked or neglected fact that culture is not homogeneous. The consequences of globalization, for instance — and the meaning of this term also requires refinement — are vastly different for television than for spinning ballads in a café, to the accompaniment of a balalaika. Furthermore, the decline of the national[1] state reduces the power of governments to foster a "national" culture but at the same time the accompanying *épanouissement* of the lower levels of government — provinces and municipalities — provides incentives for grass roots artistic initiatives. And the effects of the arrival of significant numbers of citizens whose language, religion, and traditions differ markedly from those of the already established population are, in general, likely to be more profound with respect to the performing arts — dance, song, opera, drama — than with computer generated art. Similarly, demographic change affects attendance at rock concerts differently than it touches the popularity of opera or chamber music.

Researchers seeking to trace how culture, and its transmission, are affected by socio-political and economic change thus cannot include the variable "culture" without disaggregating it into more restricted, more homogeneous, more clearly defined components. This requirement of precision nevertheless also poses problems. Cultural phenomena do share many common features and it is simply too cumbersome and time consuming to discriminate, every time statements are made about them, between the numerous subspecies. Common sense must reign, but very often the convenience of generalization invites us to overlook critical differences between individual cases. To avoid the blurring of reality which may follow, it is desirable that the researchers in the cultural domain tackle broad questions about the causes and consequences of cultural activity not only *sui generis* but also with reference to specific and well defined cultural sectors and cultural manifestation.

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[1] In the English sense.

It is also imperative to recognize that most of the new developments identified above have, as was already noted, multiple effects which are by no means always unidirectional, in the sense that they all enhance or impede the growth of cultural life: some do and others don't. Globalization, for instance, as Canadians know all too well, certainly exposes national and regional cultural life to world-wide, international influences. But it also provides a conduit for localized creative processes and artifacts enabling them to reach broader audiences. The *Cirque du Soleil*, for instance, which originated in Québec where it still has its headquarters, has become a world-wide phenomenon whose acts, performers and even locations now have only tenuous links to the company's Québec origins. Its current cosmopolitan complexion nevertheless cannot obliterate the Quebec influences — on the creators and the supporting infrastructure — when it was first established. These influences are still evident and important. The *Cirque's* presence on the world stage benefits Québec and Canada, as well as communities abroad, and would not have occurred had globalizing forces not enhanced it.

It should be noted, parenthetically, in this context, that globalization often means Americanization, at least in some sectors, like film and television. But although the wealth, size, and creative energy of the United States gives globalization its United States flavour, the process is universal. Thus artistic and literary life, including the critical domain of publishing in Belgium and parts of Switzerland, for instance, is affected by the cultural vigour of France, just as it is in other parts of Switzerland and Austria, by Germany (Université Libre de Bruxelles, 1984; de la Garde, 1993). In contemplating the effects of globalization on small countries, researchers must, consequently, distinguish between global developments evident world-wide, and those emanating from the presence of regional giants. It is the misfortune but also the luck of Canadians that the United States is both their nearest neighbour and the colossus dominating culture in the whole world.

One of the intriguing features of globalization is that while on the one hand it pulls our minds onto the world stage, and hence to some extent diminishes the influence of local factors, it also paradoxically enhances the latter. For one of the consequences of aggrandizement and of the resulting universalization is that they arouse a yearning for the neighbourhood, so to speak (Harmsworth, 2001). Universalism is accompanied by a lingering, powerful particularism, seeking to maintain a more intimate, warm and manageable context for individuals drawn into a cosmopolitan vortex.

A revealing metaphor expressing the ambivalence between a world-view and parochialism is to be found

in the simultaneous popularity in the United States of two kinds of publications: on the one hand, *USA Today* — a satellite-based daily newspaper colourfully emulating in print form the discontinuous short bites of television news — is widely popular and available virtually everywhere. It is the quintessential expression of universalism, at least within the American mind set. On the other hand, another type of publication is enjoying the patronage of an ever larger readership. It is the neighbourhood newspaper, usually distributed without cost to the recipient, which keeps its readers informed of bargains available in nearby shops and advertises lost and found articles. When your cat has disappeared, these intensely parochial publications are a lot more helpful than *CNN* or *USA Today*. Similarly, television programs or novels placed in the viewers' localities evoke particularly warm resonance, as compared with those placed in remote settings (Meisel, 1996b). Quebec's *téléroman* is a good example and, on the more restricted and fragmented English Canadian canvas, such locally focussed programs as the one-time hits *The King of Kensington* or *The Beachcombers*.

The appeal of the familiar, intimate and personal is powerful in the presence of mammoth, impersonal world-wide organizations and computer generated electronic discourse. All too often an individual seeking contact by telephone is repeatedly and ubiquitously exposed to interminable busy signals, pre-recorded answers and repeated hypocritical assertions that "your call is important to us." Hello Air Canada! Hello most other large organizations and firms! In the arts, the reaction to globalizing forces affecting culture is regional, local and other site-specific, with cultural activity drawing its inspiration from shared familiar experiences and appealing to audiences which share some sense of community. Compare the audiences for programs presented by American mega networks with those addicted to British dramas on PBS or the listeners in Canada to shows like the late *Morningside* and the present *This Morning, Cross Country Checkup* or *The Vinyl Café*.

It is significant that despite the undisputed processes of globalization enveloping Canadian arts, cultural activity is alive and well in both of our linguistic families. This is evidenced in reports by Statistics Canada (yearly), media coverage and personal experience. A straw in the wind blew my way recently when I was browsing in a book shop of a German airport. On a smallish table displaying popular paper backs were three translations of Canadian books, two by anglophone authors and one by a francophone. The presence of Canadian musicians on the international scene is likewise unprecedented and impressive. In the nineteen nineties there was some decline in activities and audiences but the principal cause was

the economic downturn of the period, and government cutbacks, not global competition. So, while globalization, and specifically the massive presence of US cultural products, particularly in popular culture, impede the full flowering of Canadian creative talent and its enjoyment by maximum audiences, it additionally provides incentives for Canadian artistic activity and, because of its remoteness and scale, also triggers the creation of a countervailing culture rooted in, and speaking to, Canadian reality (Statistics Canada, 2000; Meisel, 1996a).

Another important but neglected phenomenon grows out of developments accompanying the globalization process. Both in North America and in Europe, powers formerly possessed by national governments are being assumed not by an enveloping global hegemon but by *regional* bodies or *regional* arrangements. The North American Free Trade Agreement and the European Community are respectively reshaping the mental maps of North Americans and Europeans, admittedly in part deflecting them somewhat from a deep localized nationalism but at the same time plunging them into a universe which is anything but global. Explicitly in Europe, and implicitly in North America, a newly emerging, intervening space has insinuated itself between the old state and the new global environment. The world is being regionalized, as well as globalized. This means that although local links may attenuate, those going upward toward the broader world do not necessarily enter a global network but an intervening one, hovering somewhere between the local and the global.

This will inevitably present a new spatial and mental context for cultural life — a phenomenon already emerging in Europe. Although conditions in North America are different, there is nevertheless a likelihood that eventually the cohabitation on their continent of Americans, Mexicans and Canadians will lead towards a continental framework, separate from that shaped by globalization and even by the United States. The Hispanic and geographical reality wrought by NAFTA will modify the way culture is pursued in the three countries linked by new trade ties. The new supra-national but non-global sphere is essentially geographic. A related development is functional. Thus the International Network for Cultural Diversity, so vigorously championed by Sheila Copps as a corrective to the WTO, consists of geographically scattered states fearful of United States cultural domination.

Let us now turn to the notion of *Canadian* cultural activity and *Canadian* reality. How appropriate is it to employ so all-embracing a term? Northrop Frye, in a profound statement — so telling that I have used it as one of the epigraphs of this piece — noted that "... the question of Canadian identity, so far as it affects

the creative imagination, is not a 'Canadian' question at all, but a regional question" (Frye, 1971).

Some francophone Québec readers will have wondered about the relevance of these observations to the particular circumstances of Québec. There, it is widely recognized, a particular, well articulated and flourishing *Québec* culture is shared by a self-conscious cultural and political community. These sorts of conditions, it is usually assumed, do not hold in other parts of Canada. The assumption is flawed. New-foundlanders, British Columbians and readers from the other regions almost certainly had a similar reaction. For in many respects, and particularly that of culture, the Frye insight is perfectly apposite. Just as "culture" is too broad a term for many purposes, so is "Canada." Again, the importance of the geographical — and hence societal and mental — context varies from cultural area to cultural area. The verbal arts and those emanating from myths are more linked to the creator's communal roots than, say, abstract art or action painting, but even then only very few cultural activities are completely divorced from the creator's milieu. In a sense, therefore, artistic life in a small country like Canada takes place against *two* backdrops: one provided by the *global* scene; the other by the forces which have their inspiration in the *country* or *nation*. And within these contexts, the artists' specific circumstances — ethnicity, race, locality, preoccupations etc. — shape their *oeuvre*. And as I have just suggested, a third backdrop — the regional one — is also often present.

The respective causal force of global, regional, country-wide and specific contextual influences on an artist or work varies from case to case — in some instances one or another of these elements is insignificant, in others they may be of primordial importance.

Given this complex web of determinants, one may well ask whether it makes much sense to talk about *national* culture. Despite the foregoing observations, the answer is very much in the affirmative, just as it is legitimate to generalize about culture, so long as one remembers the nuances of these terms. Spatial and hence societal contexts *do* imprint certain shared characteristics on cultural life. It is, therefore not only appropriate but essential to speak of national or other cultures. It is in this context that I cite a wise and penetrating comment by a writer from a small nation who lives in a large one, Milan Kundera. In a classic and, regrettably little known paper, he says

> The known European culture harbours within it another unknown culture
> made up of little nations with peculiar languages, such as the culture of the

> Poles, the Czechs, the Catalans and the Danes. People suppose that the little countries necessarily imitate the big ones, but that is an illusion. In fact they're quite different. A little guy's outlook is different from a big man's. The Europe made up of little countries is another Europe (Kundera, 1985).

The differences to which Kundera refers relate to the self perception of the members of the groups involved: how they compare with neighbours, whether they are esteemed or disdained, their history, relations with others, the quality of their scientific and cultural achievements and so on. And these are, of course, in part influenced by how they are perceived by others (Taylor, 1992). He notes the importance of size, not so much because it bestows power but because for a number of reasons it imparts a sense of value and self-definition. His statement that "a little guy's outlook is different from a big man's" is, in the present context, pregnant with meaning.

By way of example, Kundera evokes Kafka, Hašek, not the goalie but the author of the *Good Soldier Schweik*, in which the famous anti-hero, though an underdog, mercilessly mocks the Austro-Hungarian empire, and Capek, Czechoslovakia's premier novelist, essayist and playwright, whose writings embodied a humanist, tolerant and liberal philosophy in a Europe hurtling towards totalitarianism (Hašek, 1973; Parrot, 1983; Matuska, 1964; Harkins, 1962).

> These writers, he says, are the best representatives of their country: what they have in common is the disabused outlook of this *other Europe* of little countries and minorities. They have always been the victims rather than the initiators of events: the Jewish minority (Kafka), surrounded by other people but isolated from them by its own solitude and anxiety; the Czech minority (Hašek), annexed to an Austrian Empire whose politics and wars were meaningless to it; the newly-born Czech state (Capek), also a minority, lost amid a Europe of big nations rushing towards the next catastrophe, and never being consulted (Kundera, 1985).

Intriguingly, Connor Cruise O'Brien (1962), in an entirely different context, makes a closely related point, emanating from his experience as the Irish representative at the United Nations. Comparing the positions taken by his delegation, and that of other small and weak states, he notes that UN delegates fall into two categories, the *groaners* — like his lot — and the *gloaters* — the representatives of the powerful states. The first group sees itself as a frequent victim and tends to be pessimistic. It does not expect much from promises made by the hegemonic states. Representatives of the latter are satisfied with the status quo and

tend to take a Panglossian, complacent view of the world. These positions do not just express attitudes or opinions but reflect deep personality traits bonded into the personae of the diplomats by their national experiences. They are, in short, national characteristics, characteristics which influence artistic creation and cultural life as much as diplomacy. Only a Czech (or a citizen of a small country with a similar history) could have created Švejk, just as only a Quebecker could have imagined Tit-Coq. Significantly, this invention of Gratien Gélinas triumphed in Canada — French and English — but failed on Broadway.

Imbedded in Jean Laponces' profuse writings on relations between language groups and diverse language speakers in mixed societies is a fascinating vignette highly apposite to the argument developed here. He observes that when two language groups of unequal size and strength coexist, "the minority-language speaker develops a specific language identity. The contact between dominant and dominated language is thus, often, a contact between two types of personalities... which have very different psychological outlooks..." (Laponce, 2001).

The same analysis suggests, although it does not explicitly argue, that globalization results not merely from the presence of powerful states and cultures, and their inter-relationships, but also from the status of various languages, and particularly English. Laponce reports that in the mid nineteen seventies, 60 per cent of the articles cited in the comprehensive and authoritative *Chemical Abstracts* were in English. By the mid nineties, that proportion had risen to over 80 per cent. The closest competing languages — Russian, Japanese and Chinese — are, respectively, in the five per cent range. He concludes that in the world to-day, "English is the language of chemistry" (*idem*, 2001). The situation in many other sciences is similar. The anglicization of so much scientific and academic literature reflects, in part, the dominance of American science, to be sure, but only in part. It is also nourished by the linguistic realities of the United Kingdom and most of the Commonwealth, and of the fact that researchers of many countries — in Scandinavia, for example — maximize their exposure by having recourse to the indisputably reigning *lingua franca*.

The issue of the extent to which small countries — in the realm of cultural creation, consumption and transmission — differ from large ones (and also how they differ from one another and why) is enormously important and badly neglected. It is too complex to be dealt with here, despite its relevance to the themes which have caused these papers to be assembled.

A very much related question concerns the place of Canada in this context. Are we a small, large or middle-sized country? We are all three, depending on the subject under discussion.

With respect to the arts, the number of potential creators and the size of their audiences is all important. In these terms, Canada is rather small, particularly when the linguistic divide of the country and the geographical dispersion of the people are kept in mind. And we are also dwarfed by our colossal neighbour, particularly in cultural domains where language is critical. In this sense, French culture in *Québec* is protected and enjoys a distinct advantage over English Canada. Comparative data on viewing American television drama provide an eloquent example. Although Quebeckers watch a great many American programs, they provide massive and loyal audiences for home-made television plays and films. On the English side, the creators of such domestic fare face daunting obstacles in reaching reasonably sized audiences, to large measure because American shows sweep the domestic product off the screens but also because there is no widespread interest in Canadian productions. These obstacles can, however, be overcome, as is evidenced by the currently very popular CBC television series *Canada: A People's History*.

English Canada is at last coming to realize that when it enjoys a comparable advantage, it manages to perform well. Thus English radio in Canada is quite outstanding, far superior to American programming. The explanation is largely structural: the presence north of the 48th parallel of the CRTC and particularly the CBC, has made all the difference. Government involvement has enabled the quality Canadian radio to surpass that attained by the much larger United States. There is a lesson in this for the theme of this conference and this volume: the reason radio has preserved its local appeal and has not succumbed to too much Americanization is technological and political. Radio waves, and particularly FM signals, can only travel relatively short distances and, although national networks exist, the reach of radio is limited. It is essentially a local medium — a characteristic it has retained despite the advent of satellite delivery. More important, however, Canada has, by political means, created institutions ensuring that radio served certain national goals. It is primarily *public* broadcasting that is Canadian and of very high quality. The private broadcasters have, for the most part, usually strenuously fought CRTC regulations when they assumed (often falsely as with their Pavlovian attacks on the FM policy requiring that 30 per cent of the records playlist must be Canadian) that to abide by them would diminish their revenue.

The persistent and stubborn opposition by the private broadcasters to exhortations and regulations in-

tended to increase Canadian content reminds us that the currently flourishing philosophy denigrating governments and extolling the virtues of so-called free markets has telling effects on cultural life. The marketeers reject regulations and public funding support for Canadian cultural creations, advocate the privatization of the CBC, TVO and Radio Québec, and favour unrestricted competition in the arts sector, as they do in all domains. This philosophy now dominates many seats of government, including Toronto, Edmonton and Vancouver, not to mention Washington. The implications are very serious for the arts, and life threatening for forms of cultural expression which, like opera, ballet or museums — cannot ever pay for themselves out of revenues. The reasons, particularly for a country like Canada, are well known and need not be reviewed here (Meisel, 1986; 1996a). Some aspects of the situation nevertheless are relevant to the problems confronted by small countries and communities and so touch our present discourse.

Creating works of art for small audiences necessarily often increases the cost of doing so, compared to catering to a large, mass market. This has two serious implications. One is that there is an incentive for artists to fashion works which are appealing, easy to understand and enjoy, and which conform to popular taste. By the same token, "difficult," complex, "deep" and seemingly obscure items are known to speak only to a few and hence present obstacles to creators which may be difficult or impossible to overcome. In large populations, those of New York, for instance, even groups with minority tastes may be numerous enough to provide a reasonable clientele for *recherché*, challenging products, but in smaller settings the critical mass required for this may be absent. Smaller states, and smaller communities, may therefore be deprived of incentives and opportunities to create for themselves works of art and experiences which are particularly desirable because of their high quality. They hence may have to import or borrow these, thus running the risk of ceding the ground in cultural leadership to outsiders.

But it is not only the *quality* of artistic creation, that is at stake. The very question emerges of whether it will be attempted at all. For as Canadian musicians, film makers, magazine publishers and many others know, US works, benefiting from the colossal size of the American economy, are made available at prices which the smaller Canadian market cannot match. Thus, a level playing field — a term much loved by American commercial and artistic imperialists — cannot be attained without state intervention. And it, as Canadian periodical publishers know better than anyone else, is becoming increasingly problematic, largely because of the ever greater interference in our domestic affairs by the World Trade Organization. This trend is abetted by the dominance of marketeering values which find any state involvement repugnant.

One of the consequences of the prevalence of anti-statist sentiments, of limitations on the capabilities of the state arising from lack of funds, and of the interference of transnational bodies, is the resort to partnerships. This increasingly common pattern involves the collaboration of both public *and* private sectors in supporting cultural and other activities. Partnerships of government agencies, private firms or institutions and of cultural organizations (or any two of these) inject funds and facilitate artistic creation. At the same time they can pose risks: long term financial planning is fraught with uncertainty; an inadequate amount of funds may be forthcoming; and the private sector may be willing to assist only projects which will be inoffensive. Thus the scale of an enterprise may be reduced, and the area of freedom it enjoys may be circumscribed. These potential liabilities are well known.

But it is worth noting that *benefits* also accrue from these mixed arrangements. One of them is that the diversification of financial support protects cultural organizations from having all their eggs in one basket. Sometimes there is safety in numbers. Furthermore, the new formulas invite a closer involvement of the cultural sector in its enveloping community. This is salutary for both parties because it encourages the arts to become more enterprising in reaching a larger public and to express themselves in accessible terms. At the same time, important economic and other organizations which were heretofore oblivious of the arts become more aware of, and involved in them. More important in the present context is that not only national and multinational firms are drawn into the cultural sector but also local enterprises and individuals. To finance themselves and mobilize needed volunteers, a great many arts organizations establish links to nearby firms who are consequently drawn into the cultural community. National organizations rely heavily for sponsorships on large corporations. In smaller, non-metropolitan areas these are not ignored, but greater reliance is of necessity placed on indigenous firms. Partnerships mobilize heretofore apathetic actors and assist a process through which cultural organizations sink roots more widely and deeply in neighbourhoods and nearby communities. This strengthens the community context of cultural life and to some extent mitigates against the universalizing forces of globalization. Further, partnerships offer an opportunity of great relevance to the role performed by a small country in a globalizing world. As attested to by coproductions in film and television, they encourage players from different jurisdictions to collaborate in common artistic enterprises and to cast their work into moulds acceptable to their compatriots as well as to those congenial to other nationalities.

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Like many western countries, Canada is being transformed dramatically by the globalization of world populations. Globalization in this sense refers to the striking increase in the degree to which the ethnic composition of many lands is becoming so much more *heterogeneous*. In Europe and America, at least, the faces one encounters almost everywhere represent a microcosm of many races and continents. Migration patterns have increased the ethnic diversity of most regions but particularly those of the largest cities and the metropolitan areas — the very places which provide the most fertile soil for cultural creation. As a consequence Canadian artistic life, which was once predominantly an extension of British and French traditions, has increasingly reflected the emancipation of the country from its colonial past and, more recently, the ethnic heterogeneity of its ever more cosmopolitan population. A comparison over time of the origin of winners of Canada Council Awards documents the growing participation and advent to prominence of creators of widely diverse ethnic and geographic origins.

Among the numerous growing pains associated with this process, none is more perplexing than the accommodation between the historically sanctioned traditional values of long established populations and the beliefs and styles of newcomers. When the latter come from distant lands, bearing diverse religious, social and cultural preferences, dissonance and even conflict are unavoidable. The central question usually concerns the status of the old "established" regime in the face of the sometimes quite widely diverging norms and behaviours of the immigrant societies. To what extent should the traditional patterns be discarded to make room for newer, more widely acceptable ones? Very practical problems emerge, such as the retention of Christian prayer in schools and public institutions, celebrations of traditional holidays — Holy days — by public and commercial bodies or, on the other hand, whether Sikhs are allowed to wear turbans while serving in the RCMP, or their ceremonial, religiously significant daggers when in court.

In the face of such issues two camps emerge: established citizens fearing that their familiar world is being torn asunder, and newcomers ill at ease because their cultures are not recognized as legitimate (Bissoondath, 1994; Bibby, 1990; Taylor, 1992). In Canada where traditions of civility are well established, a compromise emerges over time which is tolerable to both sides without satisfying either completely. But whatever the reactions of the groups involved, the result is a fundamental transformation of the host state. The arts now reflect the metamorphosis and many cultural institutions are learning to adjust to it. Museums and galleries, books by "non-mainstream" authors, programs of the granting councils, and broadcast-

ing programs illustrate the fact that the cultural community no longer consists principally of Canadians of French or British origin; it is now much more heterogeneous and steeped in traditions which reflect the emergent global village.

The new diversity affects globalization in at least two ways: By strengthening domestic cultural creativity, it provides something of a shield against globalization. Secondly, by leading to heterogeneous and cosmopolitan works, it facilitates communication between Canadian creators and their colleagues elsewhere in the world, without necessarily detracting from the indigenous quality of either. The more textured and more varied the cultural nature and experience of a country, the better it will likely fit into, and collaborate with, the newly emerging disparate and multifarious world.

These reflections make it unavoidable to confront one of the most difficult questions faced by students of culture: what is the relationship between it and a sense of national identity? Numerous entire colloquia and libraries of books have addressed this issue without resolving it. In this paper I can do little more than breathe its name. If there is one single overriding thread animating this paper, it is its emphasis on the immense complexity and richly layered nature of the principal terms of our discourse — culture, globalization, Canadian. We must add another equally ambiguous and labyrinthine notion: "national," as in "national identity."

There is, to begin with, the well known difference between French and English meanings of the same expression. The former has a distinct ethnic connotation, not always present in English. Secondly, the meaning of national identity in Québec and in the other provinces, or Canada as a whole, are not at all the same thing. The Québec population, at least its French element, constitutes a nation in a sense not matched elsewhere in Canada. This is not to say, as was noted above, that Newfoundlanders, British Columbians or other Canadians do not share a sense of identity linked to their province, region or country. But this sense of belonging and shared mental horizons is very different from Québec nationalism which, in its intensity, high focus and importance, is a classic form of nationalism, unknown in English Canada. This difference is reflected in the cultural policies pursued by Québec and the other jurisdictions in Canada. Québec attaches the greatest importance to this domain, pursues it with an imagination and vigour not equalled by the other provinces, and on a per capita basis spends a good deal more money on it. It does this because Québec governments, of whatever party complexion, value the arts more than do those in other provinces. They deem culture to be an important vehicle for the protection of the French

language and a champion of the political aspirations of Quebeckers. The vast majority of francophone Québec artists and media people are strong nationalists.

It is often assumed in Québec, and particularly by this group, that Canadians outside the province do not really share a sense nationality, that a Canadian identity, compared to Québec's, is negligible and hence of no consequence. By extension, a Canadian (or regional) culture is dismissed as being so anaemic, compared to that of Québec, as to be non-existent. A recent illustration is the statement by Diane Lemieux, almost as soon as she was appointed Québec's Minister of Culture, to the effect that there is no real culture in Ontario. This provoked howls of protest in Ontario media (Mackie and Séguin, 2001; Conlogue, 2001; Martin, 2001; Ibbitson, 2001). The brouhaha was partly caused by the fact that Mme Lemieux and the Ontario journalists attached different meanings to the words they used. But it also reflects the fairly common view in Québec that Canada does not have a national culture. Anyone who has been across this country with eyes and ears open knows that this kind of argument is just plain silly.

All Canadian jurisdictions now support culture, in part because it contributes substantially to the economy and is an increasingly important component of employment in the service sector. But for many other reasons as well. Québec and Ottawa are driven in this domain even more by the belief that culture contributes to a sense of identity, and to a sense of group cohesion. It is not by accident that one of the components of "competitive federalism" in Canada is the perennial rivalry between Québec City and Ottawa with respect to subventions offered respectively to the St.Jean Baptiste Day celebrations in Québec and to Canada Day festivities throughout the country. The federal government not only seeks to attract and retain the emotional attachment of all Canadians, French and English, but also to bolster Canadian culture vis-à-vis American competition. The Department of Canadian Heritage is now a major, reasonably well financed agency assisting and orchestrating an enormous variety of cultural activities in large part so as to enable small Canada to thrive in the arts next to *colossal* USA.

Cultural nationalists vigorously applaud this state of affairs; their opponents — continentalists, marketeers, and some provincial rightists — deplore it. Many of the latter group's arguments are flawed and need to be confronted. It is asserted, for instance, that in the era of cultural globalization we do not have much to lose, since most of Canadian culture is to all intents and purposes indistinguishable from that of the USA. In other words, is there anything worth defending, or is pan-Canadian culture merely a second rate replica of American culture? A prodigious number of studies and essays, kick started with reference

to literature, by Margaret Atwood's path breaking *Survival* (1972) and Northrop Frye's *The Bush Garden* (1971), and pursued in comparable works dealing with other fields, attest to the unique characteristics of the Canadian creative imagination, giving it its unmistakable "made in Canada" stamp. This massive critical literature provides academic backing to what every sensitive witness knows: although the differences are not huge, they exist and profoundly differentiate Canadian and American values, styles, and artistic expression.

One manifestation of the difference is Canada's desire whenever possible to contain American influences and prevent them from overwhelming us. Apart from extensive government initiatives, here are some grass roots examples: most of our principal cultural landmarks — the Stratford and Shaw festivals, or the Banff Centre are inspired either by British or indigenous models, not American ones. Among the imported conductors of our principal orchestras Swiss, British, Czech, Finnish persons are much more numerous than American ones. Our major film and television festivals in Montréal, Toronto and Banff differ substantially from similar happenings south of the US border. There is nothing comparable in America to our CBC/SRC and the NFB/ONF. These pairs of acronyms also attest to characteristically Canadian practice of relying in all our major pan Canadian cultural and other institutions on the coexistence of French and English-speaking personnel and of programs and practices encompassing the genius of the two founding linguistic families.

These observations bring us to the crunch — the idea I indirectly hinted at earlier: is it reasonable and useful to extend to North America the insight of Milan Kundera, that "the known European culture harbours within it another unknown culture made up of little nations"? Is there a North American culture which harbours within it the cultures of smaller folk — Quebeckers, other Canadians, pan-Canadians, Mexicans, Afro-Americans and now arrivals from the four corners of the world, settling down to become North Americans? And if so, what influence do these mini-cultures have on globalization?

The parallel between Europe and North America is clearly not perfect but it is nevertheless suggestive. Kundera notes that the Europe of smaller countries, precisely because they are small, has managed to escape or reject some of the follies to which the Europe of big guys had fallen heir. The Kafkas, Hašeks, and Capeks, although not often heeded, injected a humane dimension into European discourse which, though not triumphant, nevertheless provided a needed corrective. Is it reasonable to reject the possibil-

ity that the Atwoods, Robertson Davies, Ondaatjes and, yes, Fernand Dumonts — whether still alive or not — might, unnoticed, perform a similar function to-day?

You may think that I have strayed dangerously far from our subject. Not so. Small countries can only retain their integrity and persona — their voice counterbalancing that of the giants —if they develop and maintain their defining identity. This requires that they fashion a lively and vigorous cultural life growing out of their particular condition and circumstance. As I noted earlier, echoing Northrop Frye, much of the needed impetus and encouragement arises in response to local and regional inspiration. Thus, underpinning the potential contribution of the smaller communities in North America, modifying the engulfing globalization of the American imperium, is a cultural life, and hence values, at some remove from it (Meisel, 1974).

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Would the Real Journalists Please Stand Up![1]

Florian Sauvageau[*]

> *Media — and journalists have a central role in political life. In principle, they facilitate well informed citizens participating efficiently in the public affairs of the City. What types of journalist? What media? In what context? For what kind of democracy?*

It will be understood, when reading the title of this paper, "Would the real journalists please stand up!," that it is tongue in cheek. Of course, there is no genuine or ungenuine journalist, but this title is relevant to my point related to the difficulty of defining journalism and fixing the role of journalists in the political process. My 1986 version of the *Petit Robert* dictionary mentions that a journalist is a person who collaborates in the editing of a journal. My recent *Larousse* includes "audiovisual" as an almost legal definition, not unlike the one set up by the Fédération professionnelle des journalistes du Québec; a journalist is a "person whose main occupation, performed on a regular basis and paid for, is to perform journalistic activities in one or more of the written and audiovisual media." We have not moved very far with that. What is common, then to the editor of *La Presse* or the *Globe and Mail* and the chronicler of gastronomy in the same newspapers? What is com-

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mon to the reporter of news items on *Télévision Quatre Saisons*, or *City TV* in Toronto, and the financial chronicler of the *Report on Business* of the *Globe and Mail* or of *Les Affaires*? Nevertheless we say they are all journalists. In various ways, each is contributing to the democratic process.

Twenty years ago, in a study done for the Kent Commission on Daily Newspapers, Simon Langlois and I proposed a typology of journalists which distinguished among four "species" or groups: educators, invested with a "mission," reporters, analyst-surveyors; and seducers (Langlois and Sauvageau, 1982). Our survey dealt with journalists working in the print media in Québec. There were a greater number of educators at *Le Devoir*, the seducers were found in tabloids such as *Le Journal de Montréal* and *Le Journal de Québec*, or in the sports sections of all daily newspapers. Analyst-surveyors were numerous at *La Presse* and *Le Soleil*. The reporters, who prefer to confine themselves to repeating what their sources tell them, were found mostly in the regional press, where a direct and constant relationship between the journalist, his environment and his sources places a restriction on his ability to manoeuvre and his freedom; this confines him to the role as notary of current events.

The educator on the one hand, the seducer on the other. I used to tell my students that the journalist is a tightrope walker, balancing, on the one hand, the mission of public service and information assigned to him, concerned with democratic vitality and social responsibility, but, on the other hand, working for a firm whose objectives are more and more devoted to profits. The journalist is this tightrope walker, bound to his "civic" mission of providing information, but aware that he is part of a competing market, concerned with consumption, entertainment and leisure, all of which enlist takers more easily than public service content. In a world of exhibition and entertainment, where the best way of attracting the public is sought (by the so-called "economy of attention"), if the journalist does not succeed in being interesting, be it in the electronic or print media, he will be "zapped" rapidly for something else.

The journalist will be torn between two loyalties. He is under a formal contract with the medium that is his employer, but is bound by another contract, implicit and moral, which links him to a public that, according to journalistic ideals, he has an obligation to inform. How to reconcile that responsibility (some senior journalists speak of "vocation") and the status of an employee in an enterprise whose particular interests occasionally, if not often, do not coincide with public interest?[2] What is the influence of the en-

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[4] This question became acute in December 2001, when the group ConWest Global chose to impose to its most important daily newspapers of its Southam chain the publication once a week of the same editorial. Its executive reminded to the journalists of The Gazette their «duties» of employees, as that decision was disputed because of its consequence on the diversity of opinion and the democratic debate.

terprise on how journalism is practised? The journalist is also working in a particular milieu, in a society whose cultural traits and political environment are factors not to be neglected, and which contribute in their own way to define how journalism is practised.

1. JOURNALISTS, MEDIA, SOCIETY

It is interesting to go back to what Balzac had to say about journalism. In his *Monographie de la presse parisienne*, first published in 1843 and re-issued in 1991 by Arléa Publisher, he talks about how journalism is moulded by society: "The Press of London does not see the world in the same way that the Parisian one does: its approach is peculiar to England, which is rather selfish in every matter. This selfishness can be called patriotism, since patriotism is nothing other than the selfishness of that particular country. There is thus a huge difference between English journalists and French journalists. An Englishman is first English, then journalist. A Frenchman is first journalist, then French."

In Québec and in English Canada, language and culture can have opposite influences. According to what is often held, the first allegiance of Francophone journalists is to society. They are Quebeckers first, then journalists. The journalist in English speaking Canada is, on the contrary, a disinterested observer and the "objective reporter" that the North American tradition has set up as an ideal. A great many people think that a distinct journalism is practiced in Québec, much closer to the journalism of opinion found in Europe. It can be characterized, as Lysiane Gagnon put it in *La Presse* twenty years ago, by "the predominance of analysis as opposed to factual reports of events [and] the propensity to approach things from the angle of ideas rather than facts and individuals." The Royal Commission on Daily Newspapers (the Kent Commission) went so far as to assert in 1981 that the "French Canadian journalist, like the priest or the politician, has always been, willy nilly, invested with a certain nationalistic mission." Even in 1996, in the re-issue of his book *Politics and the Media in Canada*, Arthur Siegel said of the French press that it was maintaining an "intense political commitment."

This was true in the past, and is still true for a small number of journalists. However, in 1996, at the time David Pritchard and I did a survey of journalists in Canada, on what their motivations and perceptions of their role were, similarities between Anglophones and Francophones were more numerous than differ-

ences (Pritchard and Sauvageau, 1999). Our results contradicted certain generally accepted ideas; they show that journalists of the two linguistic groups share the same convictions and that their ways of approaching journalism are similar. Among other things, the accurate transmission of content (the dominating trait of journalism in North America) is seen as the most important quality of journalism. Influencing opinion or the political agenda are, for Francophone and for Anglophone journalists, at the bottom of the list of priorities of how journalism should be seen. The content of Francophone and Anglophone media is obviously different. But they bear witness to two distinct societies, one in isolation from the other. But the way journalists speak of them is the same.

On the other hand, this survey, the first pan-Canadian survey of a representative sample (550) of journalists in the two linguistic communities, covering all types of media and all regions of Canada, showed that there are two streams or two main ways of practicing journalism within the belief system that transcends the linguistic communities. In the private sector, especially in radio and television, a significant number of journalists were oriented toward commercial practice, seeking as many viewers and listeners as possible. Their main concern was entertaining the public. There is another type of journalism in Canada, which is more of the public service type and concerned with democratic life. The support for this view exemplified by words like "investigation," "analysis" and "a critical point of view," is found more frequently at Radio-Canada and the CBC, where journalists are in a way the incarnation of the "journalism of citizenship" (see table).

Table:

**Importance of 14 journalistic functions, according to whether one
is working for Radio-Canada/CBC or for the private audiovisual sector**

Function	R-C/CBC	Private Audiovisual
To report faithfully the statements of personalities interviewed	3,90 (90 %)	3,76 (83 %)
To investigate government activities and public institutions	3,89 (89 %)****	3,50 (61 %)
To analyze and interpret hard stakes	3,84 (86 %)****	3,35 (51 %)

To report information to the public rapidly	3,68 (74 %)*	3,84 (87 %)
To debate public policies while they are being considered	3,65 (74 %)****	3,23 (45 %)
To remain sceptical about the behaviour of public figures	3,33 (58 %)*	3,05 (41 %)
To remain sceptical about the behaviour of the business world	3,32 (58 %)**	2,99 (38 %)
To put the accent on news that may be of interest to larger audiences	3,00 (37 %)*	3,40 (56 %)
To extend the field of cultural concerns of the public	2,83 (33 %)*	2,53 (19 %)
To increase audience ratings	2,28 (10 %)****	3,03 (38 %)
To fill up free time, to entertain	2,11 (10 %)***	2,50 (18 %)
To influence public opinion	2,09 (10 %)	1,88 (6 %)
To influence the political agenda	1,80 (8 %)*	1,58 (2 %)
N (weighted)	94	153

Average answers by function, on a scale from 1 to 4, where 1 means "not important," 2 "somewhat important," 3 "fairly important," 4 "very important." The numbers in parentheses are the percentages of those who answered "very important" to each function. The number of asterisks indicates the statistical magnitude of the difference between the public and the private sectors.

John Meisel has demonstrated above the role of Radio-Canada in the handing down of culture in this country. Journalism can more easily fit into this more general picture. There are enormous differences between this "citizenship" approach by journalists in the public media — Radio-Canada and CBC, Anglophone and Francophone — and that of the private sector who give the impression of seeing themselves mainly from a market point of view. Far more than sociodemographic factors, such as belonging to a linguistic community, where one works, as well as the nature and objectives of the employer, shape the way journalism is practiced. In a study for the Kent Commission, Simon Langlois and I arrived at the same conclusions. The journalists of *Le Devoir* did not see themselves the same way those of *Le Journal de Montréal* did. Several other studies have shown the determining role of the news firm in defining the type of journalism close to their hearts.

David Pritchard and I have also compared our data with those of the last large survey of American journalists, published by David Weaver and C. G. Wilhoit in 1996. If we remove the journalists of CBC and Radio-Canada from our sample, there are only slight differences between how American and Canadian

journalists view their role and the way they practice it. What makes the difference between Canada and the United States is the Radio-Canada/CBC way of seeing journalism as a public service. But the continuing decline of public radio and television in the past decade speaks to the decline of that distinct type of journalism, and the increase in commercial journalism, making uniform the journalistic practices of both countries. This leads to globalization.

What is globalization in the world of media? It is not just the world wide prevalence of American cultural products. It is also the adoption almost everywhere in the world of the same model of communication, the same media model, the same journalistic model, the commercial model.

2. MEDIA, GLOBALIZATION AND DEMOCRACY

Great changes have transformed the Canadian media landscape during the last decade. The expansion of private firms and the concentration of media properties in fewer hands, in Canada as well as elsewhere, have occurred at the same time as the cutting back of media representing public service. Important groups in several countries have convinced their governments of the necessity of letting "national champions" grow, able to compete with AOL Time Warner and the rising conglomerates on the international scene. This, more often than not, has coincided with the diminution of the audiovisual public service, with extreme examples in cases such as New Zealand, where public television, under the conservative government, was sold off in 1999, to bring in dividends to the State.

In Canada, values of entertainment and exhibition have also invaded the field of journalism, especially television, with the enthusiastic participation of certain journalists, even at times at Radio-Canada, who share an idea of information which is more oriented towards satisfying public interest rather than serving the public interest as traditionally understood. Because of television's role as the main source of information for citizens, David Pritchard and I raise the following question in the conclusion to our book *Les journalistes canadiens, un portrait de fin de siècle*: "One of the most pertinent questions at present is to see how far entertainment journalism is undermining the understanding of public issues on the part of the televiewer and jeopardizing his ability to think critically."

Some fear more the control of ideas — "the single thought" — and the uniformity of information that could result from the concentration of media ownership. Members of the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) wondered about it in the spring of 2001, on the occasion of the renewal of the licenses of CTV and Global — which are now merged with daily newspapers — as to the standardization and the shrinking of the diversity of information that could be a consequence of the simultaneous ownership of newspapers and television networks. In the case of Can West Global, the problem was to see whether the CRTC would accept that it could simultaneously own newspapers and television stations in approximately ten of the major cities in this country. The same questions are raised about the acquisition of the TVA television network by Québécor, owner of the most important daily newspapers in Montréal and Québec in terms of circulation. This concern with diversity expressed by the regulatory agency is an irritant to larger conglomerates, especially in English Canada.[3]

Can we still seriously consider those conglomerates as agents of democratic pluralism? Can we still think, without laughing, that they have some role in the political process? Where is freedom of the press now? When reading the *National Post* — more biased than any Québec daily papers in recent decades — which is running a *pro domo* campaign and against the CRTC,[4] one is of the impression that a century has elapsed since the answer the Kent Commission raised to this question in 1981: "Freedom of the press is not a prerogative of the owners of media. It is the right of the public." This would mean that modern media should play the role of the forum, open to everyone in the Greek City. The "diversity of voices," according to Terence Corcoran (2001), one of the promoters of the free market and who writes a column in the *National Post*, has become the "buzz word" of the CRTC, which would corrupt the orientation of the Broadcasting Act. Thus Corcoran writes of that "anti-concept" (the diversity of voices) as a tool of political correctness which undermines "genuine freedom of speech." What type of freedom of "genuine" speech does Mr. Cororan desire, what type of freedom of the press? The freedom of expression of large size firms? Of BCA, Global and Québécor? Or freedom for everyone and a diversity of voices essential to the democratic debate? As Armand Mattelart put it (1997), the search for global culture and globalization embodied by conglomerates has created a lasting tension between "commercial freedom of expression" and "civic freedom of expression."

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[3] These "irritants" have since softened as the CRTC, which seems to accept concentration as inevitable, has renewed, with some token requirements, the licenses of CTV, regrouped with the *Globe and Mail* within Bell Globemedia, and those of Global (regrouped with the Southam newspapers within Can West Global, and it has authorized the transfer of ownership of Vidéotron (and TVA) to Québecor.

[4] The *National Post* is owned by the Can West Group, whose licenses for Global need to be renewed by the CRTC.

3. IS IT "APOCALYPSE NOW"?

Some are of the opinion, more often in the United States than anywhere else, that the evolution in recent years of the frantic pursuit of profit has led the media to relinquish their social responsibility and to find it, one must look elsewhere, to non profit foundations and universities, to find new ways of encouraging public discussion. The analysis of those alarmists is overgeneralized. In the media at large, this does not exist! As we have seen, journalism as such does not exist, but rather journalisms and diverse types of journalists. It is urgent that Canada reaffirm the importance of public broadcasting and the kind of distinct journalism that was done some years ago in Europe with the Amsterdam Protocole, annexed to the European Union Treaty, it tries to reconcile the construction of a unique market with the responsibility of radio and television, "directly tied to the democratic social and cultural needs of each society and to the necessity of maintaining pluralism in the media."

Others show no interest in professional journalism, which they see as predictable and mechanical; they pretend a "new type of journalism" is in the process of being created, in the new form of information and interactivity being developed on the Internet and at the same time a wider and more open democracy,. These "new media," so say those enthusiasts who more often than not place their faith only in technology, do not abide the norms of professional journalism, and are above all a counterweight to the dominant way of thinking. They create unusual ways for feeding the democratic debate. And they are not totally wrong, quite the contrary. But the lacunae of the Internet are numerous, not to mention the absence of verification of the information obtained there.

Others, including myself — reformists — are of the opinion that the media must change and become hospitable to readers and to groups that form "civil society." As Peter Newman wrote (2001): "They should all have their say. Unprofessional journalism it may be, but new voices with new ideas will be the result." The new chief editor of *La Presse*, André Pratte (2001), sees his role in an original way: "to enter into a dialogue with the readers and, with them, to take part in public debates." Is the journalism of public service going to be re-invented from Vancouver to Montréal in a new relationship with the public? Opinions and points of views are not the only things that are important. "News" per se is also essential for debating the affairs of the city. It is hard to see who other than journalists could serve that function, whether they are educators or seducers, holders of public service or of market, specialists or generalists, "writers of in-depth articles or of gossip," as Balzac wrote in the 19th century. All contribute, in their own ways, to meeting the increasingly complex needs of democracy.

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Entering the Tribal
and Acoustic World. Globally[1]

Michael S. Cross[*]

T his colloquium speaks of the "handing down of culture" and the place of smaller societies in an era of globalization. These are issues of crucial importance for English-speaking Canadians, even if much of Canadian public policy on culture has been either unsuccessful or misdirected. Fortunately, in forgotten corners, there are places where people exchange ideas and images, where newly reborn "tribes" chant and listen. It is now a truism that globalization has homogenized cultures and undermined the ability of nation states to maintain distinctive cultural identities. Just as surely, though, emerging media have helped to decentralize aspects of culture. National culture is absorbed into a commercialized global culture as international business concerns become hegemonic; yet the future may lie with those truly popular cultures which flourish, like weeds, at the edge of our highly cultivated global culture. As the Mexican scholar, Gustavo de Castillo Vera, commented, "… within a "solar system of cultures," those cultures that survive are those relegated to the periphery" (Gustavo de Castillo Vera, 1992: 267).

Certainly, the paradoxes are many. A recent address by the British historian Eric Hobsbawm alludes to some of them. "Market sovereignty is not a complement to liberal democracy"; he contends, "it is an

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[1] An earlier version of this paper can be found on the web site of Heritage Canada.

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alternative to it. Indeed, it is an alternative to any kind of politics, as it denies the need for *political* decisions, which are precisely the decisions about common or group interests as distinct from the sum of choices, rational or otherwise, of individuals pursuing private preferences." Yet, he points out, the media — the true sceptres of market sovereignty — mitigate the force of the market. In pursuit of their own financial choices, the media amplify public opinion, allow public discontent to wash over politicians (Hobsbawm, 2001).

South Africans struggled for decades to throw off a suffocating foreign rule. They now can enjoy a steady diet of foreign television programmes even on the public SABC, a broadcaster which one critic has described as "hypercommercialized" (Schechter, 2000). The new culture minister of Québec raised a storm by suggesting that Ontario did not have a distinctive culture in the same sense as Québec did. Angry Ontarians responded by pointing to the cultural riches of Toronto, such as the long-run musicals imported from Britain and the United States and the art treasures purchased from Europe.

Marshall McLuhan, the Canadian communications philosopher, proclaimed in 1956 that electronic media were creating an environment in which everyone could access information, and each other, simultaneously. The world was now replicating the experience of a village where everyone knew of every development. "With the return of simultaneity we enter the tribal and acoustic world once more. Globally" (McLuhan, 1964). It is an insight of central importance, but we can no longer afford to contemplate the changes wrought by technology with the same lofty detachment as McLuhan. The results of the processes are more ambiguous than he imagined. "Global" is a term which has been appropriated to justify and glorify the market sovereignty that so troubles Eric Hobsbawm. The acoustic world intersects with a new genre of visual/literary/acoustic environment on the Internet. There is a global village, most evident in the interconnected millions using chat programmes on their computers. Yet the tribes in our simultaneous environment are often at war with each other. We seem to have carried the worst aspects of the mechanical age with us into the electronic, acoustic age.

English-Canadians find themselves at all of the crossroads at once. An earlier form of market sovereignty, or perhaps economic colonialism, tied Canada closely into the economy of the United States. Canadian industry has had levels of foreign ownership which are greater than those in any other developed country. The cultural sovereignty of the United States has been even more pronounced; more than 85 percent of sound recordings in the English-Canadian domestic market, 95 to 97 percent of film earnings and 75 to

80 percent of retail book sales are foreign, mostly American (Industry Canada, 1997; Thompson, 1992). Yet Canadians are also at the forefront of the new technologies of communication. They were the first people to embrace cable television distribution, they use the Internet more than anyone else except the Danes, they have adopted on-line merchandising and file swapping, legal and illegal. English-Canadians pioneered the exploration of new media, first Harold Adams Innis, then Marshall McLuhan and more recently Arthur Kroker and Derrick de Kerckhove (Innis, 1951; McLuhan, 1964; Kroker, 1984; de Kerckhove, 1995).

English-Canadians also illustrate the complexity of this McLuhanesque world. Electronic communications have created a "global village" in the sense that they have changed the scale of interrelationships. Simultaneous, world-wide communications throw very different sorts of communities together, just as people are forced together in a village. McLuhan pointed out that, in the contemporary world, the term "mass media" no longer refers, as in the traditional definition, to the size of the audience. Rather, it suggests the simultaneous involvement of people with the media (McLuhan, 1964; de Kerckhove, 1995). The global village concept does not imply a bucolic simplicity, however, nor does it require a single cultural template. The Canadian experience is that electronic media contribute to complexity and to cultural conflicts. Globalization generates localism, and it sets great cultures against small ones.

The existence of a global bourgeois culture is apparent. Perhaps there has always been such a culture; Haydn and Mozart fit into cultural circles in England and France as comfortably as in Austria. Canada has experienced the reality of at least transnational cultures for generations. A famous example is that of the Cuban missile crisis in the autumn of 1962. The Canadian government was uncertain about American actions and declined to mobilize Canadian forces in support of the American blockade of Cuba. Canadian air force commanders put their planes on alert anyway, in defiance of their own government. Their prime loyalty was to their professional class of the military, a class which cut across national borders. The military is only one case of the global classes which have proliferated, alignments which often have only the loosest attachment to any particular national interest. Global business people, the Catholic Church hierarchy, popular entertainers, these are examples of transnational interest groups. David Welch, a historian at the University of Kent in England, sums it up well: "'Empowered' classes now transcend national boundaries. Middle class groups in Europe, for example, have more in common than different classes/groups within one nation state. They consume the same products and they hold the same aspirations" (Welch, 2000).

Globalization has done more than provide common economic interests to dominant groups, however. There is evidence that the electronic media have contributed to a convergence of values, at least among certain social orders. The *World Values Survey*, which has been assessing social attitudes in many countries since the 1970's, has found a convergence towards what are called "post-materialist" values of autonomy, cosmopolitanism, and lack of deference for authority. This convergence has been explained largely in terms of economic security, yet it is surely true that media have been the agents of dissemination of these values (Nevitte, Basanez and Inglehart, 1992; McChesney, 2001; Gruneau and Whitson, 1993). The connection of convergent values to affluence and to media access makes it a phenomenon particular to certain classes in national societies. Global citizenship belongs to those who have global information. Coverage of foreign news has declined substantially, at least in the press of the English-speaking world. In the United States, for example, the proportion of foreign news in newspapers fell from 20 percent to 2 percent over the last two decades, and the proportion of foreign news on television tumbled from 45 percent to 13 percent. Yet there is a niche or "demassified" audience which receives far more, and far better, foreign news. Philip M. Taylor points out that the best foreign coverage in Britain is provided by the *Financial Times*, a paper directed at an affluent, minority readership. "… technology allows those niche audiences to be less dependent on the profession of news journalism to mediate the doings of the few to the many — because the few can communicate to the few who can afford it" (Taylor, 2000; Hargreaves, 2000).

Inherent in this global bourgeois culture is the reality that great societies hand down shop-worn versions of their cultural forms to small societies. That does not imply that globalization requires the elimination of national cultures. It is both more complicated, and more disquieting than that. David Rothkopf, a former official in the United States Department of Commerce and now an academic and consultant, makes the case best. He notes that elites in many countries have already recognized "that to compete in the global marketplace they must conform to the culture of that marketplace." We have created, he argues, a multicultural international society.

> Successful multicultural societies … discern those aspects of culture that do not threaten union, stability, or prosperity (such as food, holidays, rituals, and music) and allow them to flourish. But they counteract or eradicate the more subversive elements of culture (exclusionary aspects of religion, language, and political/ideological beliefs). … The greater public good warrants eliminating those cultural characteristics that promote conflict or prevent harmony, even as

less-divisive, more personally observed cultural distinctions are celebrated and preserved (Rothkopf, 1997).

Canadian cultural policy has embodied an inchoate sense of the issues. For eighty years, successive Canadian governments have sought to protect and promote domestic media, on the understanding that purely market-driven media would undermine Canadian culture and Canadian values (Foster, 1982; Thompson, 1992; Vipond, 1982; CRTC, 1997). Much of that effort was in vain. Attempts to protect Canadian magazines in the 1920's and again in the 1970's had little effect on the dominance of American publications in the Canadian market. Canadian content regulations for television were first introduced in 1960, compelling stations to meet a minimum standard of 55 percent Canadian programming, a figure later raised to 60 percent. Despite the regulations, English-Canadians continued to watch American shows on cable television. More, the regulations, and indeed Canadian television broadcasting itself, were introduced long after the patterns of television production had been established in the United States. The style of television, from its pace to its advertisements, was American, whether programs were produced by Americans or Canadians.

Only the regulations for music had some force. The Canadian Radio-Television Commission, an agency of the federal government, in 1970 introduced a requirement of 30 percent Canadian content in the music played on radio, "Canadian content" meaning that at least two of the aspects of the music — the composer, the lyricist, the performer, or the performance/recording venue — had to be Canadian. The regulations helped to create a modest recording industry in Canada and to nourish some pop stars. The *Tragically Hip* are the most striking recent example of a phenomenon that was hardly dreamed of before 1970. This band from Kingston, Ontario, which frequently uses Canadian places and themes in its songs, has enjoyed an extended and profitable career, without performing the once inevitable trek to the greener pastures of the United States.

Perhaps more important are the regional musicians who have been able to find an audience, in part because of the broadcast rules. Eastern Canada has felt an explosion of homegrown musical talent. Some of it was pop music, enough to win Halifax, Nova Scotia, the nickname of "Seattle East," a rival to Seattle's famed "grunge scene." Much more was rooted in the region's real, or imagined, Celtic past[2] (McKay,

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[2] Some historians have argued that a Celtic myth was consciously created by governments and elites to sell the region to tourists, and that the myth has stunted the development of a modern society. That argument is not supported in this paper.

1994). The success of East Coast music reminds us of several important issues in the age of electronic media. McLuhan had little to say about music, although he did love bagpipes and might then approve of East Coast Celtishness. Yet music suggests the validity of his contentions about the decentralizing tendencies of electronic media, tendencies which pull in quite different directions from the more apparent globalizing tendencies. The music experience also shows how modern media can operate horizontally rather than vertically.

Paolo Mancini, a professor of communications at Perugia, explains the diversity and vitality of Italian public life, and the high level of participation in public affairs, as partly due to the fact that the media has encouraged horizontal communication. The media have permitted citizens to debate with each other, to exchange ideas with each other, rather than simply operating as conduits between decision-makers and the public, as most Western models of the media contend (Mancini, 2000). It would be utopian to believe that most Canadian media have played or will play such a role. The press has been highly concentrated in Canada, and interlocking media giants such as Rogers Communications have asserted control over both print and broadcast media.[3] Government policy and regulatory practice have encouraged centralization of television services in networks that provide minimal regional or local programming. Yet music seems to be an exception.

Non-Canadian sources provided nearly 90 percent of new popular music releases in Canada in 1995-1996 (Statistics Canada). That statistic disguises another reality, however. Lively and growing regional musical scenes have emerged. Small-scale recording studios have allowed musicians and public to communicate, at least within the regional boundaries. Local radio stations have often aided in publicizing indigenous musicians. All this happens despite, rather than because, of national policies. English-Canada's public broadcaster, the CBC, has sharply reduced local programming and become as centralized as private broadcasters. Yet more and more regionally-based musicians are able to be heard and to earn a living as artists.

National cultural values may be no less coercive than transnational ones. The struggle of the Zapatistas in Mexico illustrates this reality. So, too, does the continuing disagreement in Canada between Québec and Ottawa over communications policy. The Liberal government of Québec issued a position paper on communications policy in November 1973 which pointed out that "To confuse national unity and national uniformity by centralizing the decision-making powers inevitably creates a factor of discussion and rupture." The Secretary of State in the federal Liberal government, Gérard Pelletier, responded that assertions

of provincial authority in communications would "undermine the cohesion of the Canadian state, which … was born from communications in the era of the railways…" (Foster, 1982). Pelletier's comment reflects the preoccupation with communications that springs from proximity to the United States, and from a sense that Canada is, in the words of two media scholars from Colorado, "a nation which has a technical, but little social, being" (Tracey and Redal, 1995). This preoccupation has been a valid one, but in so far as it has produced policies which discourage regional cultures, it has also been self-defeating.

There is a vast literature on globalization and culture, full of discussions of "cultural imperialism," "core and periphery" models, and liberal internationalism (Lerner, 1963; Panitch and Leys, 1999, Eds.; Hamelink, 1996; Appadurai, 1990). A more useful model than these, from an English-Canadian perspective, may be that of cultural mediation. The mediation model complements McLuhan's insights about the interactive nature of electronic media, which require intense sensory involvement in the user. Mediation is a "'structuring process' that arranges and rearranges both the interaction of the members of the audience with the media and their creation of the meaning of that interaction." There is mediation at the individual level, influenced by the person's sex, age and immediate cultural environment. There is "situational" mediation, for example the politics of the family which comes into play because a television set is watched at home. There is "institutional" mediation, which is the influence on the audience of membership in social institutions such as the family, neighbourhood or nation. And, finally, there is "technological" mediation, in the McLuhanesque sense. Television as an electronic medium, for example, interacts with the audience in very different ways than "hot" media such as books. All of these mediating factors are in play at the same time, often making it difficult to sort out the role of any particular factor (Orozco-Gomes, 1995; McLuhan, 1995).

Canadian public policy has privileged a few of the forms of mediation. It has fostered state mediated cultural reception, and has, in the vein of David Rothkopf, encouraged certain unthreatening cultural institutions under the mantle of multiculturalism. However, individuals and groups read communications in their own ways and sometimes can use the electronic media for purposes less conventional. Music, it has been suggested, has helped some Canadians to communicate with others within their regions, to find a sense of cultural identity separate from that of global bourgeois culture. There are other examples. African-Americans have been subjected to wave after wave of cultural appropriation. From the cakewalk

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[3] Rogers is Canada's largest cable television provider. It controls AT&T Canada Wireless, a cell phone network. It owns 30 radio stations, 4 television services, 11 consumer magazines and 40 business magazines.

and ragtime, to jump blues and rhythm and blues, to hip hop and rap, their popular musical forms have been adopted and reshaped by European-Americans. Yet new forms have always emerged to express cultural needs. Even more telling, African-Americans have been able to employ their music for their own purposes, even while it was being appropriated by the mainstream society. Chuck D, of the controversial group Public Enemy, described rap as the "CNN of black people." It has continued to fill such a role, even though white suburbanites purchase most rap. It has done so because the attitude and context of the music is crucially important, as it is in all cultural exchanges. A person who shares the very specific sense of place and time that informs much rap music, will understand it in a different way than someone who does not (Best and Kellner, 1999; Fernando Jr., 1994; Kleinhans, 1994). Music, whether rap or soul or punk, is at best a partly realized expression of difference or politics, of course — even in an acoustic world. It can, all the same, communicate the most important of messages; as Greil Marcus said of punk, "the music made a promise that things did not have to be as they seemed, and some brave people set out to keep that promise for themselves" (Marcus, 1993).

None of this underestimates the difficulty of maintaining alternatives in the face of economic globalization. The very economic motivations of the great culture offer hope, in a perverse way, however. Erich Fromm, the theorist who did so much to aid our understanding of technological alienation, pointed out in 1968 that the greed of the media, their need for an audience, led them to disseminate dissenting ideas, so long as someone would pay to receive those ideas (Fromm, 1968). The commercial success of a revolutionary music group such as Rage Against the Machine confirms Fromm's insight. So does *nortec* music, in a rather different way. This new Mexican form, a blend of techno dance music with traditional northern Mexican styles, emerged because of technological and economic impulses. San Diego, California, radio stations erected transmitters in Mexico to evade American government regulations. Musicians in Tijuana, Mexico, were introduced to a variety of electronic music forms from these transmitters. They began to shape their own version, aided by another modern technology. CD "burners" permitted them to create their own recordings very cheaply, without having to submit to record company dictation. The commercial motivations of American radio stations combined with American-Japanese recording technology to encourage the emergence of a regional style of music (Strauss, 2001).

The Mexican example is instructive in many ways. The Zapatista rebellion in the province of Chiapas has emphasized the need to respect cultural difference. The rebellion has drawn the support of many

different groups, including American musicians. Subcommandante Marcos, the spokesperson for the Zapatistas, appeared on a roundtable in October 1999 with, among others, Zach de la Rocha, the vocalist of Rage Against the Machine. Marcos explained the revolution:

> There are many groups … who have also made a weapon of resistance, and they are using it. And … there are indigenous, there are workers, there are homosexuals, there are lesbians, there are students, there are young people. Above all there are young people, men and women, who name their own identities: "punk," "ska," "goth," "metal," "trasher," "rapper," "hip-hopper," and "etceteras." If we look at what they have in common, we will see they have nothing in common, that they are all "different." They are "others." And that is exactly what we have in common, that we are "other," and "different." Not only that, we also have in common that we are fighting in order to continue being "other" and "different," and that is what we are resisting for. And we are "other," and "different," to the powerful, or we are not like what they want us to be, but rather just as we are (EZLN, 1999).

The Zapatistas have another message. They, and their supporters abroad, have employed electronic media with great sophistication. The rebels first reached the news media of the world by fax. Then the Internet came into play. Groups across the continent had sprung up to oppose the North American free trade agreement, communicating with each other by Internet. The Zapatistas were able to connect with this network as well as an existent network — or, as they referred to it, a "hammock" — of indigenous groups (Cleaver, 1994).

The use of the new media to coordinate protest was confirmed in the most dramatic terms at the Seattle demonstrations against the World Trade Organization in December 1999. The Canadian Intelligence Service, the national security force, has expressed its concern over the ease with which the Internet and cellular phones permitted a large number of disparate groups to harmonize their efforts. Indeed, CSIS points out, "The Internet has breathed new life into the anarchist philosophy, permitting communication and coordination without the need for a central source of command and facilitating coordinated actions with minimal resources and bureaucracy" (Canadian Security Intelligence Service, 2000). Canadians have played an important part in these activities and, as this is written, similar preparations are underway to confront trade negotiators in Québec city.[4]

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[4] CBC-Radio, Tadrario, 2001.

This is of broader significance than political protest. The Internet brings us close to McLuhan's contention that, with the simultaneous nature of electricity and its extension of our senses, "Men are suddenly nomadic gatherers of knowledge, nomadic as never before, free from fragmentary specialism as never before — but also involved in the total social process as never before…" (McLuhan, 1964). Commonplaces about net research and telecommuting are small parts of the emerging reality. Internet chat and e-mail are new forms of interaction, ones closer to the acoustic than to the literary. People use them, at least for personal communication, as they use speech. Short forms, symbols, uncompleted thoughts, the Internet correspondence requires the recipient or participant to fill in the gaps, to be involved, in the same way that speech conversation does. This is unlike literary forms which strive for completeness, rather than cooperative involvement (Gleick, 1999).[5]

New interactive media have usually been discussed in terms of their potential for global communication. Yet clearly they have local significance, as instruments for communicating regional and community concerns, at the same time as they open the world at large. This is consistent with the different layers of mediation that operate in our reception of media. The capacity to download music, for example, permits people to sample music from many cultures. It also has the potential to enrich their own cultures. Cheaper creation and distribution of music could allow local artists, whose work is uneconomic in the traditional music business, to find an audience, and an income (Dolsma, 2000).

The Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission has chosen not to attempt to regulate the Internet. This is presumably because of the obvious technical difficulties in doing so, rather than for considered reasons of policy. Given our experience with previous attempts at national regulation, this is sensible. But it is not enough. The CRTC could do much to advance local and regional cultures by encouraging government to invest in broadband infrastructure. If every home had cheap, rapid access to the Internet, Canada could begin to test the potential of electronic media for cultural enhancement. Then Marshall McLuhan would be, at last, a prophet honoured in his own country.

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[5] Sun Microsystems carried out a study in 1997 which found that people do not read on the Internet in a literary fashion, either. They scan and sample, again in a fashion closer to speech.

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Cyberculture, Québec Identity and Globalization

Serge Proulx[*]

As a further step following on a friendly request from my colleague Florian Sauvageau, who set up a series of seminars on the theme of *American cultural influence*, I have tried to reflect on the difficult question of whether there is a form of "Americanicity" built into the design of certain technical devices, parts of what are now called "technologies of information and communication" (TIC) (Chambat, 1994). I would like to return to the subject here (Proulx, 1999). I should mention from start that I have built up my definition of "Americanicity," by taking inspiration from what, by analogy, Barthes once called "Italianicity," in his famous analysis of an advertisement for Panzani pasta (Barthes, 1964). Barthes placed the emphasis of the image, on the presence of a connotative system, whose meaning was the "putting together of tomato, green pepper and the tricoloured tint (yellow, green, red) of the poster," and what was meant was "Italy, or rather Italianicity." According to Barthes, the knowledge called up by that sign was typically "French," as it was based on the knowledge of certain touristic stereotypes about Italy. For me, the expression "Americanicity" also calls up a system of connotations which embody a style, ways of doing, choices for producing rhythms, etc., which are usually attributed, willy-nilly, to the people of the United States of America. My question can be put that way: are the technologies of communication that we make so much use of these days, influencing our cultural representations over the strict content they carry? In other words, is the very design of tech-

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nical devices found on the market of mediated communication also carrying a configuration of possible uses that could be connected to a connotation system which might be called "American" — in the same sense as cultural products spread the world over, such as McDonalds or Coca Cola, are considered to be typically American?

1. A CULTURAL MODEL BEING DEBILITATED BECAUSE OF THE BANALIZATION OF USES

In a paper I published in the book edited by Florian Sauvageau, I discussed many answers to the question of whether communication devices could generate, as technologies, their own culture, independent of the content they carry. I put forward the idea that those technologies could be defined as *intellectual technologies*, that is that they dictate a *way of thinking*, a framework opening only to specific conditions and possibilities of cognitive production. When I looked more closely at three communication devices of the second half of the twentieth century in America, I was in a position to describe the components I found as being a peculiar technological culture. The culture of writing was replaced by the culture of image, of simulation and interactivity. "Cyberculture" would constitute a place of synthesis for the diverse elements thrown into relief during the previous waves of change. Indeed, cyberculture is becoming the culture of the mediated image, put into action and movement as a result of a sophisticated apparatus of simulation and interactivity (Weissberg, 1985).

Let us come back to the question of Americanicity, whose subtle presence can be found in the design of various technical devices of communication. Each of these technologies was first developed in the United States. Each is impregnated with the respective sociocultural universe in which those who conceived them were immersed. One can think then that a certain form of Americanicity is present in the programming of the first devices that each innovation produced. When use of the devices gains some distance from the first stabilized techniques, their Americanicity tends to lose its importance. We can draw here an analogy with the automobile.[1] In 1949, the cars produced in the United States represented 90% of all the cars in the world. Forty years later, their share of the market was less than 50%. One could imagine that the culture of mobility which resulted from the advent of the automobile began as an expression of American values. But, as the car became commonplace throughout the world, the differentiated ap-

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[1] This analogy was suggested to me by Simon Langlois. I am grateful to him.

propriation of this novelty in various countries led to a culture of the automobile which, ultimately, had not much in common with the initial American context. By the 1970s, the Americans began abandoning some of their production techniques and adopting European technologies of production.

Let us now focus our remarks on the most recent innovation in communication: the interactive systems mediated by the computer and the "cyberculture" they generate (Jones, Ed., 1995; 1997). The Internet was initially an American invention which involved the armed forces, universities and then, more and more, the forces of the capitalist market. This "network of networks" is coloured by that birth, through the Anglo-American language which is heavily emphasized in the protocols of interconnection and in software languages. This is not said to minimize the efforts of other linguistic communities to assert themselves in the design of specific interfaces and protocols of the Internet. But the markup protocol is, no doubt, one of the most visible signs of the initial American predominance on the *web* — even taking into account the fact that some planners think the English language will not occupy more than one third of the territory on the information highway in 2002, because of the growing involvement of other countries in the network, such as China (Bélair, 1999). Or that, for example, in a chat on line between and among Francophones, it is still necessary to use English words like *list*, *act* or *display*.

But, as Internet use becomes more widespread throughout the world, the cultural models built around this technical invention are going to be plural, hybrid and heterogeneous; they will gradually distance themselves from their Anglo-Saxon culture of origin. Technical innovation is a process of dynamic creation: the outlines of the apparatus are constantly being modified. On the one hand, the balance of power goes up and down inside the sociotechnical networks where innovation occurs (Bijker and Law, Eds., 1992). On the other hand, the network takes on the influences of uses and reception, borrowing and re-invention (Perriault, 1989). We can easily anticipate that the wider the area of dissemination of innovations becomes, the easier it will be for the logic of these technical devices to differ significantly from their initial configurations.

2. QUÉBEC IDENTITY AND CULTURAL GLOBALIZATION

As for networks of interactive communication and *cyberculture*, I have tried to show that the status of the human subject participating in the process of cultural creation is doomed to be radically changed. The

foundations of the identity of the cultural receptor are shaken up. The plural identities of the human subject living in the interactive world will be perceived by him as unstable and floating (Baltz, 1984; Turkle, 1995). This question of the "floating identity" of the new communicating subject is worth some attention. Those *interactors* are working in new spaces of communication opened up by the convergence between the classic cultural industries and the new interactive systems, two domains largely under the influence of American knowhow.

It is necessary, it seems, to have second thoughts about the relationship between, on the one hand, what is called usually the *Québec identity* and, on the other hand, the ways of doing things imposed upon us by our southern neighbour through their design of software, and the technical configurations of systems and interfaces. One would be tempted here to refer to the metaphor of the *technological Trojan horse* — used by Yves Toussaint (1992) to describe the intrusion through new media, of public space into the private universe — to display clearly the fact that with an unconditional adoption of a technical device like the Internet, one is also importing its organization of communication and knowledge, and its values and ways of doing things. At the same time, it seems clear that the interactors are learning something new through use of the device — as much about the content they create or exchange as about it itself — and that the new knowledge isn't necessarily linked with the technology through which it appeared. This is the way one could state that the network is transforming itself constantly and dynamically; but still, the *technical configuration of the device* is, in a way, a kind of "programming" of the possibilities of its uses (Woolgar, 1991). In the last resort, it is not because this new technical culture is American in origin that there is a danger that it could undermine the identity of the communicating subject. It is more because this technique introduces a new relationship to the world. The Americanicity of its creators is secondary when seen as a source of influence, in comparison with the cognitively structuring force of interactive communication networks taken as an intellectual technology.

Interactive communication networks, in generating their own culture, create the question of a new technological culture that may change the identity foundations of Québec *Internet users*. We face here a tension between two knittings of contradictory cultural forces. On the one hand, their active participation in the construction of a "planetary cyberspace" (Benedikt, 1991) could make them forget that, being part of a society which is demographically small (such as Québec or Canada), it is necessarily vital, for individuals and the groups they belong to, to vigorously assert their *primary identity*. On the other hand, the question

of their basic identification is upset by the process of globalization and hybridization of cultures the world over. The openings set up by cyberculture could then allow for a renewed strengthening of Québec's identity through the multiplication of new intercultural dialogues with countries far away from the usual geopolitical axis of the circulation of information.

Everything is there to say that henceforth it would be necessary to introduce a third term for thinking about the Québec's identity and cyberculture — i.e., the process of cultural globalization. Here again, information and communication technologies play a major role in the carrying out of that process. Enrolling themselves against the trend to cultural homogenization (as criticised by Mattelart, 1999), the networks allow the instant and global circulation of numerous diverse bits of information, and heterogeneous cultural models, so that each individual can define himself these days as simultaneously being part of a set of cultures (Wallerstein, 1997; Proulx and Vitalis, Eds., 1999). This process of planetary diffusion of cultural models is provoking an explosion in the re-thinking of identity.

A thorough study of globalization's process would presuppose taking into account at least four levels of concern (individuals, nation-states, transnational systems of regulation, civilizations). Looking only at individuals, the process of cultural globalization affects the social construction of individual identities (Robertson, 1997). Globalization is opening up "affinity communities" of a new kind: for example, members of a group considered a minority in a given society can find it easier to identify themselves with similar groups all over the globe. Those minority groups will then develop a new transnational identity. Their situation of being in a minority is thus relativized.

We can see, on a planetary level, the expansion of a movement toward the deterritorialization of cultures (King, Ed., 1997) and the complexification of identity referents, which are becoming plural (Hall, 1997). Out of that, we could formulate the hypothesis that this process of globalization will provoke, at some future time, an important transformation of what Québécois will call the constitutive elements of the hard core of their primary identity. Since the Second World War, some layers of that core have slowly disappeared: among them, the agricultural component of French Canadian society disappeared with the coming of modernity, and then the religious component diminished with the coming of the Quiet Revolution. Today, the French language is at stake in the struggle to define the hard core of Québec's identity in a context where the demographic weight of Francophones is diminishing in favour of Allophones who often prefer to adopt English as the language of their daily life.

The expansion of *cyberculture* could weaken that identity element. Is there a danger to the linguistic security of Francophones when they devote themselves overwhelmingly to the games of "virtual floating identities" appropriate to cyberspace? If it exists, the risk of identity dilution would be found at the level of individual users of the network. Would the danger of identity destabilization of users (who are part of a territorial collectivity) increase with increased and intensive use of the network? Or, on the contrary, would this expansion of interactive planetary communication networks, to repeat an expression of Jocelyn Létourneau (1998), become a privileged place for "*in-thinking*" the question of Québec's identity — that is for defining a radical alternative to the customary history of our collective memory? The symbolic traffic of Internet users would constitute then, for an observer, a revelation of the boiling up of identity referents — as individuals and as a group — both in their plurality and their ambivalence. In an era of cultural globalization, it is time to have radical second thoughts about what would constitute the hard core of Québec's identity, multicultural and in constant transformation. Furthermore, should we retain the metaphor of "hard core" as a category to think about cultural identity? In such a context of radical reconsideration, the ways of doing and the values of "Americanicity" become one source of influence among many others in the process of the social construction of contemporary Québec's identity.

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Cyber Imperialism and the Marginalization of Canada's Indigenous Peoples[1]

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Are Canada's indigenous peoples, like the people of Canada, subject to an insidious "cyber imperialism" that threatens to alter and marginalize their cultures and even eradicate them within a generation? The process of marginalization appears inexorable. Perhaps in Canada the situation is more serious than it is the cyber third world, because the net has lulled most Canadians including Aboriginal peoples into seeing it only as a cornucopia of promise. Our governments have committed billions to constructing the superhighway and are only now beginning to be concerned about content. And they have clearly chosen not to leave Aboriginal communities "behind" if the Aboriginal site within Industry Canada's Canada's Digital Collections and Netera's initiatives are any indication. However, the issue is more complex than simply putting up aggressive content relating to the Aboriginal cultures or Canadian content.

It can be argued that a knowledge economy based largely on Canadian and Aboriginal cultural and multicultural traditions and practices is not possible, because the global nature of the internet is such that it precludes this as an option. Several observations drive this conclusion. First the dominant internet language is and will continue to be English, despite the adoption of the internet by strong "second tier" lan-

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[1] A first version of this paper can be found on the web site of Heritage Canada.

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guages. English is already so prevalent that the internet serves much like a lubricant accelerating its hold particularly on Aboriginal cultural industries. Second, the key stakeholders in the information economy are corporations, governments, and post secondary institutions all dominated by the power brokers and the middle classes not cultural non government organizations. While marginalized cultures can use the internet to reinforce community, to build protective barriers and to politicize their marginalization, they have for the most part remained on its economic and cultural periphery. Third, the state has shown little sustained interest to date in investing the kind of resources required to sustain a dynamic non-English or non-French Aboriginal cultural presence in all its complexity. Lastly, Aboriginal culture is perceived by Canadians to be best represented through the "cultural relic" lens of archives, libraries and museums. Through these lenses Euro Canadian triumphantism patronizingly praises the residue of native culture while lamenting the passing of its complexities.

David Theo Goldbert argues that in the post modern era colonialism continued to "segregate" and to "marginalize" through various constructs. For example,

> In the 1950s and 1960s slum administration replaced colonial administration. Exclusion and exclusivity were internalized within the structures of city planning throughout the expanded (cos) metropolises of the emergent "west." Fearing contamination from inner city racially defined slums, the white middle class scuttled to the suburbs. ... Local differences notwithstanding, the racial poor were simultaneously rendered peripheral in terms of urban location and marginalized in terms of power (1993: 189).

Can this observation be applied to the "cyber world?" First, some argue that the cyber world is not "colonized" and that Indigenous peoples can have real and meaningful impact. The successful internet based Zapatista revolt would seem to suggest that the cyber world has real power. But closer investigation would suggest that it was a revolt inspired by "liberal" American academics who had the e-resources of their Universities at their disposal. In Canada the "cyber" world hardly seems poised to radicalism. Indeed it continues in its quiet cyber segregation. Industry Canada carefully segregates the Aboriginal sites, as does the National Archives. This movement to "Native Portals" accentuates this separateness. Canada's museums also tend to segregate native content. It is usually in a separate cyber gallery, and is usually at the beginning of the storyline, rarely scattered throughout the various subject specializations or exhibits. Even where modernity is desired, the subject is dealt with in the Aboriginal section of the exhibition.

Despite the wish of some Indigenous people to do so, it is "virtually" impossible to segregate by "race" on the internet. Rhonda S. Fair's "Becoming the White Man's Indian: An Examination of Native American Tribal Web Sites" (2000) argues, based on an examination of the Indian Circle web ring, that there are two web realities depending upon the purpose and focus of the web sites. There are those directed to an external audience which tend to reinforce and perhaps even create "stereotypes," while those directed to the internal community tend to be more real.

The Aboriginal cyber net tends to reinforce a "class" perspective. The majority of the Aboriginal peoples who access cyber space will tend to be those who are middle class, work for government, the college or university systems or aboriginal governments. The cyber gaze of Aboriginal content tends to be those with the greatest stake in the status quo. That is, the environment in which Canadian Aboriginal peoples seem to want to work is within the context of Canadian law and its current system of justice which promise if not always delivering results. Because the internet allows the Aboriginal middle class to dominate the discourse and the challenge to Euro Canadian authority, it can be argued that they have assumed the role of the "colonial" master. They control the new instrument of defiance — the web sites. But there seems little inclination to use it. Only those Canadian Aboriginal communities on the absolute margin, the Innu or the Lubicon have used their cyber connections to bring their issues to the world stage or to use the WWW as an instrument of resistance.

So the reasons for a more detailed lament become obvious. First is the reality of language. The English language, is both the language of cyber-technology and the language of perceived freedoms — "free markets," "free expression," "free elections" and "free information." It is the language of the West that continues to promise, but has yet to deliver today's utopia to a "colonized third world." Joe Lockard, a Ph.D. student at UCLA, in "Resisting Cyber English" puts it bluntly

> The colonial pursuit of geopolitical rationalization has historically relied on over-languages to endorse a politics of subordination. Cyber-English, the first world English without a territorial base, has reformulated classic notions of universal imperial benefit. Viewed as a stage in this historiographic continuum, cyber-English is the latest extension of a centuries-long drive towards extinction of small tribal languages and consolidated expansion for a few languages of power. One blunt conclusion arrives quickly: cyber-English has declared global language/class war. Learn it or else. Speak so "we" understand you, or take a hike and be damned (1996).

Those who refute this argument point to "small" dynamic cyber languages like Japanese, Chinese, Dutch, Spanish, French and Finnish as evidence of a non-English dynamic. Yet, these are cultures with a very strong print tradition, and even on the majority of their e-sites the English language remains the alternative choice. The unwritten assumption is that when someone totally resists English they are giving clear evidence of their "technological" backwardness. Yet, it is also argued that by Fred Zellen in "Surf's up?: NWT's Indigenous Communities Await a Tidal Wave of electronic Information" that Aboriginal Cultures will "find it easy to identify themselves in the global culture linked by the net," and that the net will make it easier to "preserve artefacts of their culture" which will only make them stronger (Zellen, 2001). Further reflection on this sentence should cause considerable sadness. Globalization is to be embraced. This will ensure the "preservation" of culture as an "artefact"!

The degree to which Canada's "imperial" languages dominate Aboriginal perspectives is clear on the Canadian Aboriginal internet sites hosted by Industry Canada. As of March 24, 2001, Canada's Aboriginal Digital Collections contained thirty five sites. Yet, while most of the listed native sites cite language as a primary concern, all sites are in English or French with at best the native language in a parallel column. Where there are language sites, they "teach" the language or treat the language as an object of "curiosity." The reasons are transparent: there are too few fluent speakers.

The Six Nations of the Grand River for example estimate their language retention rate at one percent of the population — there are only two hundred twenty-five fluent speakers, with most being over the age of sixty (Anon, 2001). 1996 Statistics Canada indicates that although twenty six percent of Aboriginal Canadians could hold a conversation in their language, only fifteen percent of Aboriginal Canadians or one hundred twenty thousand individuals spoke their native language at home (Government of Canada, 1998). It should also be emphasized that there are few native newspapers that are solely in an indigenous language — and where this is attempted most offer English as a parallel alternative. In Canada it could be argued the imperial language of the internet, English, is reinforcing and accelerating current marginalization rather than introducing it.

And with English and the internet comes politics. The individual sites in the Canadian Digital Aboriginal Collection, amongst the largest on the net, for the most part avoid controversy. These sites are intended to celebrate whether it is business achievement, culture, history or language. The Waskaganish Net Site (Waskaganish aka Rupert's House is located on James Bay) near is an excellent and typical

example (*idem*).[2] The main "buttons" are "culture," "development," "history," "myths," "profile," "talent" and "tourism." All of the topics seem to be intended for the outside, particularly tourists, business investors and employers. The site paints the community as modern and connected, with a strong future in heritage tourism — particularly with the development of Charles Fort the first Hudson's Bay Company establishment. Of equal note is the "history" timeline — which starts with the coming of the first European in 1611. This is not unusual in the various sites included in Canada's Digital Collections. The "Rat River/Ddhah Zhit Han," "Peguis First Nation" or the "Wecome to the Big House Kwakwaka'wakw" e sites[3] offer similar treatments of the past — a past which begins with the arrival of Europeans!

Yet Aboriginal sites can be more than "celebratory." The non federal government sites are dominated by tribal and territorial governments. And this should not be a surprise. The Northwest Territories and Nunavut governments are both elected by majority native populations. These sites are comprehensive offerings of government services, although often through the tourist gaze. However, only the Nunavut sites offers service in the dominant Aboriginal languages.[4] The Government of the Northwest Territories does not. Tribal government sites tend to be more introductory and political, but always with a strong heritage component. For the most part the native government sites appear to be for those "gazing" in rather than for the community itself. Self-validation is probably the prime reason for the creation of many of these e-sites. In today's world, if you do not have a presence on the web — you do not exist. The mere fact of having a web page is a statement of existence to an often disinterested world.

The Aboriginal internet is controlled by the "power elite." To participate a computer, software, expertise and a host server are all required. The internet is frankly expensive and does not permeate most homes in native communities, although this is not true everywhere. In Inuvik, for example, cable access is available to almost every home and this has had considerable impact on how the news is accessed. If a review of North American internet site indicates anything it is that the Canadian Aboriginal sites are less radical, and are mired in the niceties of treaty and land negotiations and the outcome of court cases. Oka[5], Gustavsen Lake, Burnt Church[6], which were expected to be hot points, were not when they were checked

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[2] http://aboriginalcollections.ic.gc.ca/e/listsubject.htm

[3] http://aboriginalcollections.ic.gc.ca/e/listsubject.htm for both sites

[4] http://www.nunavut.com/home.html and http://www.gov.nt.ca.

[5] "Oka Crisis" at http://www.tyendinaga.net/wwwboard/messages/83.html largely deals with academic retrospectives rather than a continuing battle for human rights.

[6] "The Burnt Church First Nation" at http://efn.tao.ca.

on Google, Excite and Yahoo search engines. Several sites associated with these issues were explicit in the damnation of government action, but they were not sustained nor supported internationally over any length of time. A few had had no postings for several months. The most active protest sites are associated with Leonard Peltier.[7] Most appear to be maintained by American interests.

The most radical active e-sites in Canada were those of the Innu government of Labrador, and those of the Lubicon Nation. Both seem to employ the rhetoric of marginalization and seem to be related to the internet guerrilla movement. In the 1990's, there has been a strong internet based movement amongst the American and South American indigenous peoples to radicalize the anti-colonialist protests against NAFTA and the imperialism they believe it represents. It saw its greatest success in its support of the Zapatista struggle in Chiapas, Mexico. It became an international cause and was the first movement that won its victories in cyberspace.[8]

The cyber rhetoric of the Zapatistas is evident in that of the Labrador Innu, as is the support of the cyber intellectuals. The Innu site at http://www.innu.ca is worth a careful examination. The titles suggest anti colonialist positioning. On the front of the web page there are articles like "Canada's Tibet: The Killing of the Innu" which on further drilling down was written by Colin Samson, Department of Sociology, University of Essex, James Wilson, author of "The Earth Shall Weep: A History of Native America" and Jonathan Mazower. Another front page article the WEB page is "An Appeal for Justice for the Innu of Labrador." While authorship cannot be determined for some of the articles, they uniformly resist the neo-colonialism that they see around them. The Lubicon pages, many hosted on a server at the University of Victoria Department of Fine Art, are poorly designed but the messages are equally sophisticated and uncompromising.[9] These sites would all argue that Canada's history is an artificial construct which marginalizes Aboriginal peoples. Joyce A. Green's "Towards a DÄtente with History: Confronting Canada's Colonial Legacy" first published in the International Journal of Canadian Studies which makes this case is placed on one of the key Lubicon sites (Green, 2001).

The voice of anti colonialism is often that of academics like Joyce Green and Colin Samson. The Cana-

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[7] "The International Office of the Leonard Peltier Defense Committee" at http://www.freepeltier.org/story.htm#top viewed March, 24, 2001.

[8] "Zapatistas in Cyberspace A Guide to Analysis and Resources" at http://www.eco.utexas.edu/faculty/Cleaver/zapsincyber.html viewed March, 24, 2001.

[9] "Lubicon Supporters Home Page" at http://www.finearts.uvic.ca/~vipirg/SISIS/Lubicon/main.html viewed March, 24, 2001.

dian Aboriginal press, which functions for the most part in English, tends to the middle road, with only a modest dose of anti colonial rhetoric. *Windspeaker*, first published in 1983 for the Aboriginal people of northern Alberta, is the most widely read of the Aboriginal newspapers. By 1993 it had positioned itself to become Canada's leading Aboriginal news providers (despite the 1990 elimination of federal funding which left it the only Western Aboriginal voice in Canada). Since *Windspeaker's* transformation, its owner, the Aboriginal Multi Media Society has launched *Sweetgrass* to serve Alberta, *Sage* to serve Saskatchewan and *Raven's Eye* to serve British Columbia. It should be noted that AMMSA also owns and operates CFWE-FM radio, which broadcasts to fifty four Alberta Aboriginal communities.

The AMMA newspapers are traditional with a strongly independent yet liberal community focus.[10] The editorial policy, which would not be out of place in the *Globe and Mail*, is uniformly critical of the federal government in its treaty negotiations, its fishery policies as well as its own Chief Matthew Coon Come for his statements on alcoholism amongst native leaders. There were also extremely worthwhile articles on the Residential Schools litigations. That being said, its front page lead story on April 1 related to the Aboriginal Juno awards.

While the digital versions of newspapers are the most significant "portal" to Aboriginal cyberspace in Canada, there are Native portals like Turtle Island Native Network in Canada and Nativeweb, in the United States from which both Aboriginal and non Aboriginal peoples can gain alternative perspectives.[11] Their links emphasize the demoralization of the Aboriginal communities throughout the world in the post colonial context. It is clear that Turtle Island and Nativeweb, which are more in tune with the cyber world are more international than national in their focus, and see Aboriginal issues in a global context. The links to American tribal issues are numerous. What is equally interesting is that Turtle Island does not have a ready link to the AMMA products.[12] Commercial and political interests still supersede those of the new Aboriginal international alliances encouraged by the opportunities of cyberspace. Linkages to the United Nations aboriginal issues exist, but do not dominate.

The aboriginal chat rooms offer an important location for determining the impact of the e-world on post colonial issues. The most numerous sites in Canada relate to land claims, to self government, to cultural appropriation and to racism and to genealogy, with the most popular topic being genealogy. The most

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[10] http://www.ammsa.com/ammsahistory.html#anchor9942088 for a brief history of AMMA.

[11] "Nativeweb: Resources for Indigenous Cultures around the World" at http://www.nativeweb.org viewed March, 24, 2001.

[12] "Turtle Island Native Network" at http://www.turleisland.org/front/_front.htm viewed March, 24, 2001.

poignant chat rooms were those on the Aboriginal Youth Network which posted several key questions for individuals to join in. The topic of "racism" in the school system, particularly in the teaching of history and native subjects had the largest number of contributors.[13] The chat rooms tend to be anonymous — but there is a vigorous policing action in these rooms, since it is difficult to discern who is who, by questioning those who don't seem to use the correct "sub culture" English rhetoric. Race not culture is a determinant of who can participate. Ellen Baird, doctoral student at South Dakotah State University, argues that in those chat rooms she explored Aboriginal participants had concluded that

> American Indians in general resist assimilation and take offence at someone who is trying to pretend to be Indian, and are vigilant about protecting Indian identity on the web. ... Ironically, it is the Indian participants who sound more mainstream th an non-Indians in this observed chat room (1998).

In Canada there is as yet no literature analyzing native chat rooms. However, a quick examination of the Native-L archives or any of the other chat rooms suggests that in Canada there is less militancy than on the American counterparts. Canadian sites tend to focus on issues regarding land claims and on group identity. Little on the "chat rooms" indicate an interest in history although there is a real commitment to culture and the arts. Genealogy remains a consistently strong interest particularly on the Métis sites.[14] Métis chat is very much concerned with the issues of "identity."

These chat rooms, particularly in Canada, evidence the tensions between those who would preserve existing ownership of identities, and those who feel they should be able to join a newly discovered racial connection to culture. The emotion of the chat rooms is real and indicates how important the net might become in the creation of new identities.

> Say I lived in B.C., had done my genealogy complete, over 1 500 names, of which, 8 of the 127 of my ancestors going back 7 generations can be documented as being of native American ancestry, I had my DNA test done, stating both my genotypes are of North American origins, but I came from the east coast, wanted to join your Métis group, would I qualify? NO! ... According to the BC chapter of the MNC, we cannot meet your membership requirements, nor can we meet those of any other MNC affiliate, yet, it was our ancestors who created

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[13] Aboriginal Youth Network http://ayn-0.ayn.ca/discussion/board_mainpage.htm viewed March, 24, 2001.

[14] http://www.turtleisland.org/front/_front.htm for the link to Metis chat.

the first Métis child in Canada! It as our Native American grandmother who was the very first Métis mother in Canada, it is our grandmothers who must be crying in shame to see what her children must endure just to be allowed to come home. Shame! (Wiskipkpaqtism, 2001)

The degree to which these chat rooms are causing the formation of new identities, or placing "political" pressures to allow new identities to be recognized is as yet unclear. However, experience elsewhere indicates that one of the impacts of the web can be the creation of new virtual communities. The impact of the web in the Métis fight for a national "inclusive" identity, rather than an exclusive one controlled by Red River descendants will be worth watching. It might yet be that the 1982 Constitution recognized the Métis, but the web will make their nation a reality.

Aboriginal governments' e-sites are probably doing the most to project and protect culture. At Ouje-Bougoumou, a Cree United Nations award winning community, science and computer camps were started in 1997 with considerable success.[15] These "camp kids" developed their own web pages which reflected an incredible sense of local and international community.[16] The sense of pride and ownership of these pages and the heritage they exhibited was palpable.

The museum, archives and library community which are largely controlled by Euro-Canadians have been key to the creation of Canada's understanding of Aboriginal culture. The new cyber or virtual museums that are springing up continue the perpetuation of Euro Canadian views. The situation is of course more complex than the previous statement suggests. Moira McLoughlin for example observes that museums are "borderlands: spaces of coexistence, negotiation, and transformation which do not assume given centres of power" (McLoughlin, 1993). Jane M. Jacobs' work on Aboriginal tourist sites in Australia on the other hand argues that in this "borderland" both communities' understanding of any particular heritage site is forever transformed (Townsend-Gault, 1998). The "myth" of negotiation, or the "myth" of appropriation are all being re-negotiated at the same time. A new understanding then does begin to emerge. As the dialogue continues a consensus may be articulated in which both histories and both pasts no longer exist.

[15] 1997 Science/Computer Camp Ouje Bougoumou at http://www.ouje.ca/youth/Camp/camp.htm viewed March, 24, 2001.

[16] See Lance Cooper's web page at http://www.ouje.ca/youth/Camp/Lance/lance.htm for example viewed March, 24, 2001.

But for the majority of Canadians whether Aboriginal or Euro-Canadian, often the museum appears to dictate, not to negotiate, the modern discourse which determines stereotypes. The new virtual museums tend to reinforce the past. That this "museum gaze" is further perpetuated through the internet can be seen through an examination of Canada's senior museums: the Glenbow, the National Museum of Civilization, the National Museum of Art, the National Museum of Science and Technology, the National Museum of Nature, the Provincial Museum of Alberta, the British Columbia Provincial Museum, the Manitoba Museum of Man and Nature, and the Virtual Museum of Canada.

Most Aboriginal sites indicate the value that native people give to environment and nature and particularly their lives in it. What is interesting is that the National Museum of Nature makes no reference to that inextricable connection.[17] As far as Nature is concerned Aboriginal peoples do not exist. The Canadian Museum of Science and Technology is equally deficient. Any review of technologies tends to ignore Aboriginal interests other than the occasional tip-of-the-hat to the science of archaeology. The technologies of flint napping, of buffalo jumps, of fishing do not make it on the net version of the museum, although canoes do. From June 21, 2000 – Oct. 21, 2002 Technology is hosting an exhibit presented by "Canoe. ca." The key "hook" "What do M. Atwood, P.E. Trudeau. P. Johnson and Grey Owl have in common"? The answer is not that except for Pauline Johnson, who is of mixed European Mohawk ancestry, all were Euro-Canadians. No "they were all avid canoeists."

The exhibit "explores the history of the commercial canoe in Canada, and how the success of this enterprise has helped make the canoe a universally recognized symbol of Canada." The implication is that the National Museum of Science and Technology is for "modern" progressive people, not Aboriginal peoples.[18] This contrasts with the Royal British Columbia Museum whose technology site includes a research report by Shelley E. Reid, "The Beauty of Technology" on Aboriginal fishing techniques. The Virtual Museum of Canada's exhibit on science and technology "Athena's Heirs" also marginalizes Native wisdom by including it at the beginning of the exhibition in a linear fashion — rather finding relationships throughout the discourse. Here native peoples are again seen, albeit unintentionally, as "anti modern."[19]

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[17] National Museum of Nature at http://nature.ca/nature_e.cfm viewed March, 24, 2001.

[18] National Museum of Science and Technology at http://www.science-tech.nmstc.ca/english/whatson/index.cfm refers to the exhibit. If one drills down in canoe.ca one can find a paper by John Jennings, "The Canoe — The Boat That Built A Nation" at http://www.canoemuseum. net/old/resource.htm which does explain its native antecedents although it is little more than a worshipful paragraph.

[19] "Athena's Heirs," Virtual Museum of Canada exhibit at http://www.virtualmuseum.ca/Exhibitions/Heirs/index.html.

The National Gallery equally reinforces the stereotypes presented by the National Museum of Science and Technology. Its major digital retrospective show has been on Innuit carving. When prowling the site's vignettes, insights into other Canadian Aboriginal artists can be gleaned, but with difficulty.[20] Future shows, all curated by Marie Routledge, on the works of Marion Tuu'luq and on Pudlo Pudlat, both northern artists, appear to reinforce rather than break stereotypes and deal with native artists as a "separate" category rather than as individuals in a post-modern construct.

In history museums Aboriginal peoples fare better, but the fact is that there they are also seen as "historic" rather than as "contemporary" peoples. The view of the museums diverges significantly from "history" on Aboriginally authored e-sites. It is much more political. The Manitoba Museum has little more than an advertising presence on the web, and not much can be discerned other than native communities fall under the "ethnology" rather than under "history." The National Museum of Civilization does not include Aboriginal peoples under "history," rather First Nations are given their own sections in the virtual museum. They are before "history." The approach appears there to be linear, and for the most part interprets native people through the "tourist" or Euro Canadian gaze. Native people are seen in their "pre-historical" context as peoples of the past with little current presence. The virtual native cowboy exhibit is the exception. It deals with Native cowboy culture in all of its dimensions and provides real life to an already spell binding subject.

The awarding winning "Haida" site is a "best practices" Aboriginal site. It is one of the only ones found to be arranged in a non-linear fashion with multiple entries with the past and the present fully integrated.[21] Like most museum virtual sites however it is difficult to find out who is responsible for the site contents without considerable drilling. It would seem that museum sites on the web are generally treated as movie productions — with a long credit list — but with no real authority. The Glenbow has surprisingly little Aboriginal presence on its web. The Provincial Museum of Alberta, which along with the Royal British Columbia probably have the best e-sites. If one had not seen the outstanding Syncrude Gallery at the Provincial Museum of Alberta, the impression would be left that that museum was only interested in reinforcing old stereotypes of Aboriginal peoples as yesterday's peoples.

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[20] National Gallery of Canada, "Carving an Identity: Inuit Scultpture from the Permanent Collection," November, 26, 1999 – November, 26, 2000, Inuit Galleries at http://national.gallery.ca/english/exhibitions/carving/carving.html.

[21] http://www.virtualmuseum.ca/Exhibitions/Haida.

Libraries and archives are increasingly beginning to develop web presences. However, libraries and archives are themselves a Euro-Canadian construct that in some cases haves insidiously replaced and in others supplemented the "elders" as a source of information. Often at the forefront of the digital revolution, libraries in particular should be expected to make considerable and culturally sensitive contributions. But for the most part they do not.

The National Library digital site includes a few Aboriginal Canadians like Poundmaker, Peter Pitseolak, and Louis Riel (indexed as a pioneer!)[22], but not Crowfoot, Red Crow or Big Bear. It mentions Pauline Johnson as a Métis, which she did not identify herself as, and Victoria Belcourt Callihoo as an historian, when she may have felt herself better represented as an Elder. One presumes that the National Library has taken the decision to include Aboriginal peoples throughout as part of the Canadian fabric rather than to categorize them separately. But the Library could have shown a little more sensitivity than categorizing Riel as a Pioneer!

The Toronto Public Library offers no special access to information to the largest group of urban natives in Canada. Its search engine, however, does link the user to Aboriginal community associations and agencies, identifying their street, e mail and web addresses. Industry Canada also provides a useful Aboriginal portal to government services. Mount Royal College does have a special bibliography of native materials, which anyone would do well to use as a beginning point. The Universities of Alberta and British Columbia both have excellent native bibliographies, although in some cases the data bases listed are restricted to users of their systems. Also they are not the easiest to find. Aboriginal communities wanting to gain an instant access will much prefer going to the *Windspeaker* or if they are of more radical persuasion preferring a decidedly American perspective, Turtle Island Native Network.[23]

While Canadian archives are critical to the resolution of many Aboriginal issues, and to the finding of lost identities, they do not for the most part take special efforts to collect materials created by Aboriginal peoples. They have however made considerable progress in attempting to break through the Euro-Canadian gaze. The National Archives of Canada's "Pride and Dignity" is an exhibition of over sixty photos designed to break down some of the common stereotypes surrounding Aboriginal society. The cyber

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[22] National Library of Canada at http://www.nlc-bnc.ca/bioindex/eendeav.htm#Pioneers for the Classification of Riel.

[23] http://www.turtleisland.org/front/_front.htm.

exhibit on Treaty 8 is also a model of careful discourse.[24] The Métis Scrip material is authored and appropriate.[25] The National Archives' "Aboriginal Peoples: An Overview" offers no authorship and is little more than sophomoric pabulum. The site aimed at both the Aboriginal and non Aboriginal researchers warns users of the complexities of research relating to Aboriginal issues. It might well be construed by some as condescending, although it is surely not intended to be so.

The various documents contained at the site are in effect archival publications of selected materials, rather than complete sets of documents from which Aboriginal peoples can come to their own conclusions. Until complete sets of documents created by and maintained by Aboriginal peoples are available at Aboriginal archives and on the net, there will continue to be filters that are imposed by the dominant institutions and the cultures they represent.

The cyber colonialism of the Aboriginal people of Canada continues to be at once insidious and subtle. Manuel Castells in *The Power of Identity* clearly articulates the changes that

> are continuing to happen globally. Canada is not immune. He argues that "ethnicity does not provide the basis for communal heavens in the network society, because it is based on primary bonds that lose significance, when cut from their historical context, as a basis for reconstruction of meaning in a world of flows and networks, of recombination of images, and reassignment of meaning. Ethnic materials are integrated into cultural communities that are more powerful, and more broadly defined than ethnicity, such as religion or nationalism, as statements of cultural autonomy in a world of symbols. Or else, ethnicity becomes the foundation for defensive trenches, then territorialized in local communities … defending their turf (1997).

Within Canadian Aboriginal cyberspace, that statement has some resonance. For some, individual Canadian tribal cyber identities are being increasingly submerged not in their own "national" context, but rather in continental and increasingly in international "Aboriginal peoples" identities. That is, for example, the identity of the Cree peoples is not a unified or clear one in Aboriginal cyber space. The strongest Aboriginal identity is a continental one, developed by a reaction to American national issues and to the homogenization of the "tourism" and "museum" gaze. There is a beginning identification e.g. the Innu

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[24] National Archives of Canada, "Aboriginal Peoples" at http://www.archives.ca/08/0804_e.html.

[25] National Archives of Canada, "Aboriginal Peoples and Archives" at http://www.archives.ca/02/020120011o_e.html viewed March, 24, 2001.

and Lubicon e-sites, with international issues of a post-colonial world, but these are few and show but few signs of acceptance across the Canadian Aboriginal e-scene. The majority of Canadian Aboriginal e-sites seek validation as modern peoples through demonstrating their use of the new medium. And they further seek validation as "modern" economic players by emphasizing their "forward-thinking" community plans, their role in cultural tourism and in providing "state of the art" schooling. Most equally emphasize a commitment to language and heritage — but the very cyber world they call on to protect their heritage is the world that is eroding that heritage. In the few active native chartrooms, the real issue is often the preservation of barriers precluding "outsiders" from appropriating their issues, culture or language.

The web in itself is not eroding Aboriginal culture and reshaping Aboriginal self identities as much as reinforcing those tendencies that exist. There is no evidence right now to determine which of the literally millions of internet sites are most meaningful to the Aboriginal peoples of Canada. Are they the most frequent visitors to, for example, the Zapatista sites gaining the necessary cyber insurgency skills to stop the apparently inevitable erosion of their culture by the forces of Euro Canadian imperialism? Or are they the frequent users of country music or gospel music sites? Which chat rooms are most popular? Which Canadian museum sites resonant? Who are the visitors to individual tribal-e sites? Just a few more Euro-Canadian researchers? Why are the visitor numbers so low — less than two hundred hits over several years per site in most cases?[26] We don't know. There are suggestions by those like Michael Margolis and David Resnick in *Politics as Usual* (2000), that the cyber world will not offer as many immediate changes as Manuel Castells postulates. However, what does emerge is that as the "first" world becomes increasingly connected, those who do not have access to its cyber resources will be increasingly marginalized and become victims of yet another revolution.

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The Industrial Handing Down of Culture

Claude Martin[*]

T he industrialization of cultural production has been one of the major changes in our society since the beginning of the twentieth century. What types of changes are we looking at and why is it so important? In 1962, now a long time ago, Edgar Morin evoked, in *L'esprit du temps*, a "second industrial revolution," one that deals with "images, dreams and messages, [which] result in the industrialization of the mind." One thinks one can hear a cantor of the "new economy," a very recent notion. At that time, people were questioning the changes happening within capitalism. This is when ideas like "leisure society," the knowledge-based economy and the so called "information society" were put forward.

Several well known phenomena can be found at the core of these changes, which were firstly, the consequences of the industrial revolution. Gains in productivity and accelerated urbanization modified social structures. Parliamentary democracy and, later, the welfare state succeeded in giving citizens a status that conformed with the ancient belief in human dignity. The first steps in this process were taken in parallel with the development of the printing press, and the industries of book and periodical publishing. What would the Enlightment have been without books? And democracy without newpapers?

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Has the handing down of culture been endangered by this industrialization of intellectual production? Of course not. Looking back through time, one can see that it has been, on the contrary, greatly favoured. But, once industrialization was carried out, values changed and new occupations arose. To writing one adds the journalist, a professional with a well defined and limited task, harnessed to his typewriter, and supplying copy to the linotype machine and the rotating presses essential to a newspaper — but also to advertising, a major source of financing for that newspaper. The writer has not, however, disappeared. One can see him producing a literature described as "popular," in part tied to the new beneficiaries of literacy, but which do not impinge on colleagues plotting some aesthetic revolutions which would please more restrained publics.

Put differently, society has changed; so have the ways values and cultures develop. When sound recording showed up, it changed music. Caruso became a star throughout the world. The microphone and the amplifier made it possible to sing with a weak voice. The radio became an amplifier of the record; television even more so. Music has changed and the values it brings have also been changing.

Our hypothesis is the following one. The building up of Québec as a society rests, among other things, on the power of the cultural industries, even if the latter are also a vehicle for forces that can dissolve a society within a larger world. However, that power could not have been implemented outside the stream of the industrialization of cultural production. That is what gives those industries the possibility of reaching, of informing, of disturbing, of pleasing, etc. This is why one can talk here of an industrial paradox. On the one hand, here are particularly efficient channels for contributing to the making up of a value system peculiar to certain groups of human beings (which can in some cases lead in not very honourable directions). On the other hand, here are excellent means for those accepting the values underlining publicity or Hollywood productions. It is almost impossible to divorce these two factors. Radio can make people move in unison, but the music it is playing may have originated elsewhere.

It is with the arrival of the first publishers of periodicals and books, in the nineteenth century, that the struggle for the industrial handing down of French Canadian culture began. The Librairie Beauchemin, the ancestor of the actual book publisher, was founded in 1842. *L'histoire du Canada* of François-Xavier Garneau had its first release in 1845. This book can be considered as one of, or even the first Québec best seller. Jacques Michon (1999) is of the opinion that the first industrial production of books in Québec began around 1880. Jean de Bonville (1988) suggests that the transformation of the Québec press into mass

media supported by advertising occurred between 1884 and 1914. Radio began to broadcast in French, in Montréal, in the early 1920s. Those changes are part of an overall economic and social transformation, out of which French Canada emerged as a modern society.

After the Second World War, this development accelerated. In 1952, radio was succeeded by television. Information programs and radio soaps put on new clothes. The *Famille Plouffe* showed the changing society. With *Point de mire*, René Lévesque opened windows on the world, which was also changing. The famous strike of the Radio-Canada television producers revealed the abyss between Montréal and Ottawa. Popular book publishing placed on the market new economic approaches and *Les insolences du frère Untel* (Desbiens, 1961) is a landmark of that time. One can also find outstanding developments in the worlds of recording and cinema. On private television, *Jeunesse d'aujourd'hui* became the crucible for a series of new stars of popular songs. By the end of the sixties, Québec society was the beneficiary of a whole set of cultural industries… and social and political questions to deal with.

Those same industries, at the same time, began supplying us with a plethora of imported productions. Westerns and detective stories filled the screens of our television sets. The radio station CJMS dismissed *La bonne chanson* in favour of a hit parade of new popular music. The yo-yo and rock'n'roll music asserted themselves. The French book publisher Robert Laffont sold American best sellers here, books that were first translated for distribution in France. But all this was not totally new. Between the two Wars, some people were scandalized by the depravity of American feature films. But, mostly, there were counterreactions to that. The Roman Catholic Church, at that time, tried to produce a national cinema, but its rural orientation resulted in limited success. During the same period, the creation of France Film is a more interesting example. This firm succeeded in importing several feature films from France. Several years later, it provided the financial basis for the first private French speaking television station: Télé-Métropole.

This example is a good way of introducing another aspect of that second industrial revolution. In the transformation from France Film to Télé-Métropole, there is a major change in orientation. The market sets up its own rules for choosing and valorizing work. The dialectic of distinction is replaced by the one of distribution. The judgements of academics are succeeded by those, more democratic, of the public, who vote by choosing how to spend their leisure time. There is no question here of being naïve and adopting the slogan that pretends that the consumer is right. The public makes choices from among the supply offered by organizations that mostly seek profit. But these organizations have no interest in deceiving their

public. As for authors, they produce works spurred by themes found in their society. However, we face other dialectics, those of the cultural industries and their publics, and of authors and their publics.

But, as suggested by the title of this colloquium, Québec is a small society. This is a huge handicap in the field of cultural industries. Cultural productions, generally speaking, are characterized by production requirements that have high fixed costs, and variable costs which, depending on the size of the public, are rather low. A small society finds it difficult to make this domain profitable. A large society can do it more easily and can sell its productions abroad, without having to take into consideration production costs, which constitutes unfair competition with enterprises in smaller societies.

Given that, one would think that smaller societies would be caught in a situation whereby they import almost all their cultural productions, notwithstanding language barriers. But this is far from the case in Québec. Except, notably, for cinema, Québec productions capture an enviable part of the cultural market. Its television is a case frequently discussed in academic circles. People wonder how such a small society, living in the shadow of the United States, has succeeded in supplying the essentials of a television menu, from information to drama, the latter being the flagship of Québec's cultural industries, as my colleague Roger de la Garde put it (1992). How to explain this phenomenon?

A number of conditions made this possible. The first was a collective will to assert Québec's identity. This showed up first in periodicals and books, but moved rapidly to the mass media. It often dealt with the theme of survival. It also favoured the emergence of the social movement which addressed the political sovereignty of Québec.

The second condition is based on the overall economic development of Québec and on the springing up of a class of Francophone entrepreneurs, who like others elsewhere sought to accumulate capital in the media. Economic development gave people a level of disposable income sufficient to buy cultural goods and services, to be consumed during leisure time. An average Québec family spends about $1,000 a year for cultural goods and services, in the first place to acquire television sets and cable, but also for reading material, records and evenings outside the home. This is a good starting point. This relative level of wealth opens the door to consumer goods. Out of this, advertising has been developed, as a means of mass communication for massaging mass consumption, but also as an essential support for financing large mass media.

The third condition is the way the State intervenes in cultural development. This can take different forms. A set of cultural institutions can be an answer to several concerns, like small market size or the fear of being invaded by foreign cultural productions. Radio-Canada is the most important of these institutions. Moreover, through the years, an apparatus of financial and regulatory support can give cultural enterprises resources and protection. We can think here, among other things, about the regulation of foreign ownership and the quotas for national production. The federal and provincial governments have explicitly created cultural policies under the banner of cultural diversity.

In addition to these three pillars of the creation of a cultural identity, there are other factors to be considered; for example, the creativity of the authors of cultural products, the effects of the language barrier, the impact of the school system, and the ability of Québec's cultural sector to simultaneously accept influences from Europe and the United States.

In sum, the history of Québec's cultural industries illustrates how smaller societies can use the media to produce and disseminate culture. To ensure the handing down of culture, everything had to change. The culture that has been handed down is differently dressed now. It can sometimes be erudite or avant-garde. But most of the time, its clothing is mediatic and popular, in the sense of widespread consumption. This is especially the case with some television programs, which are viewed by more than a quarter of the population, and at times nearly half. Those new clothes have been multiplying themselves whereas society has been fragmenting into several cultural models.

On the other hand, cultural industries work more and more on an international basis, where the productions of unequal markets compete. Also, the development of capitalism in the world of cultural industries challenges at least two of the three pillars of Québec's cultural power. Local firms, searching for more profitable conditions, have to conquer a slice of the world market. Sometimes, they use strategies such as camouflaging the origins of production. Some question the necessity of protective systems which made it possible for them to develop. Others are tempted to sell themselves to the highest bidder, i.e., to international media conglomerates. These players are not keen on systems of cultural protection, and lobby to have them abolished.

There remains the first pillar, a collective willingness to assert one's identity. And what a fragile one! Listening to what the younger generation says it prefers among cultural products, we can be on the edge of

despair or cynicism. Is it because of their limited exposure to history? Or is there an irresistible trend to finding pleasure only in "international" productions? Will their tastes change when they're more mature? Two hundred years ago, we couldn't have been more full of hope. A small society, poor and isolated, profited from circumstances that give it the tools to explore its identity and opened it to the world. During the 1980s, the slice of the markets captured by Québec cultural productions fell in a number of domains (books, records, television). It was a dramatic shift, but we recovered. New creative forms have arrived. The State mobilized itself once again and cultural organizations have made adjustments in what they offer. Out of this crisis, Québec's cultural industries have benefited from a new period of prosperity, which continues today. This does not mean that all artists are well paid. That is another question. Nor does it mean that we should be proud of all that is found on our pages, our loudspeakers or our screens. Again, another question. But the point is that those three pillars can still adapt themselves to new conditions.

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The Knight's Move:
Reflections on the Translation of Culture/s

Michael Dorland[*]

T he conference organizers have asked me to give something of a personal reflection upon my research. This panel addresses the cultural industries and, in the case of this presentation, from an "Anglophone" perspective. I am not sure what that is supposed to mean, "et encore moins étant donné ma citoyenneté française, mais c'est une autre histoire." So let us say, to begin with, that it might mean that there is more to the question of the cultural industries than one might have imagined.

For the largest part of my academic career, which began in the late 1960s and has continued, with more or less long interruptions in journalism and a very short one in public relations, I have in one form or another been preoccupied with questions relating to the translation, transposition, movement or meanderings of political and social thought from one intellectual, often national, context to another. A first portion of my career was spent tracking how conceptions of socialism travelled from Germany to France, from Germany to Russia, and from Russia to China, as of the early twentieth century, via Japan. The middle portion has dealt with specific media artefacts such as film, the cultural industries, and media policy issues. The third portion deals with historical epistemologies in communication history.

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The Russian formalist critic Viktor Schlovsky once remarked that the movement of ideas corresponds to "the knight's move" in chess. In other words, it is not direct; it seems direct at first, then veers unexpectedly. An example is provided by the Russian Revolution itself. Undertaken on the gamble that the European proletariat would also rise up following the Bolshevik lead, and so provide the developmental basis for worldwide socialism, what occurred instead was "socialism in one country," a very different scenario from that of the Marxist theory of stages of historical development. Similarly in China, what began as an urban working-class movement became the basis for the encirclement of cities by peasant *guerrillas*; an idea further modified by the Cuban and Latin American experience in which "self conscious" revolutionary intellectuals willed revolution into being through acts of armed struggle.

Whether social movements or ideas — i.e., communication in a broad sense — the trajectory tends to follow Schlovsky's knight's move. Why, McGill University semiotician Marc Angenot once asked, did it take 50 years for Saussure's ideas to travel from Geneva to Paris, not more than a thousand kilometres in actual physical distance?

There is thus something deeply indirect about processes of cultural translation. The "cultural industries," considered initially as a conceptual reflection on the capitalist industrialization of cultural production in its movement from singularity (*the* culture industry) in Adorno & Horkheimer's perspective to its subsequent conceptual pluralization (as cultural indust*ries*) by often Marxist-inspired sociologists (Piemme, Miège, Flichy in France or J.-G. Lacroix, G. Tremblay and others in Québec) offer a rich case in point. And that pluralization has become even more complex given the so-called new media and their resulting technico-aesthetic modes of production and circulation. Further, if one thinks of the cultural industries as a complex of industrial *practices*, their translation from one national context to another, not to mention across industrial sectors, represents a formidable array of "apprentissages" in an impressive number of social and ideational realms. Thirdly, the sudden "engouement" of the Canadian or Québécois state in the 1970s for the *policy* idea of the cultural industries represents a further level of questions about the translatability of culture still worth examining in greater detail.

But I want to argue here, based on my most recent research, that these questions in the end have less to do with the cultural industries *per se* (or cultural policy *per se*) than with the broader "civil culture" that provides both the ideational and praxical matrix, or *habitus* in Bourdieu's sense, for the forms and types of communicative interractions that then become possible — either enhanced or constrained. In the case

of Canada/Québec, we are confronted with a civil culture of some complexity, and whose contradictory dimensions still remain largely unexplored. Here I will draw briefly on Maurice Charland's and my recently completed book, *Peace, Order and Good Government: Law, Rhetoric and Authority in Canadian Civil Culture* (forthcoming from the University of Toronto Press).

In a profound sense, the encounter of the Europeans with the First Peoples of this continent was an exercise in legal translation. It was assumed by the Europeans that their ideas about law were 1) extensible and, therefore, 2) translatable through symbolic acts, gestures and words into the languages of First Peoples. Both assumptions were problematic, to put it mildly, and loaded in turn with all kinds of additional cosmological and cultural baggage, notably about the validity and universality of European, largely Christian, conceptions of law — especially the question of who constitutes a lawful *speaker*.

For instance, it is of the utmost significance that for the early seventeenth century Jesuits, the highly rhetorical performances of Amerindian speakers made of them reincarnations of the ideal-typical "Ciceronian orator." This was a connection to a presumption of a shared rhetorical past that only further fed the missionary belief that these were souls worth saving, however recalcitrant the recipients of such benevolence might be. In this sense, law and rhetoric — and the irony resulting from the two — form a communicative triangle in which would be replayed over and over, in Canadian history, the question of how to incorporate the Other within legally authorized discourse. This would be, and continues to be, the basis of land claim disputes (and related practices from narration to modes of usage associated with conflicting conceptions of what is meant by "land"). This would be, and continues to be, the basis of disputes over cultural distinctiveness and the jurisdictions and rules of the governance of communication that might follow from such differing views. The incorporation of Others thus becomes the condition of entry into the expansion of the public sphere.

Now each of these encounters would be legally stabilized for a while in a constitutional arrangement, or by one of the parties' subscription to a particular constitutional perspective. We thus get a sedimentation of constitutional orderings, from the capitulation of 1760 and the royal proclamation of 1763 in the wake of the cession through to the Constitution Act 1982 (and Québec's still not being a signatory to the latter) — roughly, five orderings in all — that established the rules of the games of lawful speech and legal subjectivity. The problem is that the various parties — First Peoples, the government of Québec, and the

federal government, to mention just these — tend to play the game according to whichever ordering, in an ongoing process, seems to best serve their (changing) interests. Needless to say, then, things get complicated, because there is no agreement as to what constitutes the fundamental (Canadian) legal order, in the sense of a *Grundgesetz* as it is nicely phrased in German. Is that legal order 1) the British common law, 2) the French civil law, 3) a self-conscious synthesis of both, or 4) an unconscious cobbling together of some aspects of each?

Ideally, it should have been 3) a synthesis of both, except for the enormous problem of the reconstitution and translation of comparative legal systems and concepts from one context to another (from France to New France, New France to Britain, Britain to Canada, within Canada, and so on). What could have been, as McGill law professor Louis Baudoin (1963) argued a number of years ago, a fascinating instance of legal comparativity (and of the reception of civil law into the North American context) would become instead the following paradox stated by Québec legal scholar de la Durantaye in the 1930s: "Avec des mots anglais, on fait des lois françaises."

What develops, then, is enormous contentiousness over what constitutes the public sphere, its linguistic articulations, and the ever-constant difficulty of making policies; in short, who speaks for whom? And in turn the resulting cacophony or, more accurately, *banalization* of speech through ritualistic evocation of a set of clichés (about distinctiveness and differences, about quality, about Americanization and its cognates, about the distinction between public and private, etc.). It becomes difficult to say anything of much significance except within the *vases clos* of non-communicants or of self-referential monologues at best. Collective cultural practices accordingly become, on the one hand, ghettoized, localized, and regionalized or, on the other hand, as John Ralston Saul in his very uneven *Reflections of a Siamese Twin* (1997), but also others such as Gilles Paquet (1999) have argued, form instead complex networks of translation; fleeting, shifting games of differential *appartenances*, loyalties and identities. And these give themselves away *qua* game by being based ultimately upon a *clin d'oeil* of mutual complicity. In other words, they give away their basis in a shared but unacknowledged *philia* that makes the situation, in the end, more ironic than despairing.

More ironic than despairing, I repeat, but no less complicated for all that. You can imagine readily enough some of the resulting difficulties that such a civil culture then tends to produce for the elaboration of cultural practices (never mind policies for now) in their reified or stabilized sense of the produc-

tion of cultural commodities, that is, as objects fundamentally of exchange, whether in a meaning-sense or in a commercial sense. How can such commodities be exchangeable when one could say that by definition they are not really meant to be exchangeable at all, but are at best *reinforcing* of a given, prior set of the beliefs, not to call these the prejudices, of the producing individual or group? Above all, what gets created, as I have argued elsewhere (Dorland, 1998) with respect to the emergence of Canadian feature film policy, are "discursive economies," in which the key term is the first more than the second, i.e., more discursive than economies, in which what is being attempted to be guarantee is the continued production of discourse that seems otherwise mainly to stutter, to begin and then stop. Or if one prefers, what is being attempted is the establishment of the possible *preconditions* of exchange as opposed to exchange itself.

This is not to say that even this is an easy or simple matter. One might imagine, for instance, that one way of ensuring the circulation of exchange would be through translation in its usual acceptation, and on one level this seems obvious enough. So-and-so is a bestselling author in Quebec. Let's then translate the book, the film, the TV program into the other language, and *voilà*. Well, as you know, this has been tried and doesn't work, or at least not very well, or only within certain specializations in academic literary or film studies, say. Because there is more involved, as I've attempted to suggest, in translation than the mechanical conversion of one language into another. If only it *were* that simple.

Let's take another example. Québécois films for a while in the 1970s had a certain *succès d'estime* in France; they were exotic; they spoke somewhere to atavistic notions of a "France profonde;" they were also incomprehensible to contemporary French cinema audiences, except for film festival devotees. And so to the horror of their makers here, the films were shown in France with subtitles! Again, there is more to translation, as this example shows, than a common language.

One could take further examples, also from film and TV, but from English-Canadian production this time. Here one could revert also to the 1970s and the production of the so-called tax shelter films, in which Toronto or Montréal, or rather some streets and locations there, were decorated with US flags and Budweiser beer neon signs; the cops ran around being sheriffs and wore the stars and stripes on their shoulders; all this to be able to lull US audiences into thinking that this simulacrum of appearance was a "good, old, made in the USA type" film or TV show. One of my favorite moments in many of these films always included a long lingering pan of Mont-Royal and the Montreal skyline (or the CN Tower, though less commonly) that would not have especially meant anything to an American audience, but was a *clin*

d'oeil to Canadian viewers who might see the film. But there is more to translation than dressing people up in county sheriff police department uniforms and flying a few US flags.

The pressures of economics, greater continental trade coordination and, beyond these, globalization, have brought about changes to many of these issues. They have forced exchange into more predictable paths, making often reluctant partners have to learn to work together, or even to have to compromise their claims to distinctiveness in the name of an overriding common fiscal objective. Or not, given the diversification of possible markets brought about by ever-increasing demand for product, and the niching that becomes more possible in media rich environments. To contrast the example above of the tax-shelter films, take for a moment Christian Duguay's recent feature film *The Art of War,* just out on video, starring Wesley Snipes, and seemingly set in New York City, but into which Montréal has been seamlessly woven. However, no more loving pans of the Montreal skyline now. On the other hand, a feature film is often edited together from a number of varied shooting locations that one cannot distinguish except by carefully reading the credits. And the credits to *The Art of War* not only reveal an almost entirely Québécois crew but also the logos of Canadian federal and Québec government financial participation through various programs of subsidy and tax credit. This film, one could say, is a more successful illustration of the suturing that is involved in processes of cultural translation — not to mention the fact that the storyline pits yellow — and brown-skinned people of colour against evil white America Firsters attempting to bring back a whitebread and vanishing past with the unwitting aid of UN General Secretary actor Donald Sutherland, a peace-keeping and peace-loving Canadian stooge.

Globalization, in other words, forces exchange and *métissage*; it's the great gumbo of global cultural production and the rebuilding of the Tower of Babel. To the extent that it makes of global culture one of translation, it makes translation into the new *lingua franca*, This, on its positive side, makes it possible to finally begin to overcome the fragmentation of Canadian civil culture; and so allow cultural productions to take their place as a plurality of cultural formations within a pluralized world.

But I must of course address some of the negatives, mustn't I? So let me list four topics that globalization further complicates. First, the/our problematic assumptions about distinctiveness. Secondly, their essentialism. Thirdly, their frivolousness. And fourthly, the importance of story or narratives.

Firstly, then, the assumptions about distinctiveness. Part of our problem here stems from the displacement

by political (or policy) considerations of what more properly belongs to the realms of either aesthetics or business. A politicized aesthetic is a form of fascism, as Walter Benjamin claimed in his famous essay on mechanical reproduction. I wouldn't put it quite that strongly, but the point then becomes one of having to attempt to reconcile very contradictory, if not impossible, imperatives. The question of the politicization of business is a bit trickier, since business is not in my view exactly a perfect form of rationality. So suffice it to say that politicizing business overrides "normal" market rules. What we end up with, either way, in University of Vermont law professor Oliver Goodenough's wonderful phrase, are policies of "defending the imaginary to the death" (1998). And this is nihilism, because it is not clear *whose* imaginary is being defended.

Or secondly, if it isn't nihilism, it is the essentialization of certain traits claimed to be distinctively "Canadian." Whatever else that might mean, this is a strategy of exclusion on the basis of a normative Canadianess that once again shifts the burden of criteria of evaluation to the political powers, their funding agencies, their bureaucracies, etc. But perhaps enough has been said by others about this aspect of things in particular, for me not to have to repeat them once again.

Thirdly, frivolousness. Political power is exactly this: power, and so it must be deployed, or so political philosophy tells us, in conjunction with some virtue: call it wisdom, intelligence, or prudence. Power combined with stupidity or cowardice is not a happy combination. I said above that in the realm of cultural policy and cultural industries policies, we have excelled at producing "discursive economies." Let me state this even more bluntly: the discourse on culture and cultural policy in this country is a completely captive discourse, captured above all by state priorities that change, how shall I say it gently? whimsically? In other words, this "captive discourse" consists of little more than stock issues endlessly reiterated: basically, 1) define a problem (badly), and 2) devote enormous energies to "solving the problem." When that doesn't work, start all over again (just as badly). Stock issues, then, and like clichés and stereotypes, are very difficult to change, or to think outside the boxes they lead to. Let me rapidly mention two (I am sure you can make your own list): one is the American threat which I'll simply ignore; another is that Canadians wants Canadian stories; we want to be able to tell our own stories, as the cliché goes.

This brings me to point four, and the importance of stories. Human beings are among other things storytellers; stories are how we largely make sense of things and others. But of course the question becomes "who is the we" whose stories are to get told, and who decides this? We circle back, in other words, to the

problem of who is authorized to speak, who is a lawful speaker; questions that are, as I said, at the center of what constitutes the civil or public culture of this country, and about which we as speakers have never satisfactorily been able to agree.

Nor do I propose to resolve these issues here. I am quite content, if I have succeeded at all here, to leave you with a sense of the depth and breadth of the problem. What I can say, however, is that an answer is suggested by the problematics of translation, not understood as the mechanical transcription of one language into another, but as the creation of new texts across cultures.

Walter Benjamin in his essay "The Task of the Translator" argued to the effect that what translation permitted was the creation of something better than its original, because paradoxically truer to it. "... (T)ranslation['s] ... goal," he writes,

> is undeniably a final, conclusive, decisive stage of all linguistic creation. In translation, the original rises into a higher and purer linguistic air, as it were. It cannot live there permanently... and it certainly does not reach it in its entirety. Yet, in a singularly impressive manner, at least it points the way to this region: the... hitherto inaccessible realm of reconciliation and fulfillment of languages.... If there is such a thing as a language of truth, the tensionless and even silent depository of the ultimate truth which all thought strives for, then this language... is — the true language. And this very language, whose divination and description is the only perfection a philosopher can hope for, is concealed in concentrated form in translations (1969: 75-77).

Now, obviously, I'm making use of Benjamin and his mystical language as a provocation. So I ask you these questions: could one turn this into cultural policy? And how? And should one? If the possibility strikes you as utterly futile, that is a measure of how far we have yet to go. If, on the other hand, it does not, then I recommend to you James Boyd White's fine book of essays entitled *Justice As Translation* in which he discusses Canada as *precisely* such a possible site of what translation, law, and justice *could* be, somewhat in Benjamin's sense of a "hitherto inaccessible realm of reconciliation and fulfillment of languages" (1990). Or, if Benjamin's idealism offends you, let me in closing turn to some recent observations by Eco (2001) that make many of the same points. 1) that studying translation is like studying bilingualism; 2) that translation is not only a matter of linguistic competence, but also of intertextual, psychological and narrative competence; 3) that translation is a special case of interpretation; 4) but not between two

languages, but between two cultures (5, 13, 14). If this sounds at all familiar in the context of our cultural policy dilemmas, it is because these are some of the underlying — and unresolved — issues concealed therein.

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Handing Down of Culture and the Encounter of the Younger Generation With Art

Léon Bernier[*]

It is well known that culture, in its anthropological sense, is a characteristic of collectivities and individuals which comes from an intergenerational handing down. Culturally, we are the heirs of our parents. As for the arts, breaking with heritage is the foundation of an artist's approach to his or her work. So, in Québec, it is generally agreed that *Refus global* was a major date in the process of the emergence of an art which was modern and at the same time authentically Québécois. This is why it seems difficult, if not contradictory, to consider the handing down of culture through young people's encounter with art.

The relationship between art and collective cultural identities (ethnic, national, etc.) should be seen as indirect. They can become more direct during certain historical periods, as was the case in the 1960s and 1970s in Québec, when the freedom of expression of artists almost became a vast movement for the collective emancipation of Québécois. But generally speaking, the expression of artists derives from unconscious springs of motivation and approach. The idea, for example, that art should be promoted as Canadian or as Québecois is not only a dubious idea but a dead end. This does not mean that a Canadian or a Québec art cannot exist, but that such eventualities are part of a process which, thank God, neither government nor any other institution (family, school, etc.) can control.

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That said, it is not without interest or importance to try to see how, in today's Québec, the younger generation encounters art — taking for granted that it is through the free expression of the younger generation, rather than through cultural policies, that Québec is likely to contribute to cultural diversity in the context of globalization. "Like living things," says Fernand Dumont, "cultures do not maintain themselves by keeping sheltered from draughts, but through creative dynamism which shows life is there" (Dumont, 1995: 81).

My presentation is based on research I did with colleagues some years ago.[1] That research was designed to explore more closely the encounter between young people and the arts, not only through cultural activities they were exposed to in the context of school activities or otherwise, but also their own experiences of "creating," whatever the context or the artistic medium. The perspective we chose was wide, but also flexible, the process being close to exploratory, using an essentially qualitative methodology. The basic material is the content of 39 individual interviews with young persons who were chosen either as audience members at an artistic event (a theatrical presentation at the Théâtre Denise-Pelletier or a dance show at the Agora de la danse), or as "creators" (participants in the Festival de Création-Jeunesse of Oxy-Jeunes, or in a workshop at the Musée d'art contemporain, or students registered in an arts program at the secondary or college levels). They were asked to bear witness to these particular artistic experiences and to place them in the context of a history of their wider cultural life within the family, and in social, school and extracurricular activities. The majority of the young people interviewed were at the secondary level, III, IV and V, but some were attending a CEGEP or, occasionally, a university. In every case, adolescence can be mentioned as a crucial time for the awakening of creativity.

I do not intend to use all the data collected here. I will concentrate this presentation on just one of the two aspects we studied, that of creation, putting aside the consumption of culture for the moment. Nor shall I go into individual cases, even if the data are rich — perhaps the main source of interest in the work. My analysis will not deal with the messages and values upon which young people's thoughts are based (although we have had occasional access to such data). I shall try rather to answer a general question: where does youth's compulsion to make art come from — to see themselves and to assert themselves as creators? Or to put it more sociologically, what are the peculiar mechanisms in society that result in the creative activity of young people?

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[1] Several other researchers have, one way or another, been part of that research, including Marie Beaulieu, Guy Bellavance, Louis Jacob, Madeleine Lord, Isabelle Perrault, Nora Tassé. This research was financed by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

Thus, my presentation will contribute indirectly and partially to the main questions raised by this colloquium.

1. THE ARTISTIC CREATION OF YOUNG PEOPLE IS NOT A MANIFESTATION OF THEIR FAMILY'S CULTURE

In order to grasp fully the meaning and the range of this first statement, which contradicts what sociology tells us about handing down of culture, it must be said that the youth participating in our research were not chosen at random, but because of their manifest interest in art, and especially making art. We are therefore involved with a sample which was deliberately biased in its selection, but biased in favour of the younger generation, that does not mean that there was also a bias insofar as their parents were concerned. The members of the sample are, without any intention on our part, generally from a middle class milieu. Fathers who are workers are numerous and the level of education of the parents is often very low.[2] In the section of the interviews about their family and its role in their awakening to the arts, there is a sort of leitmotiv: "my parents are not very keen on culture." During the very first interview, with a young woman registered in a programme concentrating on dance at the secondary level, the disparity of cultural interests between herself and her parents was explicitly stated:

> My parents aren't fond of art at all. I once went with them to a dance performance. They didn't like it and I heard them saying: "It is dull. Shall we go?" It was very unpleasant. I don't go with them any more to such performances.

She mentioned also that her boyfriend was like her parents when going to cultural events. On the other hand, her parents and her boyfriend never miss her shows and fully encourage her and are totally supportive of her studying to become a professional dancer.

If there are cases where one can talk of a heritage of artistic creation on the part of parents[3] and if there are others where the taste of the younger generation for art is met with opposition, or, worse still, indif-

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[2] The socio-family characteristics of our sample are close to results obtained by the Ministry of Education of Québec, in a survey done at the beginning of the 1980s, which outlined the overall picture of Québec pupils attending the second cycle of secondary level, registered in arts, where it was said that "students registered in arts have the same profile as all the other pupils at the secondary level" (Cloutier and Legros, 1994: 13).

[1] But even there, as did François de Singly (1996), one should be careful to specify that, when talking about cultural heritage, the heirs ought to "earn" their heritage.

ference, the situation usually resembles the example described above, where the desire and the pleasure to practice the arts arises independent of family, in a space we could call personal, but can't realize without the central role of a family, offering financial support, and more importantly moral and emotional support. We still find that parents tend to warn children interested in the arts that it is a difficult path for earning money, but we also see a larger trend arising from our study where parents are proud of the artistic achievements of their progeny. The most common attitude of parents facing what their children can do at an artistic level is, without doubt, astonishment, and even more so when a taste for the arts does not arise in the family. Perhaps that astonishment is what children need most when they begin to devote themselves to arts; their parents are often their first and best public.

If this is the way things are going, it should be said that the essential role of the family, so far as an awakening to the arts is concerned, is at least socio-relational, if not more than purely cultural. As François de Singly puts it, "in a society that heavily valorizes individualism […], individuals, young or adult, succeed in mobilizing their energies, even those of a heritage […] only if they receive a sufficient dose of personal attention" (de Singly, 1996: 156-158). Consequently, the support and the approval most of the young practitioners say they get from their parents is very important, regardless of whether they benefit from a cultural heritage or not.

2. THE ARTISTIC CREATION OF YOUTH IS NOT IN ITSELF A MANIFESTATION OF THE YOUTH CULTURE

This second statement appears contradictory. Can we not imagine that youth culture is the sum of the cultural actions of those who comprise the younger generation of the population? In terms of pure linguistic logic, yes, but not as viewed as the sociology of youth. Youth culture does not refer to what youth are doing, but rather to what is particular to them as a precise social category. But even here, one should distinguish between a particular age group and a generation.

In our survey, we met youth members who were current or former members of rock groups. We also met some who were "graphiteurs," and others whose first experiences were in cinema and video. But we have met a larger number involved in theatre, dance, painting, poetry, singing or who were registered at a school of music — activities not necessarily linked to youth — and which made them somewhat special

in the group they belonged to. Being involved in the arts was doing more to obliterate than to enhance their belonging to their generation. For some, for whom artistic activity is becoming a quasi life project, this means searching for recognition beyond their peers.

This does not mean that young people who practice art are isolated from their group and marginalized. Most of them are socially integrated in their surroundings. The fact of their artistic activities, which others of their age are not interested in, does not keep them from being participants in the youth culture, either through the music they listen to, the feature films they watch, or the sports they practice with friends who do not necessarily share their passion for the arts. In the daily lives of these youths, their artistic activities do not act as a source of social distinction, but rather as something that makes them singular.

Youth who devote themselves to the arts are not necessarily lonely. Emulation can become a factor in the contagiousness of a taste for arts within the group. Several say that their encounter with the arts was on the occasion of an artistic activity performed by peers, at school or elsewhere. This indicates that as far as being stimulated to devote oneself to the arts is concerned (not to be mistaken with the ability to become a critical audience), an amateur presentation in which people of their age perform can become a more efficient stimulus than a highly professional show. The desire to devote oneself to the arts often begins in a casual way. Perhaps it's no different for adults.

3. THE ARTISTIC CREATIONS OF YOUNG PEOPLE ARE PARTLY A RESULT OF SCHOOL AND EXTRA-CURRICULAR CULTURES

As suggested earlier, there are special occasions when young people choose to devote themselves to the arts. Those occasions often arise in school or through extracurricular activities, but also through any activities designed for young people, whether private lessons, festivals, or other municipal and community leisure activities.

Let us look, first at the school and the role of the teaching of the arts as a point of contact with artistic creation. The importance of that sort of teaching varies greatly from school to school. It can range from a course given once a week by a teacher who did not have real training in the arts to a programme con-

centrating on an artistic discipline (theatre, music, dance or the visual arts) where one can find a number of specialized teachers. Regardless of the state of art teaching, our interviews indicate the introduction to the arts through pleasurable activities at school is important.

This does not mean that every youth will derive pleasure from the arts. We are speaking here of those who choose the arts at school or those whose choices take into account the pleasure to be found. We know that the relationship between students and school is one of necessity. They go to school not mainly because of what they are going to find there, but because it is necessary for their livelihood (Cournoyer, 1985). From that point of view, the teaching of the arts to those oriented toward becoming practitioners seems, on the part of the youth involved, to be at the meeting point of pleasure and necessity or, to put it differently, to introduce non-school into school. The following testimony of a girl studying dance puts the emphasis on what it brings her, personally and globally, in the context of other activities at her school:

> When I have "dance" on my schedule, it's wonderful. I very, very much like my dance lessons. I am highly motivated. When I come out of a dance lesson, I am beaming. Really, dance is doing me a lot of good. It is total well being. It's cleansing. I feel, when entering the dance studio, as if I'm entering… a co-coon. Then, I forget everything else, including conflicts, exercises, everything. I just stand there, totally in the moment.

The students stimulated by the arts are not necessarily weak in other disciplines. The process required to register in a program specializing in the arts, as in any other discipline, tends to exclude weaker students. On the other hand, more than one testimonial shows that the arts often motivate those students; sometimes they become a major argument for staying in school — an argument that could be used more often by those who teach the arts in school).

But there is a counterpart to this association of the arts and pleasure. Some students have difficulty with the more academic aspects of the arts. For example, one girl studying dance in secondary school had always believed, because her teachers told her so, that she was extremely talented. But she hit a wall in college, where she was confronted by her technical weaknesses and her work habits, a corollary of any serious learning in the arts. At the time of the interview, she questioned the pursuit of her college level diploma in dance; she thought of going into theatre, believing, rightly or wrongly, that she would find more freedom of expression there.

And extracurricular activities? Traditionally, the artistic activities of young people have been developed through extracurricular activities. There is, of course, a dimension of liberty, of less constraint, that favours the learning of the arts and especially artistic expression. Different festivals provide occasions for young people who devote themselves to the arts in order to perform before an audience. This dimension of performance is not minor. Despite what one might believe, devoting oneself to the arts is a highly social gesture, particularly for the young. If artistic activity takes place in private or introspectively, its inclination is still fundamentally public. Thus the importance of those occasions in which young people say, "see, I am an artist," or "I want to become an artist," or else "I'm trying to become an artist." Hélène Beauchamp who has written several studies based on field work with young people in theatre, stresses that point:

> doing theatre, is the process of playing in front of an audience, of saying something publicly. It is finding oneself on a stage, under the lights, whereas others in the hall are viewing and listening. For the former, playing is choosing to show publicly what is in their womb while having fun and bursting (1988: 47).

4. THE ARTISTIC CREATIONS OF YOUNG PEOPLE ARE THE MANIFESTATION OF A PROCESS OF INDIVIDUALIZATION TYPICAL OF CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY

We live today in individualistic societies, where each of us is doomed to see himself as a singular being. Even if all the privileges attached to birth have not vanished, the structural characteristics of contemporary societies are such that the most and the least privileged, at the beginning, have no choice but to perceive and identify themselves as creating their own lives.

That "constraint to individuality" leads to several implications which are more or less difficult to live with, inasmuch as the responsibility for one's destiny depends in good part on individual choices and actions. It can reveal different faces, one of which is the generalized claim of creation. One can enumerate diverse manifestations of that pretension in the population in general.[4] Who doesn't have a friend who went into painting or into the theatre, or is trying to write a novel? Those pretensions are linked to a good range of commitment and actualization, and all those who create do not have in mind the idea of becoming artists. But those diverse manifestations of "creativity" on the part of our contemporaries nonetheless reveal a

deep phenomenon that even statistics on cultural participation are able to take into consideration (Garon *et al.*, 1997). And more qualitative studies, especially those on the motivation and meaning underlying that participation, reveal that a "veritable ideology of art is strongly present in all strata of society" (Pronovost and Cloutier, 1996: 72).

The attraction of the young for the arts is a throwback to the more general phenomenon one observes in other societies, a phenomenon that calls on people to find "a personal free space" (Robine, 2000: 260). Some, perhaps not many, will try to become professionals. For others it will become a lifelong hobby, whether as a performer or a member of the audience.

5. TO CONCLUDE

The encounter with the arts and the discovery of oneself as an individual are two aspects of the same process. If, through the requirements of academic training, or later as an adult, more young people turn to the arts, it is a testament not just to the particular cultural activities the youth take on as a heritage, but those which come from their families, schools and society in general, and enable them to discover and become themselves. The opportunities offered to young people to take part in the arts and to do so freely are in themselves important factors. Of course, the outcomes of those personal spaces of freedom are uncertain. But that uncertainty is the foundation of future societies, whether large or small.

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[4] The book *Vous êtes tous des créateurs* by the art historian Yves Robillard (1998) is an echo of that contemporary trend.

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Social Cohesion in a Culturally Diverse Exchange Economy

Clarence S. Bayne[*]

1. INTRODUCTION

This paper was inspired by my attendance of a conference of the CIRCLE/CCRN Round Table 2000, held in Edmonton 26th and 27th May, 2000. The over all theme for the conference was "Culture, Connectedness and Social Cohesion." After the first few paper presentations, the conference found itself wrestling with many different perspectives on social cohesion. But no clear consensus emerged around a definition. The failure or unwillingness to define the concept was addressed by Collen Mercer (Nottingham Trent University), Rod Fisher (CIRCLE/CCRN Round Table, 2000), Ritva Mitchell (Arts Council of Finland Research Department). Hatto Fisher (CIED Network, Greece) used the term social cohesion but never really defined it; or rather seemed to have many definitions (CCRN, 2000). There seem to be a sense at the conference that social cohesion was a work in progress. Rod Fisher informed us that the term was not widely used in England. Ritva Mitchell told the conference that Finnish policy planners prefer to use derivatives of the concept: social disintegration and cultural diversity. The conference agreed that this obvious variation in the interpretation of the term social cohesion should not detract from the value of the work that we were

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doing. However, this raised unanswered questions of measurement and comparison. If we could not define or measure social cohesion how could we expect to talk in a meaningful way about social cohesion and determine more concretely how it contributes to civil society. I had an exceptionally difficult time determining whether what we were talking about is any different from egalitarian or a free enterprise democratic society with a high degree of distributive justice: some highly desirable distribution of goods, services, opportunities to participate, rewards and compensations, and self esteem. On the personal level, I asked the question whether what was being presented was relevant to my determining my own sense of alienation or that of persons that believe themselves to be Black; or Chinese, or Italian. The answer was, yes. But mainly on the abstract level. Then I posed the question. Are Black people, as so perceived by White Canadians, among the least preferred, preferred or most preferred? Whenever Canadians have been polled on this question the answer has always placed Blacks among the least preferred. On a vast number of indexes of inequality this can be shown to be the case in every City across this country. On this dimension one would conclude that Blacks are not made to feel comfortable as full and desired citizens in Canada. Many other relevant factors can be identified that contribute to desired and undesired states of being. They can be ranked or measured to determine the state of well being of any sub-group. The relevance of this approach is in the fact that it seeks to measure, along a number of dimensional variables, the amount of alienation, inclusiveness or well being an individual in Canadian society experiences. Collen Mercer presented the conference with a set of variables that can be used to construct a "human development index." This method of measurement of a state or condition can be applied to quality assessments at the macro and micro levels of society. However, the problem remains determining what it is we wish to measure; and being able to define it in operational terms. Social cohesion in so far as it has to do with inclusion or exclusion from some social frame of reference will be affected by differences in preferences between groups, and the freedom to make choices motivated by those preferences. Studies on social cohesion should explore these differences.

Many of the CIRCLE/CCRN paper presentations disregarded differences between mainstream and minority sub-groups. A recent review by the Department of Canadian Heritage of research on social cohesion and cultural practices (Kirpitchenko and de Santis, 1999) point to the general tendency for researchers in this field to overlook ethnic minority cultural activities. This practice often leads to faulty analyses that fail to take into account the contrasting participation rates for the minority and majority groups. This point is made in the findings of research done by Michel Laroche, Chankon Kim and Marc

A. Tomiuk (1998). Their work strongly suggest that all ethnic groups exhibit consumer behaviour that are determined by lifestyles and values that are either of the "cultural resistant" category or the "cultural shift or cultural incorporation category." The research suggests that consumption behaviour should be examined as a function of both the reflective (based on values, beliefs and attitudes) and formative ethnicity indicators. Given the proven importance and explanatory power of these two types of ethnicity indicators, I find this tendency to disregard minorities in the paper presentations strange. Especially since every one talked about "managing diversity," "living together in a diversified society," "Canadian multiculturalism and diversity." On further reflection, I realized that the problem stemmed from the instated treatment of "social cohesion" as an ideal that CCRN/CIRCLE presenters seemed to unconsciously believe every one would opt for, once it was discovered and accepted as a good thing: a sort of physiocratic view of society. It is at this juncture that I decided that social cohesion would probably be better understood if it were regarded as an "output" of the exchange economy. In this context it would represent the well being of the individual and society as a function of the economic choices made by social and public institutions, and individuals in their private and public "spaces"; as well as the distribution of the private and social benefits of that society among individuals and diverse cultural groups. It is not simply the economic efficiency of the production of socially desirable quantities of goods and services that determines this sense and manifest realizations of social cohesion; but rather it is the degree to which we feel that we have met our functional needs, and some more, while at the same time enjoying the benefits and satisfaction of having created a more humane society and sustainable environment. One could experiment with the development of a social cohesion index by taking measurement on a number of structural, social and economic status and satisfaction indicators. At the upper end of the scale one would experience a state of rest where the system is in equilibrium, and where the society is producing and providing everything that is consistent with the greatest happiness of the largest number of citizens. That is to say a state where everyone, relative to his/her neighbour, is satisfied with his/her perceived and recognized position in society. On the lower end of the scale, the degree of dissatisfaction with social and economic disparities, pollution and environmental decay, cultural assimilation and decline, alienation and inhuman living conditions would be so great that it would cause severe forms of social protests, war, riots, civil disobedience, domestic and public violence.

2. A THEORETIC FRAMEWORK

It seems to me that social cohesion could be discussed within the theoretical framework of a Walrasian general equilibrium analysis (See Note 1). It is understood that when all the assumptions of the classical market model are met there is equilibrium in all markets and sectors of the economy. As long as the opportunity cost of all goods of every type are the same in all markets and are equal to the rate at which each consumer is substituting one good for the other the market equilibria will have met the Pareto optimality condition. The theory tells us that for a given technology and knowledge base there are many different distributions of wealth that will result in Pareto optimality. But the underlying classical general equilibrium market mechanisms do not guarantee an outcome that will necessarily be consistent with society being at the highest point on any social cohesion index. In fact, it cannot guarantee results that will produce any specified desired degree of "social cohesion." It is precisely dissatisfaction with this weakness that has lead to the search for a civil society theory.

An understanding of how the market model fails, leads to important insights and critical thinking about a number of public policy issues. The Heckscher-Ohlin or Edgewood geometric presentation have proven powerful instrument in helping us to explore the possible applications of Walrasian general equilibrium (Masc-Colell, Whinston and Green, 1995; Lancaster, 1957). To make practical sense the model must be adjusted to take into consideration the real world existence of consumer and producer external economies and diseconomies; fundamental dissimilarities in consumer preferences; differences in the concentration of wealth and ownership; sectorial differences in capacity to access and use technology; The exercise of monopoly power. The model tells us that the exercise of monopoly creates social cost that may be unacceptable. These costs are incurred in addition to the social cost of negative goods that may be produced as a part of the process of production in general (producer externalities): pollution, the destruction of non-replaceable natural resources; global warming and the destruction of the Ozone, etc. The exercise of monopoly power, and consumer and producer externalities are the major economic reasons for market failure. The uninhibited market does not take social cost into consideration and therefore tends to overproduce goods that have negative by-products associated with their production. On the other hand, the market does not reward suppliers for the social benefits of producing certain good or service. So the supplier tends to produce less than the socially desirable amount. I think it is fair to say that there is the possibility in the "laissez faire" market exchange economy to get close to maximizing our satisfaction with

respect to our strictly utilitarian needs, but at the same time creating an environment that keeps us on a low level of the social cohesion index. Because of market failure, Government intervention is required; or at least considered useful for regulating the use of monopoly power, especially with respect to essential or socially strategic (public) goods. The introduction of NGOs to the social and market system is a response to both market failure and government failure, as well as the failure of these civil society institutions/NGOs themselves. Obviously vigilance and awareness are extremely important to the maintenance of a desired state of social cohesion.

This response mechanism is external (exogenous) to the market system. But it is part of the democratic process in a "free society." It does not reject the market system as such. But, it reflects the fact that the profit oriented market system (corporate society) cannot or will not provide all the goods and services necessary to satisfy all the needs of the members of society; and at the same time produce a distribution of wealth and a quality of life that puts that society on the highest possible level of the social cohesion index. It recognizes that it requires non-profit oriented institutions (NGOs) to provide those goods and services that the corporate private sector will not; or cannot provide: alternative visions of society, teaching and sustaining the values of good citizenship and loyalty to community above and beyond profits, experiments in the development of healthy communities and institutions free from excesses of selfish individualism and corporate control; facilitating and monitoring the necessary transfers of wealth to adjust for market failure resulting from externalities; and the uneven distribution of the application of cost reducing technologies between the services sector (health, education, the arts, culture, etc) and the physical goods sector.

We can extend the analysis to include goods such as ideas (transmitted through the mass media and education institutions), culture goods of all types, public and social cohesion goods (preservation of the environment, protection of animals, healthy environments, parks, arenas, athletic facilities, cultural facilities, safety and protective services, etc). The model raises questions about the fairness of any distribution of wealth that is not uniform. It assumes that all individuals are identical in their preferences. Thus any sense of equity or distributive justice would require uniformity in the distribution of assets and or goods. But this would end the necessity to trade or to carry on exchange. Society would become atomistic in its economic functions. However, uniformity is impossible because of the dispersion in physical location and ownership of specialized resources (land, mineral resources, scenic value of landscapes, differences in

historical sites, art and cultural assets, etc). This means that if disproportionate ownership of resources is inevitable then equity, in the sense of uniformity, requires a new form of ownership or a different system of redistribution of the wealth created by the productive use of these resources. Unless, of course, one assumes that everyone will be satisfied with whatever share of the pie that the "invisible hand" serves him/her. The fact that this assumption is not realistic is partly the reason that issues of social cohesion arise. Poverty may be defined as not having the means to afford a lifestyle above the subsistence level. But one's self esteem and sense of progress is not measured in terms of distance from a subsistence income; but rather in terms of how well one is doing relative to one's fellow citizens. Income is partly a measure of that. But increasingly the research shows that "how income is spent" may provide an important index of social cohesion. Laroche *et al.* (1998) show that the goods that different ethnic minorities spend their incomes on can be classified as cultural resistant/incorporation products or cultural shift products. The first category is determined by their ethnic origin and are extremely resistant to acculturation. The second category is determined by the extent to which the group has been exposed to the culture of the other group. Therefore the traits which distinguish the various groups identity will play a role in determining whether the market is providing the kinds of goods that are necessary for a sense of the cultural wholeness of specific subgroups. In the Canadian case, this is particularly important in the cultural sector and the way funds are distributed for the funding of the arts and culture.

The classical market or exchange economy assume that there are no problems related to the asymmetry of information; there can be no exercise of monopoly power since the scale of organizations and firms are too small to influence the market, and consumers are indifferent as to which of the many suppliers meet their needs. On one hand, consumers are believed to be sovereign and independent in their choices and are motivated by the desire to maximize their satisfaction. On the other hand, the private sector firm's action are based on profit maximizing principles that form the rationale for their commitment to the provision of goods and services. Many critics see this profit motive and the rabid individualism (implied by the model) that drive consumer choices as anti-civil society forces. They see both behaviours as leading to excessive selfishness, the loss of the value of social action/community, greed and the diminishing of loyalty to community, the elimination of caring communities and democratic values. Not withstanding this, the perfectly competitive model places the failure of the market system to provide the socially desirable demand for goods and services, required to satisfy our utilitarian as well as hedonic and symbolic needs, at the feet of those in society that exercise monopoly power. That is, those that have inherited large

endowments of resources, own specialized resources, have exclusive access to information, and use their market position to control entry to or engineer exits from the market. Those who by virtue of the power represented by their ownership of a disproportionate share of capital resources can and do restrict the participation of entire classes of persons in the economy and society. The classical competitive model considers this type of exercise of power as an externality that causes the market to fail. Government intervention in the market to fund the arts and culture is properly prompted by the partly public nature of many aspects of the arts and the disadvantage arts institutions suffer by not being benefactors of productivity improvement due to technology progress to the same degree as the manufacturing and other sectors (Baumol and Bowen, 1966). But governments have created cultural monopolies which largely encourage acculturation on the Anglo and Franco conformity dimensions (Bayne, 1997).

The Walrasian general equilibrium illustrated in the theoretical construct of an Edgewood box allows us to examine the welfare properties of equlibria in an exchange economy. In particular, it allows us to examine social cohesion from the perspective of the ideal of Pareto optimality. That is to say an economic outcome (a set of social, cultural, economic, environmental conditions) for which there is no alternative feasible outcome and for which every individual in the economy is at least as well off and some individual is strictly better off. The internal logic of the model allows us to show that, provided certain characteristics of consumer behaviour exist, a desired level of social cohesion and Pareto optimality can be achieved by a transfer of wealth. However, the model does not address the effectiveness of certain methods for effecting transfers, like volunteerism and philanthropy, or the likelihood of successfully implementing government transfers in the face of resistance from powerful monopolists and neo-liberalists. It is this limitation that fuels the arguments of many among the civil society movement The spokespersons for this movement continuously point to the fact that Corporations pay less and less of their fair share of the tax burden. That the middle classes of Western democracies finance the welfare transfers. They argue that the emergence of global markets replaces trade by inter-company transfers and has created a complex international system of business that facilitate tax avoidance and reduce corporate accountability to any given state (Chomsky, 1997, 1999; Eberly, 2000).

3. INTERNATIONAL MONOPOLY POWER AND COMMUNITIES

Globalization focuses our attention on the relationship between society and national and multinational corporations. It draws attention to the role large corporations play in advancing civil society or frustrating its development. One of the major issues is the effect of globalization on small states; non-European economies, and subcultures and regional economies within larger communities and economies. It is believed that huge American corporations are dominating world trade and are through trade homogenizing the cultures of other societies and cultures. Moreover, they are exploiting the weak bargaining power of workers in third world countries and paying subsistence wages, or slightly better, in the interest of making large economic rents/profits. Large Corporations seek almost blindly the maximization of profits or the wealth of their shareholders. They transfer investments from high waged areas relocating their operations in third world countries where in the interest of reducing costs they disregard safety, the protection of the environment, the health of the local populations. In general they seek to avoid paying the social costs of doing business that they would be required to pay in the more industrially advanced economies. That is to say they transfer these costs to the third world governments and their societies. In many of these arrangements women and children are by circumstance forced to carry the burden of this feudal economic development supported by local governments. It is also argued that the transfer of capital to these societies result in major dismantling of industries in the industrially developed societies with the result of major reduction of employment among minority populations and the working classes created by capitalist forms of production. The impact of this is felt and born mainly by minorities that held these jobs. NAFTA is now know to have been not advantageous to either Canadian or American minorities and White working classes. It is also known that it was put in place by a concerted collusion between Canadian Government, The American Government with the support of the large Corporations, and the professional classes. The WTO international free trade initiatives are now being opposed by civil society groups that seek practical alternatives to globalization advanced by what is now popularly described as a neo-liberalism philosophy.

Neo-liberalism is an extension of aspects of the perfectly competitive model from trade in small geographic areas to the national economies to world economies. It is argued (Chomsky and others) that it holds out the illusion of the efficiency of competition in the organization of scarce resources; but essentially acts to restrict competition when the interest of the upper classes are not served; and seek competition

when they have the advantage. World trade is believed to be good because, as the free-trade model argument goes, it increases the number of goods and diversity of goods available to global populations at the lowest prices possible. The arguments are very persuasive as put by M. Friedman and when backed by Thatcher, Reagan, Clinton, Mulroney, the World Bank, and powerful industrialists. But the competition that is postulated is not the order of the day or what is advocated by the neo-classical theory. The national economies that are being represented by NAFTA and WTO are dominated by monopolists (national and multinational institutions); and the interest of monopolists are the opposite to what competition (Adam Smith's "invisible hand") is suppose to achieve. Monopolistic action/market strategy is intended to reduce competition, restrict output, homogenize products (in the interest of cost reduction) and let prices rise, or set prices in keeping with some desired private rate of return and let the market adjust quantities: in short, maximize profits or shareholders wealth. Monopolists seek gains in excess of the normal profits considered acceptable as part of the fair economic exchanges of perfect competition. Monopolists are also interested in maximizing power and control over others, for such is the nature of monopoly power: it is an a priori expectation of the nature of a niche market strategy and the notion of competitive advantage that consumers are discouraged from seeking or denied alternative choices by the corporate exercise of monopoly power.

This redistribution of wealth must rest on a theory of consumption and consumer preferences. Using the Edgewood box construct, lets us assume an exchange economy in which every one is a carbon copy of one person in every respect. In such a world, welfare redistributions of wealth by transfer payments is a simpler problem to solve than if we are dealing with a world of diverse consumer types. In the first case common ownership and equal distribution of all goods and services may be possible. Think of two groups (G1 and G2) in two regions (R1 and R2) that are identical in terms of their most fundamental material needs but sharply different in terms of their cultural and spiritual needs, Let us assume that one group (G1) has a greater abundance of capital resources and can produce the larger share of the total the production of the basic material things needed by the two regions. Let us suppose the second group (G2) has a scarcity of capital resources but has a greater number of resources in the arts and artefacts and lifestyles. According to the Hecksher-Olin model trade will take place such that Region2 will trade cultural art and cultural goods for essential material goods from Region1. This will of course be subject to the relationship between prices in factor market and prices in the goods and services markets. If the groups are culturally homogeneous. There may be no problem. A transfer of wealth can be effected that will ensure that the

distribution of all goods produced by the economy conforms to some acceptable Pareto optimality. If, however the two groups are culturally distinct, all though there may be some cross over in culture (acculturation of the formative type), it is much more difficult to achieve social cohesion. R1 may perceive that its cultural fabric (its sense of self and being uniquely rooted in a culture and certain traditions) is being threatened by R2 through the nature of the trade. Achieving the optimum social cohesion in such a case may be very difficult. Why? Because the assumption that the shape of the indifference curves for individuals in R1 and R2 are similar no longer holds true. For region 1, beyond a certain level of consumption of cultural imports the sense of being in a socially cohesive situation changes in a negative direction. This becomes worse if there is a sense that the development of local art and culture is being inhibited by a collusion between large producers and distributors in both regions. This adds the dimension of the sense of loss of control and community.

The problem becomes more complicated when we consider a culturally diverse population. A significant minority in R1 may closely identify with the culture and lifestyles of R2. They are therefore dependent on R2 cultural exports to R1. They may even be involved in the import and distribution of these goods and services. Now assume that the majority cultural group within R1 decides to take action to protect the perceived culture exclusive of consideration of the minority group. The question arises as to why would the minority wish or be expected to support the action of the majority group. If restrictions to these imports were to be imposed without the agreement of the minority, this would not be consistent with the overall objective of civil society, to maximize the sense of being in a situation of high social cohesion. For example, Blacks as a minority may not want to support the Mainstream Canadian concern with the homogenizing effect of certain aspects of American trade. Blacks in Canada see themselves reflected on most aspects of American culture and by virtue frequently. They don't see themselves represented and reflected in Canadian culture in any significant sense. If "Roots" were being shown at exactly the same time as CBC's prime time History of Canada, what would I do? I would have cheated myself and reduced my sense of esteem by looking at CBC's programme, which was essentially about how the French and British conquered and wiped out the Indians, after they (the Indians) helped them to stop the American invaders. According to that programme this country was not about us or any other minority for that matter. A solution to the problem is to increase the range of cultural goods produced by minorities within the context of an evolving Canadian society and economy. The sense of creating a new society creates National and Regional loyalties, and with this communities

to protect. This enhances social cohesion and moves individuals and communities on to higher levels of utility.

For some communities then, mainstream scholars and policy makers could be perceived as being more guilty of homogenizing subcultures in Canada than US trade can. When they speak of Canada's interest or Quebec interest it almost always is mainstream Canada or mainstream Quebec. It almost always is based on the assumption that the shape of the indifference curves for individuals in the exchange economy are similar, concave and strongly monotone. And that the prototype is either Anglo-saxon or Francophone.

They fail to take into consideration that the relevant basket of goods and services differ radically from one sub-group to the other. May be determined by both reflective and formative acculturation indicators, not just acculturation shift factors. The Doukhobors excluded cloths and British Canadian education from their market set. I think it is fair to say that there are no reference points on their indifference curve that correspond to an equivalent point on that of the average British Canadian. Order in Council 1203, Section 13, Statutes of Canada (1919) classified Doukhobors, Mennonites and Hutterites as undesirable immigrants for precisely this reason: "their peculiar customs, modes of life, and methods of holding property." There was no possibility of trade between the two groups. The measures of social cohesion for both groups were not strictly comparable. Forcing them to adopt the same consumption behaviours as other Canadians reduced their sense of social cohesion. This is similar to the actions taken by the Canadian and Provincial Governments to force the Indians through a process of White acculturation by removing their children from their care and educating them in religious schools. Mainstream culture could not accept that there are many different subsets of values, beliefs, traditions, goods, environments, systems of learning that generate and sustain different core personalities and societies. There may be little or no purpose for exchange between some of these minority or subgroups and mainstream society if, as it seems, preferences are dominated by ethnic affiliation characteristics.. Using force as part of the acculturation process is destructive of the social cohesiveness of the sub-group and ultimately the larger society, even if it creates an alternative reality that satisfies the creative urges of the acculturation group to fashion a society after its own image and likeness. It is a risky experiment that requires altering the personality of persons without any knowledge of the ultimate consequences.

4. THE CANADIAN REALITY

From a Black perspective, the reality in Canada today is that after 133 years of Confederation in a country that has been peopled by immigrants from every part of the world the dominant cultural institutions are almost entirely Anglo-Saxon or Francophone. Multiculturalism as a fundamental tenet of Nation building has won out over Anglo-conformity and Biculturalism. But the political reality and power of the concept of governance by two founding and equal peoples rule the day. Multi-culturalism has done very little to change the distribution of cultural assets and the allocation of operating funds between mainstream and minority cultural communities and institutions. This is true at the level of government funding agencies and at the level of private sector organizations. The contributions of private sector foundations to funding the arts, cultural and multicultural organizations were estimated at 58,3 $ million in 1996-1997. Of that, 1,6 $ million (2,7 %) went to multicultural and ethnic organizations. 13,8 % of this (just over a third of a percent) went to other groups that comprised of Amenian, Black, Celtic, East Indian, Multicultural, and Russian organizations. Black organizations received 100 000 $, less than 0,2 of a percentage. After 25 years of funding by Canada Council the Black Theatre Workshop receives between 20 000 $ and 30 000 $. Over the same period of time its funding from CACUM has risen at a snail crawl to 20 000 $. It has done much better from Quebec City: approximately 30 000 $-45 000 $ over the last 10 years. In Toronto, Black Theatre Canada died in the eighties in the process of negotiating support from Canada Council and Ontario Arts Council. Fountain Head has become a shell, echoing the failure of recognized Black professional actors to get professional funding. A few individual Black and ethnic artists get individual grants from various councils. But support for individual artists does not have the same social cohesive impact as creating and supporting cultural civil society agencies. In general, non-mainstream cultural institutions and practices remain essentially hidden in enclaves of the Canadian society. They are seldom celebrated at the National level; or have a permanent established presence at the National level or Provincial levels. The celebration Black history month by the city of Montreal is an exception. The exploitation of Carifiesta and Vues d' Afrique (Montréal), and Caribana (Toronto) as experiments in tourism are certainly worthy of serious mention. These events, like the St Patrick day parade, may highlight the cultures of particular communities but they are not integral to the daily celebration of cultural life in these cities. In most part, minority communities are expected to be consumers of mainstream culture. If art and cultural goods belong to the reflective rather than the formative category of goods, then the prediction of rapid growth in the representation of minority populations in the metropolitan areas of Canada is reason

for concern about possible ruptures in social cohesion as a result of resistance to mainstream cultural programming. These concerns were explored in a conference held at HEC, November 1997: "Cultural Organizations of the Future."

In Canada the strategy for supporting the high arts creates a professional class of arts creators whose role it is to entertain, delight and educate arts consumers. These arts creators are legitimized by their membership in formal or informal grouping of peers. This professional classification serves as a barrier to entry of new ethnic communities of artists seeking access to funding. This exclusion is supported by the creation of academies or regional cultural institutions that have the power of monopolies managed by mainstream cultural leaders. These institutions have a guaranteed existence sustained by government subsidies; and mainstream corporate and family foundations grants. They are protected from pressures for cultural reform by a network of mainstream artists organized into unions; and by the principle of evaluation by peers that underpin the arms length funding agreement with various levels of governments. The arms length principle makes these institutions almost impervious to change as suggested and reflected in the commitments to multiculturalism set out in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and formulated in the objectives of the Multicultural Bill. The notion of excellence as the critical factor in deciding who gets funded and who does not is determined by mainstream artists and cultural leaders whose aesthetic experiences and core cultural values and beliefs make them insensitive to forms of culture and aesthetics that are not grounded in European historical references. Excellence becomes an abstraction identifiable only in the eyes of the defenders of mainstream culture. Thus in every minority community there is an non-government funded cultural sub-economy resistant to this form mainstream cultural colonialism and which shows a face of Canada that has little or no public presence. There is on the public cultural dimension a tear in the fabric of social cohesion that needs mending.

NOTE 1

The Heckscher-Ohlin trade model is a general equilibrium model based on the Edgeworth Box Diagram approach to describing different types of exchange economy. It is based on the assumption that perfect competition exists and is a desirable ideal. This type model has a wide range of applications from the pure exchange economy with two individual having different proportionate shares of any two goods to a

situation involving more than one economy, two or more goods and two or more factors.

The defining assumptions of the simple model involving two or more regions are as follows:

· All regions produce the same two commodities, using the same two factors, using processes defined by the same two production functions.

· The production functions for both goods involve the use of both factors, are homogeneous, convex, and with constant returns to scale.

· The production functions are such that the relative factor intensities are the same at all factor prices which are the same in both industries. That is the labour-intensive good remains the labour-intensive good.

· There is perfect competition in all markets and full employment of all resources.

· There are no transport or similar costs, and no tariffs or other trade barriers.

· The relative endowments of the two factors vary from region to region, or country to country.

· Consumer preferences are identical in all countries.

By assuming constant returns to scale in both industries the model eliminates the effect of economies of scale. Constant cost prevails. There is no incentive to be large. Also if we assume identity in knowledge and skills with respect to the two types of activities there is no advantage in the movement of factors between the two industries. Both factors are substitutable to the same degree in each of the two industries. The only differences are in the endowment of factors held by the two groups respectively; and the factor intensities required to produce one good vs the other.

Let us assume a two goods economy. According to this theory productive resources must be allocated such that the ratio of the marginal productivities of any two factors (say, Labour and Capital) used to produce a particular good must be equal to the ratio of the marginal productivities of the same resources used to produce the second good. The assumptions of the model allows us to answer a number of ques-

tions by stripping away a number of confounding factors. One very useful thing it reveals is that exchange will take place (either on a regional basis; international basis or between groups) because of differences in the amount of productive resources owned by the two groups (countries, states, provinces, regions).

NOTE 2

Jill Humphries, *Foundations Support to Arts, Cultural and Multicultural Organizations*, CCRN, May, 2000.

Note: An analysis of foundation support to performing arts, visual arts, heritage and multicultural and other cultural organizations, taken from Canadian Centre for Philanthropy 1996/97 data. Published by the Nonprofit Management and Leadership Program, Schulicvh School of Business, York University, with support from Department of Canadian Heritage, and Onyario Arts Council.

The study showed that 31 % of the Foundations covered by the study supported arts and culture. A total amount of 58,3 $ million given in grants in 1996-1997. *0 % of all foundation grants were from family foundations. 1,6 % million (2,7 %) went to multicultural and ethnic organizations; slightly more than a third of a percent went to other cultural groups: Amenians, Black, Celtic, East Indian, Multicultural, Russian. Black organizations accounted for 100 000 $.

NOTE 3

Monday, August 24th, 1988, 26 Canadian well known artists and cultural leaders met in Ottawa in order to protest against budget cuts imposed upon the Arts Council of Canada. Among those personalities there were no Blacks or Asians or artists of any other visible minorities or from institutions representing that part of the world of culture (*The Gazette*, "Stars of Art Protest Canada Council Funding Cuts," Tuesday, August 25, 1988).

NOTE 4

The International Carribean Carnival Association (ICCA) saw birth in Montréal on November 15, 1986. It is an umbrella organization of groups of carnivals and festivals of West Indies in the United States, in Canada and in Europe. Its purpose is the promoting, facilitating and coordinating the programmes of its body members, with a view on their continuous development and the institutionalization of the West Indies carnival/festival event having a social value, as well as a cultural and an economic one, whether in Canada, in the United States, in the United Kingdom or elsewhere in the world. This organization is seeking to use the Carnival for promoting cooperation and unity between population of all races, cultures and nationalities.

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Québec, its Cultural Policies and the Handing Down of Culture in a Time of Globalization

Diane Saint-Pierre[*]

Québec society is living a paradox common to other "smaller societies," which are numerically and linguistically in a minority: on the one hand, they aspire to the economic advantages globalization might bring; on the other hand, they need to protect their culture, the core of their identity and its specificity, in order to hand their culture down to future generations. For forty years, governments in Québec have played a decisive role in the development and protection of the arts and culture of Québec. They have created institutions, improved infrastructure and helped support the creation of professional organizations.

The central question raised by the theme of this colloquium, but also by the mandate given to us by its organizers is the following one: in the context of globalization, whose principal characteristic is a struggle to be free of government controls, do Québec's cultural policies offer a sufficient number of guarantees which at the same time ensure access to the world, strengthen Québec culture, and ensure its handing down to the next generations? I shall try to answer that question in two steps.

The first one is meant essentially to briefly recall the role played by the government of Québec in recent

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decades. It established a powerful link between Québec identity and the handing down of its culture. The second step brings us to the idea of "thinking globally, acting locally." In that sense, I shall talk briefly about municipal cultural policies, one of the channels for the handing down of culture. But before that, let's have a look at the origins of the notion of "cultural policy."

During recent decades, several international authorities and organizations have tried to define cultural policies, to map them out them, and to give them new orientations. Literature on the subject has proliferated, concerned not just with the notion of "cultural policy" but with themes closely related to it, such as "cultural needs," "cultural rights," "cultural development," "the democratization of culture," "cultural democracy" and, more recently, themes of "cultural exception" and "cultural diversity." Like other Western countries, the cultural operations of the Québec government have been influenced by international policies and organizations. Let us look briefly at the evolution of public interventions in that area in recent decades, where several of these central themes can be found.

In Québec, during the 1960s and 1970s, public interventions in the field of culture contributed to the development and of a consciousness of identity as a Québec nation, mostly francophone, and the heir of a rich heritage. Cultural policies and public programmes allowed for the emergence, the building up and the assertion of a new collective consciousness. Cultural institutions, along with cultural production in the literary and artistic realms, heavily supported by the State, are all excellent instruments not only for the handing down of culture, but powerful instruments for solidarity and cohesion through which every citizen of Québec can build up identities, both individually and collectively. The emergence and the development of a Québec identity — no longer simply French Canadian — have outstripped Québec's politicians with respect to the federal Government.

One of the first developments in that direction was the creation of the Ministry of Cultural Affaires in 1961: Québec's government asserted its role and responsibilities for the flourishing of the arts, but also for the protection and dissemination of a cultural identity based mainly on francophone language and culture.

Some years later, in a vast survey which ended up with the *White Paper on Culture* (1965), the Liberal minister, Pierre Laporte, proposed a "cultural action plan," whose foundation was "cultural identity." In fact, Laporte tried to expand the scope of his ministry, which had been created four years earlier, over the

entire domain of the arts, including cinema, arts and crafts, cultural commodities, sciences, etc.

Even if the *White Paper* had not formally been made public, provincial elections having led to a change of government, it must be emphasized that the 1960s were characterized by the creation of a number of institutions, with nationalist connotations, and bold for that time: *L'Office de la langue française* in 1961, *Délégation générale du Québec* in Paris in 1962, *Service du Canada français d'outre-frontières* in 1963, *Direction générale de l'Immigration* in 1966, *Radio-Québec* in 1968, among others. At the same time, the Ministry of Education was an important contributor to the changes taking place in Québec society. Other ministries, which also had cultural dimensions, were created: Immigration in 1968, and Communications in 1969.

A decade after the White Paper of Pierre Laporte, the "Green Paper" *Pour l'évolution de la politique culturelle du Québec* (1976) of Liberal minister Jean-Paul L'Allier was brought before the National Assembly. In it, since priority was given to active support of cultural activities, to their dissemination and to accessibility, the policy suggested among other things "a transfer from different sectors of the public service to para-public bodies," like the *Régie du Patrimoine*, the *Société de gestion du patrimoine immobilier*, the *Commission de la bibliothèque et des archives nationales*, the *Commission des musées*, etc. But, as with the *White Paper* of 1965, L'Allier's proposal coincided with a new political reality: the election of a new government in November 1976.

In fact, in response to a "federal cultural offensive," the PQ government decided to create a superministry which included Cultural Affairs, Education, Communications, and Leisure and Immigration, all the ministries having to do with culture. Implemented with a view to competing with the resources of the federal government, the actions of that superministry seemed to bog down, until it was phased out in 1982. Certain decisions the Ministry of Cultural Affairs could have taken were lost in the shuffle (Fortier and Schafer, 1989: 45). One thing is obvious. In his *White Paper*, Laurin argues that the anthropological notion of culture — and the underlying question of the handing down of culture — becomes totally meaningful when it becomes the "core of life" where "the whole of existence is about the production of culture" (Québec, *White Paper*, 1978: 9).

Let us summarize the Québec government's initiatives since the beginning of the 1990s, a period which corresponds to the publication of the *Politique culturelle du Québec*, brought before the Québec National

Assembly in June 1992 (Saint-Pierre, 2001a). If we include the statements mentioned earlier (White Papers and Green Paper), eleven successive documents have been brought down or debated between 1964 and 1992 (see table); as for the Ministry of Cultural Affairs, it has seen more than fifteen titulars, each trying to leave their mark. In trying to offer a broad perspective on the main initiatives of the Québec Government during the past 40 years, one could say that the 1960s were characterized by the creation of important national institutions, the 1970s by measures for protecting the French language, the 1980s by an increase in the number of cultural bodies and, in the 1990s, by the change of scale mentioned earlier: municipalities take charge of the cultural development of local and regional communities, and the *Conseil des arts et des lettres* takes charge of other cultural institutions and areas.

In fact, if the sometimes sweeping central statements of the cultural policies of Laporte, L'Allier and Laurin were like the ideas found in documents dealing with "projects of societies," it must be said that during the 1980s, the content, if not the tone of the papers, changed dramatically.[1] Caught up in the problem of funding artists, producers and cultural industries, the minister of Cultural Affairs of Québec, Liza Frulla-Hébert released, in June 1992, a document entitled *La politique culturelle du Québec*. This new statement was an important change compared to the "traditional" role of the Ministry of Cultural Affairs. Its mandate was widened and gave it a new "horizontal" role — prompting other ministries (about twenty of them plus government corporations), municipalities and other partners to include culture in their own responsibilities — while putting forward new concerns, including ensuring a "wider opening to cultures of the world," and putting more emphasis on the regional and international dimensions of culture (Québec, *La politique culturelle du Québec. Notre culture, notre avenir*, 1992: 15). The new Ministry of Culture was also given the mandate of harmonizing and coordinating regional ministerial activities, through global agreements with municipalities and the MRC, while maintaining exclusive control in specific fields: heritage, cultural technology, museums, libraries, historic sites, professional training and cultural industries.

Not only did this policy place emphasis on the horizontal dimensions for coordinating government activity, it has also led to two important pieces of legislation, the first modifying the *Loi sur le ministère des Affaires culturelles* (new functions and orientations), the second creating the *Conseil des arts et des lettres du Québec*, which had been called for by artists since the 1960s.

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[1] See the Action Plan of the minister Clément Richard in 1983, or the *Bilan – actions – avenir* of the minister Lise Bacon in 1988.

The last part of this presentation is meant to echo one of the elements of the 1992 cultural policy, which was intended to establish a new partnership with the municipalities in Québec. It is also meant to be an echo of a recent reform, because during the last two years, the Québec government has made known its intention to reorganize municipalities (L.R.Q., 2000) and to modify certain pieces of legislation (*idem*, 2001). We already know that this municipal reorganization will have important repercussions on the cultural and artistic development of cities in Québec.

If the municipalities of Québec, saw their responsibilities in the domain of culture confined to public libraries and sometimes to heritage in the 1960s and early 1970s, it can be said that this realm has been significantly broadened since then. At the same time, the "cultural decentralization," which began in Québec in the 1970s with the first regional bureaus of the Ministry of Cultural Affairs and the first Regional Councils on Culture, was accelerated in the 1980s, and was soon reinforced with a new way of managing local "cultural affairs."

It must be said that during the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, as mentioned earlier, discussions about culture changed in nature, caught up in a new game that can be called: the new ideology of the liberal state. Based on a serious questioning of the capabilities and responsibilities of the state, the economic realities and social demands of the public, that ideology relies on a foundation which is free of government control: globalization of the economy, free markets, and the advent of new technologies.

During the same period, it is interesting to observe that several Western countries sought to overcome their fears of cultural globalization by re-discovering local and regional cultures, which had been greatly neglected and even forgotten. What seemed then to characterize the phenomenon of globalization, implying the handing down of national cultures, was a change of scale: a move toward the cultural realities of a "smaller society." In fact, the more one thinks globally, the more different governments, either national, local or municipal become conscious they have to act locally (Saint-Pierre, 2001b). This phenomenon can be found not just in "smaller societies." Even France, the world leader among Francophone countries, has taken steps in that direction.

Through the implementation of municipal cultural policies since the beginning of the 1990s, the government of Québec seems to have placed itself in a "new" stream, whose purpose is to make the municipal partnership a privileged level of development and, of course, of the handing down of culture. In the

context of shared responsibilities, the municipality establishes a cultural policy, chooses its priorities and makes clear the kinds of services it intends to offer its citizens, with the help of an action plan for ensuring cultural development. Among several objectives, municipal cultural policies aim at defining more clearly the cultural identities of the residents of local and regional communities, but also at becoming more aware of the expectations and needs of their populations, their artists and their cultural institutions.

To sum up, during the last decade, Québec's municipalities have gradually taken over fields formerly the responsibility of the Ministry of Culture; it remains to be seen what sorts of fruit such initiatives will bear. During the last ten years, several Québec municipalities have created their own cultural policies whose aims, generally speaking, are to strengthen and develop the domains of arts and letters, heritage, museology and popular events (Dalphond, 2000). In February 2001, according to data gathered by the Ministry of Culture and Communications of Québec, 73 municipalities and 12 regional county municipalities had adopted cultural policies.

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To conclude this presentation, I am going to place the emphasis on two particular suggestions.

In the first place, I believe it is now time to consider and analyze the different kinds of cultural policies one finds in Canada. The Council of Europe has done similar studies, as part of a vast programme of cooperation.[2] In my opinion the same thing has to be done here, since culture has traditionally been shared among the three levels of government. This sharing of jurisdiction is a reality which for decades has shaped government interventions, federal as well as those of Québec.

Among Canadian provinces and levels of government, it seems that cultural policies are more or less centralized, more or less rooted in the past or oriented toward contemporary creation, more or less dependent upon public funds, regardless of whether they are English Canadian, French Canadian or Québécois.

It is clear that globalization leaves all governments, federal, provincial and municipal, facing similar problems. I believe there is ground for transverse studies and comparisons which may allow us to ask precise questions about common problems, and to examine, appraise and make public the different political

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[2] The studies of the cooperation programme of the Council of Europe are about two precise topics: "national cultural institutions in transition" and "cultural policies and diversity" (see the following Internet Site: http://www.culture.coe.fr/clt/fcuexam).

answers that are being and will continue to be brought forward. Such a project could have a number of benefits, one of them being the establishment of cooperative relationships in the sharing of knowledge and expertise in this field, but access to such comparative studies could also be useful in developing common and shared political strategies in the face of the rapid evolution of the world's economic and social contexts.

My other suggestion is more closely linked with the theme of this colloquium, because when talking about the handing down of culture, one talks of meaning, about the proper and common values of societies. Confronted with "new" actors in the field of culture, who, as underlined by Vincent Lemieux (1996: 195-196), speak "a discourse which can be called collectivizing, as it valorizes collective identities, at whatever level," these actors being agents defining and handing down collective values (members of municipal councils, public administrators, faculty members, pressure groups, Canadian and Québec coalitions, non-governmental organizations), I think it is time that researchers and analysts investigate the role and impact of those actors, and the values and beliefs they represent and hand down.

I do not think it is necessary to point out that governing, nowadays, is becoming a more and more complex activity which goes beyond the traditional institutional framework. What has happened in recent years, especially with the negotiations of the World Trade Organization (GATT prior to 1995) — the failure of the Seattle Conference in December 1999, or the demonstrations at Davos (Switzerland) and at Porto Alegre (Brazil) — or the recent Third Summit of the Americas, held in Québec City in April 2001 in the framework of the negotiations of the Free Trade Zone of the Americas, show us with certainty that the zone of influence of political institutions, as well as the influence of their leaders, is changing rapidly.

In spite of the size of the phenomenon, pressure groups and coalitions in the world of culture, along with other social stakeholders, have not been paid sufficient attention by researchers and analysts. It's about time we put them under our lenses.

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Table:
Ministerial and/or Government Documents (White or Green Papers, Action Plans) Concerning Culture and Related Matters, 1964-1992*

Year		Title	Targeted Sector
1965	(1)	*Livre blanc de la culture* (Ministry of Cultural Affairs; entitled "White Paper")	Culture
1971	(2)	*Pour une politique québécoise des communications: document de travail* (Ministry of Communications; entitled later as "Green Paper")	Communications
1976	(3)	*Pour l'évolution de la politique culturelle* (Ministry of Cultural Affairs; called "Green Paper")	Culture
1977	(4)	*La politique québécoise de la langue française* (State Ministry of Cultural Development)	Culture (*Language*)
1977	(5)	*La politique québécoise du développement culturel* (State Ministry of Cultural Development; called "White Paper")	Culture (*Development*)
1979	(6)	*Pour une politique québécoise de la recherche scientifique* (State Ministry of Cultural Development; document presented as a "political statement"; called "White Paper" (*Le Soleil*, December 3, 1980: E9)	Culture (*Science*)
1980	(7)	*La juste part des créateurs. Pour une amélioration du statut socio-économique des créateurs québécois* (State Ministry of Cultural Development; document presented as a "political statement", called also "White Paper" (*Le Soleil*, December 3, 1980: E9)	Culture
1981	(8)	*Autant de façons d'être Québécois. Plan d'action du gouvernement du Québec à l'intention des communautés culturelles* (State Ministry of Cultural and Scientific Development; document presented as an action plan)	Cultural communities
1988	(9)	*Bilan-actions-avenir* (Ministry of Cultural Affairs; operation launched in 1988 and whose purpose is to make on evaluation, and to identify priorities for the future)	Culture
1992	(10)	*La politique culturelle du Québec. Notre culture, notre avenir* (Ministry of Cultural Affairs; mentioned as the "first government cultural policy")	Culture (*Government institutions, municipalities, etc.*)

* For the years 1964-1984, see: Gaston Deschênes, Coll. Madeleine Albert, *Livres blancs et livres verts au Québec, 1964-1984,* Québec, Library of the National Assembly, 1986.

The World Needs More Canada. Canada Needs More Canada

Robin Higham[*]

1. INTRODUCTION

The Canadian government has demonstrated a persistent inability to mo-bilize the resources needed to make a serious cultural diplomacy policy operational. That cultural diplomacy is a real policy priority, has proven to be amongst the most durable of Canada's foreign affairs myths. Whenever officials, politicians and other Canadians take time out to reflect on the directions they want to go in our foreign policy, the notion of cultural diplomacy as a fundamental instrument of our presence abroad consistently ranks near the top. But the doctrine of plain language fails us here. It might be posted on the website, but it seems that we do not really mean it.

Consider the government's response to the 1994 cross-Canada foreign policy consultations. Tabled in parliament in its 1995 Foreign Policy statement *Canada in the World*, the government set out three objectives for Canadian foreign policy and for the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade:

·   the promotion of prosperity and employment;

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·   the protection of our security within a stable global framework;

·   *the projection of Canadian values and culture in the world.*

Two years later, the priority had apparently lost no ground. The Department's self-assigned raison d'être, the Mission Statement of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, which was tabled in the House of Commons in 1997 reads like this: "To act for Canada and all Canadians to enhance prosperity, employment and security and work toward a peaceful world *by the promotion of Canadian culture and values*."

And yet cultural diplomacy and "the promotion of Canadian culture and values" remains at best a sidebar activity with marginal resources and staffing in the Department which is responsible for its execution and management. There is equally marginal collaboration and support from the various cultural and funding agencies of the federal government.

2. WHAT IS CULTURAL DIPLOMACY? A COMPONENT OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

Public diplomacy is generally understood to be what governments do (usually, but not always, through their embassies and consulates abroad) to influence foreign democracies *through their citizens...* public diplomacy is initiatives for shaping public opinion abroad. There are usually three main components of a complete public diplomacy program:

·   **Media relations:** explaining contemporary national issues and national objectives to, and through, the foreign media;

·   **Academic relations:** building and strengthening of links between foreign intellectuals and future decision-makers (students in higher-education), and their counterparts at home;

·   **Cultural diplomacy:** "making yourselves interesting" to opinion makers and decision makers and the public abroad.

As is the case with international media relations and academic relations, cultural diplomacy has an unabashed and pragmatic national-interests rationale. The cultural diplomacy idea is to get decision-makers in other countries to think about us whenever they are looking for alliances and partners to collaborate in the pursuit of common goals, be they human security, environmental, economic, social or academic. At its most effective, an embassy's cultural diplomacy program usually targets a specific demographic. The target population is chosen according to the decision-maker profile of the host country. That target demographic profile can range from elite to popular. The choice is usually a function of the degree and nature of the country's democratic evolution... the degree to which citizens influence public policy decisions.

But heads up! It is important not to confuse the notion of Cultural Diplomacy with the notion of International Cultural Relations. International Cultural Relations, as funded and encouraged by national governments at least, generally have a different objective, cultural development... that of building a country's competence and capacity for its own artistic expression through international exposure and collaborations abroad with other artistic or cultural professionals. The Alliance française, the Goethe Institute, the British Council, the Japan Foundation and even Canada Council were founded in varying degrees on the cultural development/international cultural relations rationale and less as tools designed exclusively for cultural diplomacy.

Notwithstanding their differing primary objectives, Cultural Diplomacy and International Cultural Relations are intimately linked and can in fact lead to similar kinds of initiatives abroad. Activities undertaken in either file (or either budget line) almost always deliver important benefits to the objectives of the other. It is difficult in fact to avoid the by-product benefits of "making oneself interesting" in a foreign policy sense when engaging in a cultural exchange with much more altruistic objectives. And the opposite is equally true: mobilizing cultural professionals to "make us interesting"cannot but help to building experience and capacities of a nation's artists to discover, express and refine its own cultural character. *But the challenge for foreign policy policy-makers and for those who would influence them, has always been to understand the subtle but distinct objectives of the separate activities, and the consequent distinct centres of policy responsibility and budget lines.*

But, alas, these two files do share, along with most other cultural programs of governments in Canada, one unfortunate stigma. The costs of delivering their programs and policies are inescapably measurable in monetary terms whereas the benefits are stubbornly measurement-resistant when using a dollars ac-

counting yardstick. The consequence of that shared stigma, the costs-benefits handicap, is well known amongst arts professionals everywhere. When times are tough, the tough cuts start here.

3. A GLANCE AT FOUR SUCCESSFUL NATIONAL CULTURAL DIPLOMACY MODELS

France, the country which can claim to have invented the cultural diplomacy idea, still puts about 1/3 of the nation's foreign affairs budget into cultural and academic relations (at one point recently, that 1/3 was the equivalent in spending power to the total Canadian Foreign Affairs budget). The French have a *Mission civilisatrice* which quite simply seeks to demonstrate, and generate respect for, French artistic and intellectual supremacy. The effectiveness of maybe three centuries of French cultural diplomacy is so persuasive that many other European countries have been pulled into its vortex. Many governments try, few succeed, to compete with the French model on its terms rather than on their own. If one ever needed persuading that cultural diplomacy has exploitable economic or trade consequences, just note that we pay more for a litre of French "designer" bottled water than we do for a litre of high-octane for the BMW. And the high octane is 75% domestic tax. That *Mission civilisatrice* translates just as effectively to foreign exchange earnings power through international markets for French fashion, jewellery, wine, food products... in fact the high-end of almost the entire spectrum of "essential" luxury products and, of course tourism. The love of French culture has long established it as by far the number one world tourist destination.

The **USA** feels the need for neither international intellectual supremacy nor a domestic ministry of cultural affairs. But the US Americans have decided that cultural diplomacy is becoming so important that their State Department has taken full control of the venerable US Information Service. State Department is now training its diplomats as never before, on how to employ cultural diplomacy in the advancement of many of its objectives abroad. But we are not in French territory here. The motivation is largely driven by a desire to demonstrate the US *Model of Democratic Capitalism*... the model of the supremacy of private enterprise. Why is there no need for a cultural ministry to back it up? Because, as somebody we all know once said, "the medium is the message.".. the US government's cultural diplomacy partners for helping the world to understand the benefits of US democratic capitalism, are the US entertainment/cultural industries themselves.

Since the end of the war **Japan** has set itself a clear cultural diplomacy mission aimed at escaping an overly tenacious image of a closed and strictly traditional society. Theirs is a *Mission modernisatrice* (!), one which seeks to demonstrate (and to market) the remarkable Japanese competencies in "Western" technologies, western design, and cultures and the arts too. Rather than setting out to differentiate themselves from their neighbours, Japanese cultural diplomacy is bent on showing target audiences that, in terms of tastes and preferences "we are just like you… only we do it better in some very interesting ways." And because they claim it abroad they set out to do it at home.

The **Australians** have just come out of a major cultural diplomacy *blitzkrieg*… the 2000 Sydney Summer Olympics. The Australians capitalized on the once-in-a-century opportunity to demonstrate before a global audience, their uniquely *Australian National Style* of self-confidence, enthusiasm and energy. That renewed Australian image will doubtless require an extensive and expensive long-term program of public-diplomacy maintenance and it will be interesting to see if that happens and if it can be made to work. Can they continue to make space for Australian voices outside Australia?

As for **Canada**, there seems to be less to say when describing our current mission abroad. So let me propose some policy clarification.

4. TWO ARGUMENTS FOR AN ENHANCED CANADIAN CULTURAL DIPLOMACY PRIORITY

4.1 **The first argument** is in terms of Canada's international affairs' objectives. Shall we call cultural diplomacy what it is?… self-interested national-propaganda, distributed, broadcast or "narrowcast" internationally. From that perspective, objectives for our cultural diplomacy might include:

·   to generate more interest in Canada by foreign tourists, investors, importers, researchers, brain-gain immigrants, foreign students;

·   to generate more export business for our cultural industries, books, films, and tv productions, and professional artists services in all disciplines… the more Canada you sell, the more Canada they "buy.".. and that can include Canadian ideas and perspectives;

· to build "Soft Power.".. with few guns and fewer $s, Canada's international public image and consequent persuasiveness abroad is all we have to bring others to our point of view on major global issues;

· to assist the emerging democracies and help bring peace in the world's troubled regions. More justice and better human rights abroad saves costly peace-making and peace-keeping interventions (Peace-keeping in ex-Yugoslavia alone has cost Canadians 5 $ billion in the past ten years). In order to be convincing about a spending priority for cultural diplomacy, it is often useful to demonstrate net financial benefits to national accounts. Cultural diplomacy which suggests, however subtly, how the Canadian model for governing its diversity might be employed to assist peaceful coexistence, could well be money in the bank for taxpayers... the peace-dividend argument.

· to make us interesting. Others who have established themselves as "interesting" are pushing us off the screen and out of the news. Just like the other "niche" or small cultures in an overpowering *national* cultural environment, fighting for survival *internationally* means staking out space for Canada in the international media. Silence leaves us disenfranchised and without influence or legitimacy in the global arena. There is a persuasive argument along the lines that because Canadian culture is precisely non-distinctive, that it accommodates rather than excludes, our message requires not less effort and resources but much more, and more original, initiatives to make ourselves interesting, understood and influential. The arts, cultural diplomacy, can deliver that message for us.

4.2 **The second argument** for an enhanced national project of cultural diplomacy can be made in terms of *domestic* Canadian objectives:

· to help develop and strengthen our culture and arts communities at home, that is our capacity to express ourselves as a people and better able to understand the cultural expressions of the "others" amongst us;

· to help make Canada interesting... to Canadians, through discovering what makes us interesting to others;

· to help build an improved identity awareness within Canada... to assist in the location of a national

identity and in doing so to contribute to our own social cohesion (willingness to share, to act together);

· to help legitimize and build upon our diversity at home, through demonstrating Canada's diversity advantage abroad;

· to provide a stage for more French-English or two-solitudes collaboration in a national project abroad, through the low-risk medium of joint cultural initiatives;

· to help counter-balance the pressures of global homogenization. Under the hypnotic attractions of global commercial entertainment, as a nation we can lose the habit of self expression... and end up by having nothing to say. Some (Canadian) critics say we are already there, that we are so fully anesthetized by global commercial programming and by the culture of commerce, that we have become exclusively consumers of other peoples cultural expressions and productions;

· to engage Canadians through our artists, intellectuals and entertainers in global conversations. Zero cultural diplomacy is not an option. Silence implies indifference and that we have nothing to say. That degree of disengagement from the global village is one of the few things which might merit the label of being culturally "un-Canadian";

· to provide the federal government with a window for facilitating the nation's cultural expression. Cultural diplomacy is an international activity, federal government turf. The provincial government claimed monopoly on domestic cultural affairs (which may tend to compromise pan-Canadian cohesion) can be legitimately accompanied at the federal level through cultural diplomacy. The increased facilitation of cultural expression abroad is an under utilized low-risk technique for building Federal relevance in cultural affairs;

· to capitalize on the phenomena of the "conditioning stereotype." We may eventually become what we claim to be. Cultural diplomacy can have an important impact on domestic policies by instigating national compliance with our own image abroad. It is more difficult to sin while you are claiming saintliness. Some past conditioning stereotype examples which have inspired us to work to improve public policies include:

1.   The impact which international criticism of our forest management practices has had on making policy changes at home. Our self-image as being environmentally responsible was offended and has led to better citizen monitoring of the forest industries;

2.   Our claim to being champions of human rights led to extreme public discomfort when the living conditions of our first nations' became international news;

3.   As self-proclaimed humanitarians, we have been mobilized to change practices with respect to leg-hold traps for trapping wild animals and the harvesting of seal pups;

4.   As proud peace-builders the comportment of some members of their armed forces in recent missions abroad was devastating to Canadians. As a result the Armed Forces are now launched into a twenty year program to bring their culture into line with that of their citizen-shareholders.

These are all examples where a public desire to live up to our international and self-image has driven major policy changes at home. At a provincial/national level the Québec government has used the conditioning stereotype factor by mobilizing its own international cultural diplomacy program to demonstrate its "national character" abroad and ensuring that its remarkable success abroad is understood at home.

5. CONCLUSION: *Une mission canadienne?*

Could the persistent absence of a credible federal government response to its own long-recognized need for a vibrant cultural diplomacy program, be the result of an inability to come up with a theme, *une mission canadienne?* The DFAIT mission statement quoted in the introduction to this paper, while implicitly embracing the logic for cultural diplomacy, fails to suggest what is meant by "Canadian culture and values" or how the promotion of that abroad, might contribute to global stability, Canadian prosperity or the well-being of Canadians. If we have difficulty with beavers, Mounties, hockey, forests, furs, fish, maple syrup, mining and cold winters as worthy of a sustained and marketable national image abroad, what is left? "Eh"? What have we got to talk about which is relatively unique to Canada and yet supportive of

both our international and domestic objectives? What kind of Canadian public image abroad is going to reinforce and sustain our soft power, our ability to persuade others to share Canadian perspectives and values in the multilateral fora and in bilateral relationships as well? What images of Canada and Canadians can make us more attractive to tourists, investors, qualified immigrants, foreign students, academics and researchers? And finally, what characteristics and experiences could we showcase abroad, which would provoke positive public policy and citizen responses at home?

Is the answer to those questions, the national mobilization of cultural diplomacy as a prime vehicle to articulate and improve upon the handing down of the *Canadian Model for governing and building on its diversities*? A new program of cultural diplomacy should both assert and demonstrate that our version of democracy-for-diversity, is worthy of examination for its potential as a route to peaceful coexistence and stability across national and international differences. This re-jigging of the founding French notion of the *mission civilisatrice* for cultural diplomacy would become in Canadian hands *une mission de civisme…* of civility. It would highlight the dividends potential of making space for otherness in the many communities everywhere which are experiencing inescapable or no-choice diversity. It would demonstrate the ennui of the kinds of homogeneity proposed by proponents of racism and religious fundamentalism. Through cultural and arts and academic initiatives, a strengthened cultural diplomacy would showcase the creativity and innovative advantages of our diversity governance model and its relevance to knowledge based economies and societies of the twenty-first century.

And a cultural diplomacy mission built around such a model would surely generate profound national embarrassment whenever we were caught sinning against it through image-inconsistent practices and policies at home. Wonderful!

But no matter how that model or mission might be defined, just embracing it in the objectives and mission statements of federal departments and agencies is not enough. Like toothpaste, it only works if you use it. The wisdom of those good intentions will make little difference to our success either abroad or at home until we act on them. Over to you DFAIT, Canadian Heritage, Treasury Board, PMO and the provinces.

The American Sphere of Influence, the World Free Market and Municipal and Regional Cultural Policies: the Québec Case

Michel de la Durantaye[*]

1. INTRODUCTION

Some time after the Summit of the Americas, which was held in Québec City amid controversy and behind closed doors, it seems appropriate to talk about the handing down of culture and of cultural identity in the context of globalization.

The levels of governance that make up local municipalities, regional municipalities and urban communities, are geographically and socially a better location for interventions, being more efficient and better able to counteract damages to social cohesion, which are affecting our societies and our cities in particular.

Community identity and the perception of the quality of life at the local level are becoming more and more important. Cultural policies, in that context, are much more strategic, especially those devoted to localities and regions. Local governments being those nearest to their populations and to problems

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derived from the damage done to social cohesion, the municipal level has henceforth to be considered a strategic level of intervention.

On the other hand, as federal and provincial cultural policies contribute to asserting cultural identities at the macrosocial level in a context of globalization of cultural exchanges, local and regional cultural participation (with all the expectations, aspirations and cultural policies which lie behind them) contribute to asserting local identities. If the national or provincial cultural policies focus on macrosocial aspects of identity, they contribute little to the manifestation of local identity. Municipal cultural policies contribute to them.

As for culture, the relationship between the provincial level, which has constitutional responsibility (in Canada, local, municipal and regional governments are given their powers by the provincial government), and the municipal, local or regional levels did not develop suddenly. This relationship corresponds to the level of community and cultural development. This is why it must be examined in the broader context of society as a whole.

This new relationship should also be put in the context of a transfer of roles or functions from the state government to the local government. In Québec and in Canada, this devolution of powers from the higher levels of government to local and regional administrations can be exemplified, for example, by the Ryan reforms in education and the Trudel reform of municipalities. The transfer from the national to the local is increasingly accepted. The Earth Summit underlined, as early as 1992, that: "Local strategies and plans have proved far more successful in making a direct impact than those at the national level" (Kleberg, Ed. 1998).

I shall try to show that, when it comes to the handing down of culture, local and regional municipalities, especially in the context of serious municipal reorganization, are playing and can play, a not insignificant role. When one takes into account all the possible ways of handing down culture, the local and regional levels are better positioned than other levels, provincial, federal or international.

2. SMALLER POLITICAL SOCIETIES IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBALIZATION AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH CULTURE: THE QUÉBEC CASE

2.1 LINGUISTIC SPACES: THE FRENCH FACT IN AMERICA

Forty years ago, the first article of the political agenda of the Québec Liberal Party, put before the voters during the memorable general election of June 22nd, 1960, an election which symbolizes the beginning of the Quiet Revolution, was entitled: Creation of a Ministry of Cultural Affairs.

The explanatory note introducing that article is less well known. It stated: "In the context of Québec, the most universal element we have to develop thoroughly is the French fact. *It is more because of our culture than the force of our numbers that we are going to make ourselves respected.* It is through our language and our culture that a French presence on the North American continent will be asserted" (Lapalme, 1988: 315-316).

That credo has transcended any political party for a number of generations. Our great poet Gaston Miron made that credo clear in 1978, stating that "a work, only because it was written in French here, was a subversive and revolutionary act: it introduced a difference in North America" (1978). But that is not a drawback for society in the twenty-first century, which is crossbred, tolerant and pluralistic.

In fact, the originality of Québec society is not visible to the casual observer. As the authors of *A Cultural Development Policy for Québec* (Government of Québec, 1978) put it, for the visitor, it is not easy to detect at first glance a specific and original culture there. The observer may be tempted to see only a wide amalgam of borrowed elements. The French heritage of language and civil law, the Amerindian heritage of ways of living and dealing with nature, the British heritage of political institutions and criminal law, the American heritage of economic, industrial and technological structures, and the Roman Catholic heritage of institutions and religious thinking.

Of course, on closer examination, one sees original productions: *Cirque du Soleil*, the book publisher *La Courte Échelle*, *Softimage*, the *Festival international de la poésie*. But "Everything is working as if those productions had slipped through a sociocultural framework whose rules had been thought of and developed elsewhere. A great many of Québec's collective structures are borrowed. History shows clearly that several decisions which had a significant bearing on it came from Versailles, London, Rome, New

York or Washington… It is a paradoxical culture whose components often came from outside, however original its inner life….” (*idem*). This collectivity has fully entered into major North American trends, with its important movements of urbanization and industrialization from the beginning of the twentieth century through the two World Wars. However, the question remains: “is it possible to remain the same while multiplying borrowings from a world which is not indebted to us?” (*ibid.*).

In his book, *Raisons communes* (1995), Fernand Dumont admitted he had been surprised by Ms. Kari Levitt who, in her book on the spread of multinational firms in Canada, placed her emphasis on the cultural aspects of the phenomenon: to her mind, the supreme danger was the manipulation of cultures and needs — of ways of living — by major powers foreign to the country. “She was convinced that, if we have to resist, it is not because of a sham taste for economic autonomy, but because *human beings should be free to choose their ways of living and the meaning of their lives* from the customs and *solidarities* inherited from history” (1972). Fernand Dumont concluded that, for the same reasons, an authentic cultural development will be born in Québec only if it calls upon its own cultural resources, from which it must draw its strength and fidelity in order to be useful to human beings. “People waiving their rights to be adults because they despise themselves are not good partners” (1995: 72).

Given these circumstances, it is not surprising to see Québec defining itself partly by the culture of its citizens — i.e., by their ways of living, how they use their free time and by what their idea of a society is.

And this, in spite of the existence in Canada of what Abraham Rotstein had already called a “territorial ethic” or “mappism,” which translates a concern about the integrity of Canadian territory from sea to sea, with “a powerful central government which could stand for the cultural and social needs of Canadians in confronting the expansionism of large American firms” (Levitt, 1972: XXII).

But that Canadian paradigm did not historically prevent Québec provincial governments from developing *their own strategies*. For example, the Québec Liberal governments of Gouin (1905-1921) and Taschereau (1921-1936), as well as the Unione Nationale governments of Duplessis (1936-1939 and 1944-1959), accepted the rules of the game imposed by American capital with its financial and industrial interests. More recently, it did not prevent the Parti Québécois and the future Premier of Québec, Bernard Landry, from being effective supporters of NAFTA, even if more than one region of Canada had reservations about it.

According to Eric Kierans (1978), from 1945 on, Canada's National policy has used multinational and transnational firms which allowed Canada to become a satellite in an interdependent world economy. The result was that Canada, a free market, became more vulnerable to international cycles and more dependent on large corporations.

Québec found its solution to the problem of continental integration in the building up, thanks to the Québec government, of a structured and functional network of québécois institutions which integrated themselves with both Canadian and American networks. There is the emergence, here, of a model, originally under the control of the government, which integrated the Québec economy into the international market; there is a wide consensus about this model in Québec, among both workers and employers.

In any case, the *Cultural Development Policy for Québec,* launched under René Lévesque in 1978, and written partly under the influence of the late Fernand Dumont, took for granted that culture is first and foremost a way of living, a common creation. Culture is education and pedagogy (Government of Québec, 1978: 153). According to the White Paper, the three cornerstones of cultural policy are: ways of living, creation and education.

In their introduction to the White Paper on cultural policy for Québec, the authors mention that "every culture is characterized by diversity: *diversity* of classes, generations, minorities, *regions*." They conclude their introduction by saying that henceforth States will try to use filters, by means of agreements, to confront the international flow of mass culture.

They quote Premier Daniel Johnson, who in February 1968, in a memorandum to a federal-provincial conference held in Ottawa, stated: "Only a language and a culture that are vibrant and alive, supported by strong social and political foundations and capable of genuine creativity can claim to be respected by other languages and other cultures" (*idem*, vol. 1: 31-32).

The authors of the *Cultural Development Policy for Québec* mention also that the first important action taken, in 1977, by the Ministry of Cultural Development, under Camille Laurin, was a White Paper on language policy, which became the famous Charter of the French Language or Bill 101. This approach, according to its 1978 authors, is more than traditional in Québec, it is central to its *history*.

3. MUNICIPAL AND REGIONAL CULTURAL POLICIES

It was provincial government policy which in 1992 determined Québec's major orientations on cultural matters, especially those concerning local and regional municipalities, which deal with citizens' access to, and participation in, cultural life. Those orientations were notably:

1. to reinforce education and awareness of the arts and culture (Ministry of Cultural Affairs, 1992: 99);

2. to promote access to arts and culture, the public library being an essential resource (*idem*: 107; Baillargeon, 1998);

3. to facilitate the participation of citizens in artistic and cultural life, notably through cultural participation and volunteer activities (Ministry of Cultural Affairs, 1992: 116-117).

These orientations have had implications at the local and regional levels. It is in the context of chapters three and four of *La politique culturelle de l'État du Québec* that we can refer to a certain "*municipalization" of culture in terms of responsibility for action in the lives of those who practice it: the local community and the region it belongs to*.

Any cultural activity undertaken as leisure is always done *somewhere*. It is then normal that a certain availing of work, in the sense of *a close by public territorial administration responsibility*, has a full meaning. It can be found here usually as a *municipal cultural policy*.

In 2001, there were 85 municipalities (73 local and 12 regional) in Québec which had approved a cultural policy. These municipalities comprise the majority of Québec's population; 33 other municipalities (15 local and 18 regional) were about to approve cultural policies. In the coming months or years, Québec will benefit from 118 local or regional cultural policies. This number is remarkable. I think that, both in the West and internationally, it is a major phenomenon.

It must be emphasized that in Québec the number of municipal cultural policies has multiplied by 14 between 1990 and 2001. This is a significant development. This Québec phenomenon depends on a unique way of seeing the world, where the development of a community is a priority, using culture and

democratization as tools for carrying out that development. The municipal cultural policies in Québec are mainly phenomena of urban life and modernity (De la Durantaye, 1999).

These cultural policies are meant in the first place for young people, those under 18 years of age, and also for families. They are connected to education and shaping future users. The target audience of these cultural policies are first the citizens of the municipality. Cultural policy is seen as an important step in the development of citizenship, a well advanced degree of citizenship, including the attitude of solidarity that underlies it.

The idea that social cohesion is derived notably from the quality of cultural coherence seems to lay itself down more and more, especially at the municipal level. This cultural coherence is a kind of fruit of a balanced relationship between local and regional cultural participation, what the people do, and the perceptions citizens have of *what the quality of life is in the territory they belong to shows up in their daily lives. In other words, social exclusion and cultural exclusion go together.* To succeed in reaching social and cultural inclusion, cultural islands and ghettos have to be avoided. It is in fact modern urban life that can give the territory that identity and can favour its inclusion.

In the context of globalization, metropolitan areas and capital cities turn themselves toward cultural and artistic import and export. They leave to peripheries and isolated cities complementary roles, more domestic, in the diffusion, animation and promotion of culture. It seems that a hierarchy of cultural functions is unfolding through the marketing of cultural goods and services.

But that dualism: *the proximity of cultural services versus cultural services whose direction is the world or the "nation,"* that duality of global/national and local, is fragmenting cultural development in general in a given territory and makes relatively trite the cultural development of cities. A better integration between these levels would lead to a better social cohesion.

These changing situations call for a re-definition of public services in general, and the provision of arts and culture in particular, at the municipal level, inasmuch as these administrations are seen, geographically and politically, as places that supply a number of front line services to local communities that are more and more pluralistic and heterogeneous, whose cultural needs and interests are more and more diversified.

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Locality and Culture:
Creating Public Spaces for Culture
in the Mind and in the Civitas[1]

Donna Cardinal[*]

T he invitation given us was to reflect on our research as it relates to the themes of the colloquium: the handing down of culture in smaller societies in a context of globalization. I join Michel de la Durantaye in considering this theme in relation to local and regional cultural policy making and cultural development.

The aspect of the topic that tickled my curiosity was the question posed by Jean-Paul Baillargeon about the role of memory and of future possibility in the generating/handing down of culture in small societies in a context of globalization. He put the question this way: "In the face of an a la carte culture consumed only in the present, should we be concerned about the handing down of culture from one generation to the next and, … what role should we attribute to memory, to future possibilities?" He posed the question in reference to creators, their works and their public. I am going to respond with reference to citizens who are engaged in the creative process of generating alternatives to those aspects of their collective lives that are unacceptable to them. That is, I will describe a research process in which the creators are citizens, their works are the imagined futures they seek to create together, and their public is their fellow citizens in the public sphere.

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[1] A first version of this paper can be found on the web site of Heritage Canada.

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Does that sound like I am stretching the invitation? Perhaps some will conclude that I am, however, for me there is a fit with the themes of this colloquium, and the fit is in two dimensions. One dimension is that my research and work are most often in the domain of culture and the arts. The second dimension is that the process by which we conduct the research is, in my mind, an application of the artistic process or creative process to the production of, not art, but new states of affairs in our public worlds.

In research terms, I understand what I do as a form of participatory action research undertaken collaboratively with peers who, in these cases, are citizens. Our collaborative work is to two ends: addressing some problematique in the shared life of the community; and, along the way, intentionally developing and refining skills and competences needed in that community to address this and other problems they are encountering.

My research has been exclusively in Canada outside of Québec, mostly with local communities, that is, communities defined first geographically and then by interest or shared concern. Some of those communities have been small and remote, as were Dawson City and Terrace; others like Edmonton and Winnipeg could be described as large and remote! In between I might categorize Thunder Bay, Sault Ste. Marie and St. John's NF. I am using remote in the sense that one travels a long time to get there and the travel is challenging.

None of the communities have been remote in the sense of being beyond the reach of external influences including global cultural influences. Whether remote or not (for I have also worked with citizen groups in Toronto, Kitchener, Vancouver, Victoria), when a local community makes public policy in support of its own cultural development, global cultural forces form an inevitable part of the context in which citizens do their work. Cultural globalization and homogenization are embraced by some as the high point of our cultural evolution; accepted by others as the inevitable price of doing business with the wider world; and resisted by others as colonizing the public space available for distinctive local cultural expression. These differing attitudes comprise part of the diversity to be taken into account by all participants in making sense of the present and imagining the future.

Global forces make themselves felt on the local stage, says Jill Grant in *The drama of democracy. Contention and dispute in community planning* (1994). Grant uses a dramaturgical metaphor to examine the cultural implications of local planning, with specific reference to two case studies in peninsular Halifax.

International and national policies and examples are evoked in local debates, says Grant, by all players: politicians, planners, and citizens. "Local practice occurs within [an] international and national context and frequently refers to it" (p. 143).

However connected they are to a larger reality, the starting place of the work of citizens in these communities is primarily local — what will we do here to address this issue about which we are concerned. A premise is that it is possible to take action locally. If it were not, action to address an issue would not make sense.

One scholar who views the municipal or regional as promising political space for action taking is Warren Magnusson. Cities, according to Magnusson in *The search for political space. Globalization, social movements, and the urban political experience* (1996), are the nexus where global social movements and locality intersect and interact, where the benefits and stresses of globalization are experienced. It is where people move outside of their every activities to see themselves not as passive subjects but as citizens making wider political claims. In so doing so, they "lay claim to a political space that may or may not conform to the spaces allowed by the existing systems of government" (p. 10).

Another of Mr Baillargeon intriguing questions, concerning our capacities for creative expression and for handing down culture in the face of globalization, was:

> [C]an we not still find open spaces yet to be overrun by […] homogenizing multinationals? And within these spaces, is it not still possible to encourage originality […]? Is it not fertile ground for the encouragement of diversity in the midst of uniformity?

I understand the concept of open spaces to be both within the mind and within the public sphere, the collective mind. We might have concern for the openness of both. For surely what we have in the public sphere is colonized space, space occupied and defined by stock images pressed upon us for decades by the behemoths of both advertising and entertainment until they have now merged into the global lifestyle branding operation described so thoroughly and chillingly by Naomi Klein in her recent book entitled *No Logo* (2000). Looking outward, we can feel as though the public space of the imagination is completely colonized, completely sealed, without points of entry for new ideas and without much capacity for idea generators to engage in creative dialogue with one another to shape new possibilities. Perhaps an even

bigger concern is whether our imaginations have not themselves become so determined by stock images that we merely recycle these, while thinking that we are generating original images from within. From my experience with thousands of imagers over the past 15 years, I can report that, when invited, when hope and trust are present, and when the status quo will no longer do, people generate new, sometimes even remarkable, alternative visions of the future individually and collectively.

What is the nature of the inner space in which new images are generated, and of the shared public space of the imagination in which to conceive the outer action that flows form the inner action of imaging new possibilities? The space created in an envisioning project is already a newly configured political and cultural space. In that space, imagers listen to one another in new ways, and these ways of listening are often designed into the future that persons envision together. In that space, protocols are introduced and used for the inner search for images, for discerning their soundness, for the outer search for collective vision and for discerning the soundness of those visions. Just as the visions entertained in the present are a foretaste of the futures people seek to invent, so is the space for imaging in some senses a foretaste of the kinds of new political/cultural space needed for enacting those futures. Just as it is possible for people to generate new images in the face of crowded imaginal space, so it seems possible for people to open new spaces for their work despite crowded public space. And these spaces have particular qualities.

Returning to Magnusson, we are invited to consider that cities embody the contingent, limited, fragile and dependent qualities of political space in which citizens can make wider political claims. He reminds us that "we cannot locate ourselves in relation to just one world and just one history; instead we have to come to terms with the multiplicity of worlds and histories — spaces and times — that make up the political conditions we face… (1996: 7). For it is considering claims in relation to one another that we begin to see the connections between problems, the commonalities in the solutions (*idem*: 114). Perhaps it is these qualities of the political space locally that have led me to work most often with groups whose focus is the local level of political action. Into just such contingent political space can the new offerings of citizens be made, responded to, discerned, judged and potentially enacted.

I return now to my primary question: to consider the roles of memory and of future possibility in culture-making in smaller societies in a context of globalization. The following observations have emerged from practice as I have coached citizens working together to describe their concerns with the present (that which they do not want to pass on to their grandchildren) and to image a future in which those concerns

have been well addressed (a world they do want to bequeath to the next generations). "Future" in this work functions as a metaphor for the human imagination, for what is possible, for our worthiest aspirations, for what we stand for and seek to create. Future is understood in this work as the domain of action, not of knowledge. The claims we make on behalf of the future are not about what will or must happen, but about what could happen, what we intend. These are offerings to our fellow citizens, starting points for the difficult work of discovering what we have in common and what we can come to share in order to take action together rather than alone.

Future possibility functions as a lens through which to view the present. When we have glimpsed our purposes, our intentions, we know what aspects of the present are intimations of the future, however awkward and half-expressed. We know what to give attention to in the present, what to build on, affirm and encourage, and what we don't have to bother with.

Images of the future, or of possibility and intent, serve as the basis for discovering people with whom we might take joint action. Often community processes group people who hold similar concerns. In this process, groupings form around shared images of the future, of what is possible. The data of individual images is collected and categorized, not by a researcher or even by a facilitator, but by the citizens themselves. There is creative and necessary tension here between the intended future imagined by individuals and the shared vision, or scenario, gradually taking shape as a group of people image collectively. How do we move from one to the other if not by the intervention of a single mind discerning the patterns? By a difficult and messy process we refer to as "raw democracy," wherein people seek out those whose images connect to their own and agree to work together on a scenario of a future they can share. If done with fidelity to one's own images, a compelling shared vision of the future emerges from the imaginations of the imagers, one rooted in their intentions, that is, a vision on behalf of which they cannot **not** take action.

This brings me to a fourth function of future possibility in the creation of culture. Satisfying individual and collective images of the future release energy in the imager, energy needed for moving from vision to action. One can feel that energy present in a group of people, or a room full of groups, when, with their eyes shining and frequent bursts of laughter, they tell stories in the present tense — the future present moment — of what it **is** like when they dwell in the new place they have imaged together. Or when they enact for one another the futures they have envisioned and someone says, "I'd like to live in your future!" Or when the moment of truth comes as people recognize that only they can take action on their images,

and they self-assign to take the action steps they have identified. Or when the action taking gets tough and people persevere, not by forcing but by a process of continuous imaging and enacting in response to the evolving present. This aspect of imaging is so important that it constitutes one of the criteria of a sound goal: that the imaging of it releases more energy than it consumes. As one participant said in the context of a personal envisioning, when I consider the future from the vantage of the present, I have no energy for what needs to be done, but when I consider the present from the vantage of the future, I have all the energy I need.

I have been describing the functions of future possibility when groups of citizens in a given locale gather to address shared concerns. Are there some parallels we might draw to culture making in smaller societies? In Canada outside of Québec we often give as justification for protectionist cultural policies the need for our particular stories to be told on the world stage. Our stories are unique and if they are not heard, the world's story bank will be diminished. When we say this, we probably mean stories of things that have already happened, that is, stories of the past. Could we also mean our stories of the future we intend? Our small society could offer its stories of the future, its future possibilities, as stances we are prepared to take in the world. Continuing the parallels, would we find other smaller societies, even perhaps Québec, who stand for similar futures and work together in discovering and enacting our shared vision for the world. From these stories of what is possible and desired, we would know what to give our attention to, and would find the energy to attempt it against all odds, including the odds of a suffocating global monoculture. It is interesting that with regard to the FTAA negotiations, it is not our governments but our civil society organizations who have functioned in this way to articulate an alternative possibility to the global order, to find alliances with other countries' civil society organizations, and to find in the shared vision the energy to seek to bring it about. In the early protests organized in Québec City (at the start of April), the process of protest was clearly halographic of the world envisioned by those offering alternative future possibilities. It was peaceful, it sought to inform, it held out alternatives, participation was equitable, and so on.

When we come now to consider the role of memory, we might be inclined to think of memory as an opposite pole to future possibility, however in my experience the two forms a kind of an axis, as I hope to show.

One important role for memory is as a site of hope. Hope is a prerequisite for envisioning alternatives to

the status quo. If we do not believe that something other than the status quo is possible, we would have no reason to attempt to address present problems, however intolerable they are. "Hope can neither be created now destroyed. It is like a path on the hillside. At first there is no path, however as more and more people walk this way, a path appears."

Ronna Jevne, executive director of the Hope Foundation at the University of Alberta, speaks of the importance of a person's hope quotient in overcoming adversity, especially illness. In her research with people living with cancer, Jevne seeks to help the person build their hope quotient (Jevne, 1998). In my work, we help people ground to their own hope by inviting them to recall a time in their own lives when their spirit was emancipated, when their inner and outer lives were in harmony, when newness entered the world through them and changed them and their world. The question varies according to the group and its focus, but some examples are: recall a time when learning was empowering to you; or a time when you took a risk for the sake of something you believed in and, against strong odds, something good happened; or a time when you were an actor in history rather than a bystander. Everyone has such a story. Most people have many such stories. Telling the stories remind us how we have acted in the past to address issues and we come to see ourselves as capable of acting in the world to create something new, as citizens making political claims rather than as passive subjects. At this point, the diversity among people is evident and respect for that diversity begins to develop. The validity of each person's experiences, of each person's concerns, becomes apparent, even when those experiences and concerns differ significantly one from another. Memory, and the sharing of memories, begins to shape the flexible, contingent, fragile space needed for considering claims upon the future in relation to one another.

A second function of memory in this approach to creating culture is as an analogue to futures imaging. We are all comfortable with memories. We all have them. We know what they are, where they come from, how they act. They record events which have, after all, happened. And we can recall them at will. Once we recall some part of a memory, all the rest will come, for the memory is halographic, that is, all of it is contained within each part of it. If we want to, we can begin anywhere with an aspect of a remembered event or person and continue on to recall and relive and relate the memory in considerable detail. Now consider the possibility that images are memories of the future. Images will have exactly the same qualities as memories: they are concrete and specific, not abstract and theoretical; we can relive them in our imaginations — taste, touch, smell, see, feel, hear them and explain the significance or meaning they have

to us. So too, by analogy, can we taste, touch, smell, see, feel, and hear images of the future, live them in our imaginations, and grasp their significance and meaning to us. Images of the future operate in our imaginations in exactly the same way as memories of the past, even to the fact that two people remember the same "future" event differently! The only difference between memories and images is that memories have happened and futures images haven't — or so we think. But in the imaginal world this is not a very big difference. So entertaining images of possible futures, or futures we desire and intend, is a way of rehearsing them, living them in our imaginations, initially within ourselves and then with others, to see if they meet our criteria of loving, good, just and humane futures. For these are the futures we seek to create.

Memory functions in a third way. In addition to reminding us of the basis of our hope and serving as an analogue of futures imaging, our memories are also a storehouse of ideas and possibilities we have entertained through the years. When invited to imagine alternative futures, some imagers will produce memories of the past — stories or feelings or actions which fully embody the world they long for, that have become their touchstone for the future. They have glimpsed their future and it is yesterday. As I said before, in the realm of the imaginal, this is not a consequential difference so long as the image stands the tests for concreteness, specificity, compellingness, etc.

I wonder if these functions of memory have any relevance for the creating and handing down of culture in smaller societies in a context of globalization. In Canada outside of Québec, I see the role of memory in building hope. From time to time, being smaller than the source of the global monoculture, we have needed to remind ourselves that we have taken action in the past to address our concerns and the results have been successful, even impressive. I think here of the gradual process by which we in Canada put in place a social safety net over a period of nearly a century, a social safety net that has served us well inside Canada and even received favourable reviews beyond Canada. As a smaller society, too, we have had to remind ourselves that not all that can be invented has been invented and that we have the capacity to imagine worlds other than those we now inhabit which are, after all, inventions of those who came before us. I think here of our failure, so far at least, to imagine (perhaps more a failure of will, but also of imagination) a just social order with First Nations and Metis and Inuit people in Canada. Memory functions, too, in our smaller society as a storehouse of policy ideas we have thought and tried, or not tried, in the past; ideas that may be more valid for us than those imported from other places. I struggled for an example here, but perhaps it is our early and sometimes misguided applications of multicultural policy.

Well, I put out for discussion these ideas about memory and future possibilities, about creating inner and outer spaces for culture. It seems to me that at every level of meaning making, from the inner to the local to the societal and the global, there is a tremendous tension between homogeneity and diversity, between status quo and newness, between the powers of the king and those of the poet, as Walter Bruggemann (1978) would say. Based on my experiences with citizens groups, I am hopeful. My hope quotient is high! I see groups broadening the notion of cultural resources, and using cultural mapping processes and methods, to discover and articulate for themselves those characteristics of place that make it unique. I see them opening spaces, both internally and in the public sphere, in which to imagine and to enact what they have imagined. I see them capable of identifying for themselves what is not okay about the present, what they do not wish to hand down to their grandchildren. I see them imagining alternatives that are fully satisfying and on which they are prepared to take action individually and collectively. Being smaller groups within a larger community has not prevented either the imagining or the enacting. True, all groups wrestle with two difficult questions: what about those who aren't here, and who are we to invent futures for our communities? But the futures they imagine pull them forward, releasing energy for the task. And their offerings as small groupings within the larger community constitute new offerings to that larger community. So might we, Canada outside of Quebec — or even Canada with Quebec — as a smaller society, make our contributions in the face of global cultural homogenization to hopeful, just, and more fully human futures. What are we doing when we do this? We are creating new political spaces: provisional, unsealed, dependent. We are shaping new worlds for ourselves and for future generations who will find in the culture we hand down the dissatisfactions which lead them to imagine their alternatives. We are, in the words of Walter Bruggemann, "transforming the world [and, I would add, ourselves] for the sake of humanness" (1978).

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Indigenous Knowledge:
Questions, Issues and Challenges[1,2]

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O ver the past fifteen years or so, the subject of Indigenous knowledge — more often referred to as traditional Indigenous knowledge or eco-logical knowledge[3] has attracted growing interest. As Indigenous peoples have emerged as major players and partners on the national and international scene, this knowledge has come to represent a new sphere of cultural and political affirmation for them. Throughout North America, hundreds of documents, pro-duced by the scientific community and by Indigenous and government organizations, have broached the subject from various angles (see Chabot and Lévesque, 2001, among others, for a compilation of the recent literature on the topic). The number of conferences and discussion workshops on Indigenous knowledge is continuing to grow every year, and the legitimacy of this knowledge as a relevant source

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[3] The expression *Traditional Ecological Knowledge* (TEK) is fairly common in the English-language literature on this topic. However, my use of the expression *Indigenous knowledge* is not equivalent to the typical use of the notion of traditional knowledge. Rather, I associate the expression *Indigenous knowledge* with a far more comprehensive notion, one that seeks to understand not only particular systems of knowledge but also the historical and social conditions associated with the emergence and dissemination of this knowledge, a matter I will return to later on in this text.

of information to help protect ecosystems, increase our understanding of environmental phenomena, and manage natural resources has been recognized on countless occasions by the governments of many countries, including Canada. This recognition has also been manifested in the special provisions targeting the protection of this knowledge in numerous international conventions and several national policies and programs.

We can cite as an example the commitments made in this regard at the 1992 Rio Summit (or Earth Summit) that were duly included in the text of the international Convention on Biological Diversity (CNUED, 1992). A similar focus is also seen in the recommendations of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency (CEAA) — which is responsible for ensuring implementation of the provisions of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act — and in some of the provisions of the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development's sustainable development strategy, as well as in the principles advocated by Environment Canada, especially in the context of its Northern Ecosystems Initiative. Several Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) programs also include special provisions that concern not only the knowledge of Indigenous peoples but also the need to integrate this knowledge into scientific knowledge, particularly in projects aimed at protecting and managing natural resources.

There is no doubt that interest in Indigenous knowledge has in part been triggered and reinforced by the growing environmental awareness that has emerged in the West since the mid-1970s. A number of observers have viewed this knowledge, which expresses a different type of relationship with the natural world, as an alternative to the exploitative and disorganized practices of governments and large corporations: practices that are leading to the destruction of plant and animal resources, and thus imperilling the biodiversity of ecosystems and even the very survival of the planet. But despite the popularity of this subject in many spheres, it is still extremely difficult to describe this knowledge on a theoretical or methodological level, which leads to numerous problems when attempts are made to apply this knowledge. In this text I will examine some of the key questions currently being raised in regard to the links and correspondences between Indigenous knowledge and scientific knowledge, and especially in regard to the nature of the knowledge shared by Indigenous people and the transmission of this knowledge.

1. BETWEEN CONTRAST AND INTEGRATION

The knowledge specific to Indigenous people can be very broadly defined as oral information that has been handed down from generation to generation for hundreds and even thousands of years.[4] This information consists of organized bodies of knowledge, or, in other words, coherent systems of knowledge, which several authors have referred to as *Indigenous science* (see in particular Clément, 1995). The production of this knowledge is based on a systematic approach aimed at comprehending reality; it relies on the accumulation of diverse data, using a number of methods and intellectual operations (observation, classification, transmission) as well as specialized concepts (Mailhot, 1993). This knowledge is thus seen as the expression of a particular means of apprehending reality; it is encoded in a culture, in the sense that it is a part of culturally-specific systems of representation, and it conveys values and a particular view of the world, of nature and of life.

Many researchers approach the topic of traditional knowledge by comparing it, and indeed contrasting it, with science. In this perspective, the emphasis is placed on such characteristics as the oral nature of this knowledge, its basis in observation and experience, its holistic, intuitive and qualitative aspects, and the fact that it is not directed toward the domination of nature. Conversely, science is understood as a system of knowledge specific to the Western worldview. It is based principally on written documentation; it is taught and learned out of context; it is compartmentalized, analytical and quantitative; and its ultimate aim is the domination of nature and the world. In this way of thinking, it is important to establish the greatest possible distance from science since, from the outset, the objective is to distinguish traditional knowledge by defining it as a very different and autonomous field of knowledge. In stressing how distant it is from science, researchers generally point to the spiritual dimension of traditional knowledge or, in other words, the aspect that ultimately differentiates it from science. Unlike science, these researchers claim, traditional knowledge does not create a separation between nature and culture, and it is seen as the expression of a fundamental and unified understanding of the place of human beings in the universe (Berkes, 1999; Simpson, 1999).

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[4] Researchers studying this topic most often refer to the definition produced in 1995 by the Dene Cultural Institute (cited by Stevenson, 1996: 281): "Traditional environmental knowledge is a body of knowledge and beliefs transmitted through oral tradition and first-hand observation. It includes a system of classification, a set of empirical observations about the local environment and a system of self-management that governs resource use. Ecological aspects are closely tied to social and spiritual aspects of the knowledge system. The quantity and quality of TEK varies among community members, depending upon gender, age, social status, intellectual capability and profession (hunter, spiritual leader, healer, etc.). With its roots firmly in the past, TEK is both cumulative and dynamic, building upon the experience of earlier generations and adapting to the new technological and socio-economic changes of the present."

At first glance, it is easy to see the weaknesses of an approach that so strongly emphasizes contrasts, an approach that more often than not tends to set up hermetic categories and to rank criteria by placing them in a relationship of superiority or inferiority. The setting up of a duality of this kind, i.e. Indigenous knowledge vs. science, is directly in line with a number of persistent and deeply-rooted oppositions: tradition vs. modernity; rational vs. irrational; universal vs. local, science vs. myth and religion, etc. On the other hand, often inspired by a need to define the intrinsic nature of this knowledge "from within," and by a desire to demonstrate its legitimacy, this approach, when it goes beyond a fundamental dichotomy, can lead to a profound questioning of human beings' various types of knowledge, since it introduces the perspective of the coexistence of these various types of knowledge, and indeed their right to coexist.

Since the mid-1990s, as the topic of traditional knowledge has gained greater visibility and acquired greater legitimacy, perceptions have changed on its relationship with science. The emphasis is now on incorporating Indigenous knowledge into scientific studies. For example, specialists studying climate change or the migrations of caribou populations often ask local populations about their own observations concerning these phenomena. This approach of incorporating or integrating traditional knowledge is currently the most popular strategy. But even when it is the focus of constructive initiatives and real efforts are made to satisfy the requirements of this approach, it is still generally influenced by the positivistic dictates of science. Traditional knowledge is then robbed of its significance. At best, it is absorbed and assimilated into a particular type of data, generally empirical, or instead, reduced to simple geographic data or isolated bits of information obtained in response to specific questions, such as: Where do you hunt for caribou? How far out does the bay freeze?, etc. Traditional knowledge is thus judged and measured according to standard scientific indicators.

More often than not, traditional knowledge is used to validate scientific data. A phenomenon observed by a scientist and subsequently confirmed by a hunter, in whole or in part, is immediately given "experimental veracity," without anyone ensuring its actual validity or looking at the status of the person transmitting the information in question. Isn't traditional knowledge then likely to become a new testing area for scientific experiments in many regions, especially the North, where there are a growing number of studies on environmental phenomena and where the people most directly concerned by these phenomena are Indigenous people?

Such a trend is increasingly occurring in the field of environmental assessment in the Indigenous milieu, particularly in the North. Environmental assessment processes, which are governed by Canadian and Québec laws on environmental protection and quality of the environment (such as the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, which I mentioned earlier), provide a normative framework for the carrying out of development projects (mining, oil and gas, hydroelectric, road projects, etc.) where it is important to determine the impacts and effects, both positive and negative, on the physical and social environment before the project begins. The guidelines issued by the various review committees in Canada consequently urge proponents of these major projects to study the anticipated project impacts and to recommend mitigation or remedial measures designed to limit, as much as possible, any adverse environmental effects. In the past few years, these guidelines have included provisions for incorporating Indigenous knowledge into the studies in question. But there are generally very few instructions or indications accompanying such requirements, so that they are applied in a wide, and often surprising, variety of ways.[5]

2. QUESTIONS ABOUT THE NATURE AND TRANSMISSION OF INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE

The problems in characterizing the field of study of traditional knowledge go beyond the issue of how this knowledge relates to science. When we look at how traditional knowledge should be defined or how it is transmitted, there are still a number of questions and challenges. Since this knowledge is oral in nature, it is clearly transmitted from one individual to another in a very personal way. Elders are considered to be the legitimate holders of this knowledge, which was handed down to them by their ancestors, and which they in turn are logically expected to pass on to others. Moreover, this knowledge reflects a particular way of life, generally the hunter's way of life. Yet very few Indigenous youth want to become hunters nowadays.[6]

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[5] The method of taking Indigenous knowledge into account is often left up to the proponents, who then have all the leeway they need to limit this requirement to public consultation activities, informal meetings with particular individuals, or public opinion surveys. In some extreme cases, the government stipulation to take Indigenous knowledge into account is simply understood to mean noting the presence of Indigenous people in various places at various times. For example, the fact of bringing together a group of Inuit or Indian people in a meeting hall has sometimes been viewed as proof that this knowledge is being taken into account. An epistemological reading of the situation could in fact induce one to admit that knowledge cannot exist separately from the human beings who hold this knowledge, so that bringing these individuals together is the ultimate expression of Knowledge in action. But there is little chance that, in the case of environmental assessment especially, the proponents' intentions might be of a similar order.

[6] A fairly recent survey (Lévesque and Johnson, 2002) involving some 70 youth, aged 16 to 25, in an Indigenous community in Québec's sub-arctic region confirms this situation. Every one of these young people, both girls and boys, unequivocally expressed their interest in learning techniques and knowledge related to life in the bush, but all of them also felt that it was essential to learn other kinds of knowledge and skills in school. The challenge, in their eyes, lay in linking the two worlds.

Since traditional knowledge is largely assimilated through experience, it must be given concrete form in action. In other words, it is through the practice of hunting that it will probably continue to exist and be handed down. Without hunting, is the knowledge likely to disappear, or to lose its relevance? Does this mean that Indigenous people living in urban areas or who no longer hunt or fish have no such knowledge, or have no access to this knowledge? Does this also mean that this type of knowledge does not change, or that it does not evolve? That it is in some way the reflection of a natural and primordial order that existed prior to the modern order, which can be said to have marked the end of this "authentic" way of life?

Moreover, the way in which this knowledge is currently understood and defined is clearly associated with environmental issues: the provisions dealing with Indigenous knowledge in international conventions and government programs are all concerned with issues of environmental assessment, natural resource management or the protection of biodiversity. The relationship with nature, the transmission of this special relationship, and the continual use of natural resources are seen as specific characteristics of the knowledge held by Indigenous people. From this perspective, can we then suppose that in all other areas, Indigenous people have no knowledge?

Some of these questions have already been raised by researchers attempting to conceptualize the field of traditional knowledge and to clarify its scope. Stevenson (1996), for example, has produced a sophisticated classification in which traditional knowledge is considered in a category independent from that of non-traditional knowledge. In the category of traditional knowledge, Stevenson distinguishes between eco-logical knowledge and social, cultural and spiritual knowledge. And finally, in the category of ecological knowledge, he considers knowledge specific to the environment, knowledge concerned with the relations that human beings have with ecosystems, and the ethical principles governing these relations. Similarly, Berkes (1999) and Usher (2000) have also proposed their own particular definitions and categorizations highlighting various types of information and different levels of analysis.

When it is a matter of the transmission of Indigenous knowledge, once again, science has no clear an-swers. Given its nature, can Indigenous knowledge be transposed, that is, transmitted to scientists, written down, and analyzed according to scientific parameters, without being distorted? In other words, can we study this knowledge? Can we at least disseminate it more broadly? Is Indigenous knowledge ultimately a matter for initiates only? Questions of this kind are not insignificant (Wentzel, 1999). They are currently supporting an ideological position to the effect that only Indigenous people themselves can understand

the real scope of their knowledge. This position is also dominating the debate on intellectual property rights associated with this knowledge.

On one level, it is clear that the very complexity of the topic may appear to be a source of obstacles that are hampering attempts to develop a specific field of study on the knowledge held by Indigenous people. It is these obstacles that are currently making it difficult to take this knowledge into account and to apply it, and that are resulting in the rejection of this knowledge by a number of scientists. And yet, in my view, these problems are related not so much to the nature of the knowledge and how it is transmitted, but rather to an incomplete and, indeed, inadequate characterization of this knowledge. When, in discussing traditional knowledge, the only reference is still to a type of science mistakenly limited to academic knowledge, there is little chance of avoiding the dual pitfalls of comparison and/or integration. It is also very difficult to separate the issue of traditional knowledge from the larger context of relations between Indigenous and non-Indigenous people.

3. SOME AVENUES TO EXPLORE

When, as happens in many studies, Indigenous knowledge is seen as a source of information or geographical data, this is already a conceptual distortion. There is no doubt that Indigenous knowledge contains relevant information about the natural world: people living in close interaction with nature obviously develop an expertise and practices that are tested and proven through experience. But Indigenous knowledge is much more than information, just as science cannot be reduced to data alone. Knowledge, in whatever form, essentially develops and is renewed through the relations it brings into play between individuals; it crystallizes expectations about the social world and the natural world. Together with skills, experiences and representations, various forms of knowledge constitute dynamic and autonomous wholes. Consequently, Indigenous knowledge cannot be isolated from, compared to or contrasted with scientific knowledge; nor can it be integrated into the latter because, in expressing different views of the world, it takes certain social skills and requires that different paths be followed for this knowledge to be applied and reproduced.

The question of social skills, of how knowledge is produced and how it is applied, is not neutral. Knowledge does not develop and does not evolve in a vacuum, cut off from the real world and from human

beings (Barth, 2002). Recent works by a number of philosophers, sociologists and historians of science in fact highlight the social and historical conditions influencing the production of scientific knowledge, for example, and the rules, mechanisms and motivations that affect how this knowledge is circulated and how it is transmitted (Barnes, Bloor and Henry, 1996; Bourdieu, 2001; Latour and Woolgar, 1986). The processes influencing the development, transmission and use of knowledge continually interfere with its content, whether this knowledge is produced by scientists, or by Indigenous hunters.

Also, when questions about the knowledge shared by Indigenous people lead to a challenging of science, we again need to ask what kind of science we are talking about. Science is generally viewed as a "unidirectional" and homogeneous whole. And yet it is clear that the methods and expertise of specialists in the natural sciences are very different from those of social scientists. The two types of science are not necessarily opposed, but there is a difference in their essence. Even within the social sciences, the differences in approach and focus are such that one cannot necessarily assume that all scientists are talking about the same thing or work in the same way. A relevant example here is the holistic perspective that is said to represent a particularity of Indigenous knowledge. When this is discussed in the absolute, we tend to lose sight of the fact that ecology is also based on a holistic understanding of environmental phenomena; and we also tend to lose sight of the fact that anthropology, in studying the human condition, is primarily characterized by a global and integrated approach, and that relations between human beings and nature have long been an especially fruitful area for the production and renewal of knowledge in this discipline.

When authors like Berkes (1999) and Stevenson (1996), for instance, stress how important it is to not isolate knowledge from the context in which it is embedded, and emphasize the philosophy or worldview that underlies actions and practices, we can clearly see how close this type of approach is to the many avenues explored by generations of anthropologists in their study of *culture*. In some cases, the resemblance is so marked that we might ask whether the study of Indigenous knowledge has not in fact become a new way of considering culture and attempting to understand its mechanisms and manifestations, or indeed, a new way of defining the anthropological challenge. We have to ask such a question when one of the main tendencies in current research on traditional knowledge is to view everything that concerns Indigenous people, in any field, as a component of traditional knowledge.

Moreover, as we have already stressed, the question of Indigenous knowledge is an integral part of the

movement of affirmation that is currently dominating relations between Indigenous and non-Indigenous people. Indigenous people are seeking *recognition* based on their *knowledge*. This whole area of Indigenous knowledge brings into sharp focus the stumbling blocks in our own relationship with knowledge and the power often associated with knowledge. What is at stake with knowledge, whether it is denigrated or not, and whether or not we understand what this knowledge consists of, is the expression of a difference, and an affirmation of identity. In a way, we again find ourselves struggling with the issue of human rights, which was so dominant a concern in the debates of the 1970s and 1980s. This time, however, in today's "information society," we are dealing with the ultimate expression of modernity: that is, knowledge.

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Fast Forward to Modern Pluralism: Culture and Small Scale Societies in Canada

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Over the past century, the study of the diverse arts and material culture of Aboriginal peoples — Inuit, First Nations, and later Metis (those of mixed heritage) — has attracted the growing attention of artists and academics. The arts and material culture have provoked many questions. Who created the works? Why were they made? What meanings do they convey? Are they to be exhibited? Who is to interpret them? Present-day practice raises still more questions about, for example, assimilation, appropriation and repatriation. This paper examines the research, production and collection/exhibition customs related to indigenous cultures over the past five decades in order to place them in the context of contemporary issues and practice. It also considers the implications of those customs for cultural policy-making in the 21st century. The paper will draw on participant/observer experience in the Eastern Arctic, archeological practice in the plains culture area as well as experience with Canadian cultural policy-making and practice.

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Four decades ago, beginning in the spring and lasting until just before the first snow in October, I could be found on weekends, walking on windswept prairie hills and plains in and near the Qu'Appelle Valley and elsewhere in southern Saskatchewan, looking for evidence of long past habitation. We were a small group of young and older enthusiasts, all members of the Saskatchewan Archaeological Association, led by two dedicated amateur archaeologists, John and Jean Hodges. We sought to supplement the effort of the few professionals working in the field — in particular Thomas and Alice Kehoe — archaeologists with the provincial Museum of Natural History. Together, but somewhat in competition, we planned to document early occupation before all physical and ethnological evidence disappeared (A part of the challenge of the Hodges was to prove that the First Nations peoples occupying these lands produced and used pottery; some professionals argued otherwise). Approval to search on these lands was given by farmers, who themselves had extensive collections of artefacts, which more often than not, were without documentation except for the family's own oral history. And there was a growing and disturbing marketplace for artefacts that kept important items in private hands.

The walks were lonely, as our heads always faced downward. From time to time, evidence emerged of temporary settlements, a simple cairn was found or a projectile point that had been turned up by ploughs. Tipi rings, evidence of earlier habitation, once numbered in the thousands, were by now becoming increasingly rare because of modern agricultural practices and vandalism. When boulder-outlined figures of men and animals were found the site took on new meaning. When these mute monuments of past cultures (cairns, medicine wheels, or effigies) had been originally constructed on a site overlooking the distant horizon, the power of the place and its view must have been, and still is, breath taking. In the winter we spent weekends documenting our findings, and reconstructing the pottery shards into pots and thus began to define their common features. Finally, we joined forces to dig the Last Mountain House trading post. We were part of the heritage and museum community's appreciation of the need to include indigenous peoples was limited. For example, after many years on public view (and later in storage) in the Saskatchewan Museum of Natural History, it took a very public protest by First Nations to ensure that the remains of a child were returned to his/her community and buried according to traditional practices.

In 1964, I joined the first archaeological team sent out by the Glenbow Foundation to work in Alberta. For part of the seasons, we camped on the Peigan reservation, digging a site that had been used repeatedly by nomadic peoples over a very long time, probably because of its proximity to water and shelter. Our contact with the First Nations community was limited, though we were curious about each other. Eventually, we developed some trust and were invited to attend both a burial on the reservation and a nearby Sundance. Our next site was in the midst of a cattle ranch, but we camped with the bulls, bullocks and cows this time. There is little question that early hunters in southern Alberta concentrated their hunting effort on bison. A major effort on our part was to dig the early test holes of the kill site, now known as the Fletcher Site. Subsequent digs at that site resulted in sufficient information to include it in the Syncrude Gallery in the Provincial Museum in Alberta. The final site was further north and near the oilfields. This time we camped near oilmen, and for the first time we felt insecure; drunken workers raided our camp in search of women. This site was the least productive of the three.

I returned to Saskatchewan and continued to spend my available weekends digging at the trading post site. The Aboriginal population in Saskatchewan was already sizeable and is now predicted to become as high as 40 per cent in the not too distant future. Regina was the home on an active amateur theatre community and an annual summer pageant, the "Trial of Louis Riel." His execution by hanging has brought to an end the dream of a Metis nation in western Canada, following the North-west Rebellion of 1885 and the Battle of Batoche. I joined the Little Theatre, and met and worked with Harry Daniels; he aspired to be on stage while I stayed backstage. Later I supported his unsuccessful NDP candidacy for a federal seat in an upper middle class constituency in Winnipeg (near the historic Red River Settlement and the home of Riel).

Although the Native Council of Canada was a strong voice for Metis nationalism, tensions between western Metis and eastern non-Status Indians led to the formation of the western-based Metis National Council in 1983 (Harry Daniels became one of the Metis community's outspoken leaders). Similar divisions occurred at the provincial level. For example, the Association of Metis and Non-Status Indians of Saskatchewan split into two organizations in 1988. The Saskatchewan Federation of Indians continued to represent Status Indians (those identified by the terms of the Indian Act). Elsewhere in Canada the indigenous population is represented by a range of organizations in support of a variety of concerns, confirming the cultural and regional diversity of the people. Separate Native postsecondary institutions

were created. The Saskatchewan Indian Cultural College — now the Saskatchewan Indian Federated College — was established in Regina approximately thirty years ago. It is linked to the University of Regina, governed by elders, and jointly funded by the provincial and federal governments. The Gabriel Dumont Institute, an Aboriginal and cultural center with locations throughout Saskatchewan, is active in maintaining and encouraging Metis heritage. Other Canadian universities have established Native Studies Programmes. Aboriginal organizations have established community facilities such as the Woodland Cultural Centre Museum on the Six Nations reservation in Brantford, Ontario, and Metis Friendship Centres throughout Canada.

Though I wasn't conscious of it at the time, these contacts with Aboriginal peoples were my first experiences of "fourth world peoples," the still colonized indigenous minorities living in complex modern nations. They lived not only on the streets of cities and towns as I had first known indigenous peoples, but also on reservations, and like their urban relatives, as subjugated peoples. Until now, my knowledge of the peoples of the Great Plains was based on changes in projectile points, their location, and other artefacts such as end scrapers, random flake scrapers, and bifacial knives, as well as some bone tools. Unfortunately, the objects manufactured from skin and sinew and wood and plant fibres have not survived in the archaeological record. And precontact anthropological evidence was based on indigenous oral records and later, after early contacts, on the written observations of others. The stereotypical image of an Indian held by the dominant society was of a Plains Indian walking, or riding a horse in the Calgary Stampede or playing the villain in movies, or being portrayed in advertising for GM's Pontiac car as a warrior brave. Even though Plains cultures were constantly changing, the Pan-Indian stereotype was dressed in Plains-style feathered headdresses and skin costumes, thus promoting an identity well beyond their time and place in the history of the First Nations.

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My interest in the Eskimo, as they were then called, had begun in high school when I first read about stone cut prints. In 1962, as a visual arts student, I bought #1/50 of "Sea Monsters Devouring Whale" a stone block print series by the Cape Dorset artist, Kiakihuk. I was unaware at the time that the Inuit were still known in the Arctic by numbers and not by names, nor that the names would be spelt differently by

officials who could not speak their language or dialect. Providing a name rather than a number for the artist became part of the arts marketing strategy, but numbers can still be found on the carvings and their documentation.

In the spring of 1967 I flipped a coin — heads, Expo 67 and tails, Rankin Inlet, Northwest Territories. By June I was one of a few archaeology and cultural anthropology university students on a train that stopped on request to let Indian and Metis off with the supplies they had traded for skins and fish. As they disappeared on foot into the bush, the train continued to the town of Churchill on the southwest edge of Hudson's Bay. I stayed overnight in a hotel and the next morning flew north by bush plane to the west coast of the Bay and Rankin Inlet. The plane landed inland — had it been winter we would have settled down on the ice — and the Inuit, who met the plane, unloaded it. I spent the summer months learning the Inuktitut language from a local teacher, reading about the Arctic peoples, working as an artist in the Arts and Crafts Workshop with Inuit craftspeople, documenting the settlement and observing the interactions among the Inuit themselves and with their non-Inuit neighbours.

On the edge of the town stood the shell of a copper mine. It was part of an earlier government and the private sector effort to create an economic foundation for the settlement and had been abandoned as uneconomic. The then current ill-fated industrial effort was to create a niche market in the south for canned seal meat, sometimes curried or with other sauces, and other "county foods" such as whale and caribou. Earlier, Inuit arts and crafts workshops had been set up in the larger communities of the Eastern Arctic as part of the same effort to establish viable northern industries. The Rankin Inlet artists were experimenting with clay, firing hand built pottery head shapes in electric kilns. When the kilns failed, green ware production continued and salaries were paid to the Inuit craftspeople. Regardless of the result, art and craft making had become a rationale for the delivery of social assistance. Stone carving was still practiced in the community and both the pottery and carvings were marketed as "Eskimo Art" especially in the larger cities in Canada and the USA.

Carving for the tourist trade was already well established in the 1940s but a commercial and artistic venture on a large scale was the result of an initiative by Alma and James Houston and the government. This industrial effort began with carving and printmaking in Cape Dorset and other isolated communities. It later expanded to other media. At the community level, art making was a division of labour based both on race and gender. The work was celebrated for its originality in *Arts Canada* and other magazines that

were targeted to help promote sales. Under the sponsorship of the federal government, the aesthetic and cultural values of the dominant society prevailed. "Eskimo Art" had become an ethnic indicator of the Inuit and was promoted in commercial and public galleries and specialty stores throughout North America and Europe.

As I wandered through the empty copper mine, I read the notices posted on the walls. One advised the non-Inuit workers that if they were caught on the road to the "Eskimo village," they would be sent south immediately. Rankin Inlet was a segregated town. The utilador, an above ground system of pipes, delivered some of the utility services to the residents and businesses, but it stopped at the road to the Eskimo village. In the "government" part of the town, the houses were a standard southern bungalow style, built above the permafrost, though sometimes wired together to keep the walls from separating. The standard government-issue furniture, like the houses, was provided for the teachers and other professionals in the community, at a highly subsidized cost. Only one resident, a British immigrant and academic, Bob Williamson, whose knowledge of the Inuit and their language was considerable, had battled to buy a house as a demonstration of his commitment to the north. He flew the territorial government flag on his pole as symbol of NWT's wish for independent status, similar to that of a province. No one else, neither Inuit nor non-Inuit owned their home, and the federal government controlled everything through their non-Inuit employees while the Inuit provided the labour.

The Inuit themselves lived in Quonset huts heated by oil stoves. No matter the size of the family, their homes were rarely bigger than three small rooms. The surrounding area was an open-air workshop where the men would work on their skidoos, fish and meat hung on lines, and women stretched skins to be cured. Sleds and other supplies could be found on the roof, or against the walls. Children played until all hours of the bright night. Few dogs remained and those that did were tied up; the government and Hudson Bay Company had convinced the Inuit to give them up for safety reasons and because of the need to feed then. The hunters and their families had entered into a cycle of dependency on the Company's supplies, such as gasoline and foodstuffs, which were shipped in once or twice a summer by boat, at a cost well above southern prices. When the price of seal and fox skins dropped, as it did, the dependency was even greater.

I returned to the Canadian Arctic regularly in the 1970s and early 80s. By now I had experienced at first hand internal colonization. Not only did the community administrators control the towns and villages,

but they could also control who came into the community (Rankin Inlet was one of the few communities to have a public bunk building called the "Rankin Inlet Outlet Inn" where transients could stay). Once when I was traveling overland by skidoo and sled to a village some considerable distance away, I was denied access to the community by the administrator because he didn't want any anthropologists in town. They might unsettle the residents. As I knew I would otherwise need to camp on the snow and ice, I used the radiophone to call ahead to the government administration office, only to be told that there was no place to stay. In defiance, a local schoolteacher said I could stay with his family, and I did.

Throughout my travels in the north, the teachers and nurses provided shelter for me. In the days before regular telephone service, radio, and later TV, their offer of hospitality was the way they kept in touch with events in the south. It didn't matter that we were strangers. When the DC 3 I hitch-hiked on to fly to Repulse Bay crashed near the settlement, the Inuit arrived quickly to bring us to safety, and when it came time to leave, I hitch-hiked on another plane to the next community. This was all an adventure for me, but for the Inuit, life in the Arctic was no longer independent. Many young Inuit were sent away against their will for the upper grades of school or to schools run by missionaries. Most women were sent south for childbirth and medical needs that could not be met by the nursing station, required a medical evacuation. But the time when there was mutual gain had long passed.

At first, the land and culture of the Inuit had been exploited by business and overrun by missionaries and government — the latter, albeit, in an effort to keep the Inuit from starving and to provide security, health and education. Before and following World War II and during the Cold War, the benevolence of the dominant society resulted not only in the loss of their independence but also the traditional skills necessary for their survival. They were moved and reorganized throughout the Arctic to meet political and resource needs. Their labour was exploited and through social reorientation — especially the education system — their culture was assimilated to that of the south.

In 1969 I was studying cultural anthropology with D'Arcy McNickle, the first indigenous academic to be hired as a university professor in Canada. I found myself in meetings among First Nations leaders who were discussing the federal government's White Paper. The Paper was promoted as bringing equality to First Nations but it had been developed without the participation of Aboriginal peoples and met a wall of resistance. The old Indian Act remained in force. But the effect of the White Paper was enormous, research about Aboriginal peoples and their rights increased, as did the politicization of the Aboriginal peoples themselves.

Each summer in the early 1970s my husband, our young family and I camped on the Stoney reservation at the foot of the Rocky Mountains, participated in sweat lodges and attended pow-wows — until the American Indian Movement (AIM) joined the informal gatherings. AIM helped to foster Aboriginal politics in Canada. Camping here became uncomfortable for us, but not for our children, two of who are Metis, of Cree and French heritages. Though the reservation began by welcoming non-Aboriginals it soon became a contested site and we no longer visited (Recent allegations of fraud and misappropriation have focused on the management of the Stoney reservation that held such promise as a model community 30 years before).

4

My career in cultural policy-making and practice began in 1972. The newly created Saskatchewan Department of Culture and Youth employed me as a consultant. One of the programs the department began was "Towards a New Past," a first effort to be inclusive. It was controversial, as was our effort to place the arts in a larger community setting and to resist the ascendancy of professional practitioners demanding preferred treatment. Our goal was to encourage participation in arts, heritage and cultural activities and to provide leadership, thereby improving standards, but industrial and economic objectives, and the arts and heritage community's goal of professionalization, weighed down our efforts. Our dependence on national resources steered our activities to meet the objectives of federal programmes. This was also the decade that introduced lottery financing to western Canada. In response to the demands of the few, the model chosen by the province was based on amateur sport — it was organized into provincial associations and was highly participatory. The effect was immediate: the promise of lottery dollars led to the building of an extensive network of community organizations and a hierarchy and bureaucracy parallel to that of government. Rural communities, with a strong infrastructure of sport and recreation activities, benefited particularly from this model but not the First Nations organizations that also participated in these activities. Thereafter the rift between the haves and have-nots was cemented.

One of the cultural initiatives of federal and provincial governments at this time was to support the policy of multiculturalism, first announced by the government of Canada in 1971. The focus of government was to accommodate immigrant populations through, among other programmes, the sponsorship of "her-

itage languages," and multicultural and community-based arts and crafts. Both the Francophone and Aboriginal populations excluded themselves from this policy and its implementation. They demanded parallel but superior structures to meet their objectives. A decade later community tensions increased as the racial and cultural pluralism of Canada, especially in larger urban centers, grew. The government sponsored heritage language programme was displaced by anti-racism initiatives in an effort to deal with predominantly urban-based conflicts, but not with the institutional and systemic racism that have for so long confronted Aboriginal peoples.

Those promoting First Nations and Inuit artists and craftspeople at this time were well aware of the potential of external tourist markets and the economic benefits of arts patronage, especially for collectors and those who planned to resell or donate their collections to the state. Promoters, including the government, and in particular the federal department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, were able to support the creation of material culture of their own liking, constructing the context in which it would be viewed, and suppressing that which did not reflect and support its conception of the marketplace. Eskimo soapstone sculptures and the argillite model poles of the Haida on the west coast had become novel. Inuit prints became a national genre of assimilated fine art. Even stone models of and Inuksuit ("like men" cairns) became part of the tourist trade and are now marketed in the south, and like gnomes, are garden monuments.

In the Qu'Appelle Valley, under the guidance of Lorna Ferguson, women on the Standing Buffalo reservation hooked rugs that told traditional myths. This effort to follow the success of the Inuit arts and crafts by promoting the rugs in eastern galleries and in New York City was unsuccessful. The history of arts and cultural policy and practice as it relates to Aboriginal Peoples is to a great extent a history of the commodification of their art and material culture. Modern Aboriginal artists were denied access as long as predetermined and largely ethnographic criteria were applied to their work by museums, galleries and granting agencies, such as the Canada Council.

Today few contemporary Canadian galleries focus on the arts of First Peoples, though the Winnipeg Art Gallery, McMichael Canadian Art Collection and the McCord Museum are notable exceptions. Even fewer have aggressively sought to include their arts and material culture in their collections, though both the National Gallery of Canada and the Art Gallery of Ontario have recently accepted donations from collectors. In the case of the NGC the collection of DIAND has been transferred to its facilities in Ot-

tawa. The National Museum of Man, now the Canadian Museum of Civilization and located in Hull, led the way by creating a position as Curator of Contemporary Art, which is now held by the Plains Cree artist, Gerald McMaster. But here and elsewhere the historic curatorial practice of collecting and exhibiting the art and material culture of Aboriginal peoples in an ethnographic (or anthropological) context has endured (Recently Robert McMichael, founder of the McMichael Gallery, has indicated his intent to deaccession a significant portion of its collection, including the more contemporary work of artists of Aboriginal heritage such as Metis painter Bob Boyer and Gerald McMaster).

It should not be surprising that Aboriginal artists chose to take control of the representation of their own culture, whether through the short-lived group of seven Aboriginal artists associated with "Woodland School," artists such as Norval Morrisseau and Daphne Odjig who have been recently credited with being the first truly modern indigenous Canadian artists — or by studying at the non-Native art schools and in university degree programmes. The new visual languages in which the artists were trained formed the basis for anti-colonial rhetorical strategies in art making by contemporary Aboriginal artists such as Joane Cardinal Schubert, a Blackfoot. The Indian Federated College was among a few post-secondary institutions welcoming students of Aboriginal heritage in the 1980s, and was important in helping form a number of prairie artists. Later, some of these young artists became teachers at the College. Bob Boyer, for example, developed a specialized Aboriginal studio art curriculum.

5

In 1980 I was appointed to the Federal Cultural Policy Review Committee. It was the first comprehensive review of arts and culture since the Royal Commission on Arts and Letters, which reported in 1951. We reported to the Minister of Communications in November 1982. Although no specific recommendations addressed First Peoples issues, we did call for the elimination of discriminatory barriers as part of Canada's social policy. We said we were "convinced that Native Artists must be recognized first and foremost as contemporary artists, whatever their field, and that federal policy should give special priority to promoting both traditional and contemporary creative work by artists of Indian and Inuit ancestry."

In 1982 I left the position of Executive Director of Saskatchewan Arts Board to become Deputy Minister

of Culture, Heritage and Recreation in Manitoba. It had frustrated me that the Arts Board in response to the maturing arts community had narrowed its support for arts and culture to complement the goals of the Canada Council. By doing so, the activities of culturally and ethnically diverse community organizations promoting Ukrainian dance or Scottish pipe bag music were not supported. The paintings of reservation life by self-trained First Nations artists such as Allan Sapp and Michael Lonechild were excluded from the Board's collection, although folk artists of European descent were included. Support for artists of Aboriginal heritage remained the responsibility of the DIAND and the Indian Art Centre in Ottawa — the division between federal and provincial responsibilities was maintained, although elsewhere the Saskatchewan government accepted a role in the support of First Nations peoples living off the reservation and in urban areas. Alberta's Glenbow Museum sponsored the exhibition "The Spirit Sings" for the 1988 Winter Olympics with financial support from among others, Shell Canada. That became a flashpoint for demonstrations by the Lubicon Indians and drew attention to the massive First Nations collections held on foreign lands.

As deputy minister, I was able to begin to address systemic discrimination against minorities and those with characteristics, including those of Aboriginal heritage. New legislation established the Intercultural Council that sought to improve relations among culturally diverse communities. The Council advised government on all matters under its jurisdiction, such as education and the recognition of foreign credentials. When the heritage legislation was revised, consultations included the Aboriginal community. The range of designated heritage sites and events to be honoured by the province expanded to include among others, Metis communities and labour. Sacred indigenous and other camping sites located outside federal lands were protected. When our support for the film and publishing industries expanded, Aboriginal themes were encouraged and supported. The Aboriginal broadcaster, Native Communications Inc., located in northern Manitoba, was in regular consultation with our offices. Radio and later TV, had become important elements in a northern strategy to maintain and develop Aboriginal languages and cultures. These first steps supported the initiatives that followed on the recognition of the existing Aboriginal and treaty rights of Canada's indigenous peoples in the Constitution Act of 1982 and the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Affairs that reported in 1996. It was established in 1991 as a consequence of the Oka crisis to report on the situation of Aboriginal peoples.

The retention and maintenance of Aboriginal languages has been an on-going concern because there is

no other country in which they are home languages. Federal programmes available to all other Canadians did little to encourage their use. The 1982 and 1983 public list of titles supported by Canada Council block grants programme for publishers made no reference to languages other than French and English. Publishers eligible for department of Communications support were assessed according minimum sales in an official language market. And the government's translation grants encouraged a greater exchange between English and French language texts by Canadian writers or their translation into languages other than French or English for distribution to audiences abroad. But these criteria excluded the Aboriginal languages of Canada.

At the same time, the Northern Native Broadcast Program was limited although there was a substantial indigenous population speaking Aboriginal languages in the south. Furthermore the accepted practice of multilingual interpretation and publications had not been widely adopted by Canadian galleries and museums, although there are occasional examples of Aboriginal voices on tapes related to specific exhibits. However, among the more recent firsts, is the creation of an Aboriginal Television station based in Winnipeg and broadcast throughout Canada in English, French and Aboriginal languages as part of the required cable offerings and the adoption of a strategy for artists of Aboriginal heritage by the Canada Council for the Arts.

The period between the White paper in 1969 and the patriation of the British North America Act in 1982 was marked by policy uncertainty, protest and confrontation, for example, by the James Bay Cree in northern Quebec. It should not be surprising that later in the Manitoba Legislature Elijah Harper, an Oj-Cree Chief of the Red Sucker Lake and the only Aboriginal MLA (NDP, Ruppertsland) held up an eagle feather, and delayed the passage of the Meech Lake Accord. Phil Fontaine was then head of the Assembly of Manitoba Chiefs. A former civil servant in DIAND he tried to establish better relations between Ottawa and Aboriginal communities when later he was elected Grand Chief of the Assembly of First Nations. He observed that it was not the Indians who opposed distinct society status for Quebec, but rather that the Aboriginal peoples with their 55 distinct original languages, 52 of which are distinct to Canada, are on the brink of extinction and therefore even more distinct.

Volume 3, "Gathering Strength" of *Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Affairs* provided specific recommendations related to language, arts and heritage. They relate to the need: a) to identify and protect historical and sacred sites and to safeguard Aboriginal heritage from misappropriation and misrep-

resentation; b) to conserve and revitalize Aboriginal languages; c) to enhance the presence of Aboriginal people and cultures in the media; d) and to support the literary and artistic expression of Aboriginal people. One would like to think that the force of this Report, the self-government negotiations, land claims and the establishment of a new Arctic territory governed by Inuit, Nunavut, on April 1, 1999 might begin to transform the lives of Aboriginal peoples living in Canada. As a whole the Commission has been described as the first time in modern history that Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples have reviewed their collective past and charted their future course.

Recent developments in the arts and culture community such as increased repatriation of arts and material culture from museums in Canada and elsewhere to their Aboriginal homes, the recognition of indigenous theatre and other performers as measured by the growth of music videos and CDs, and sponsorship of *Aboriginal Voices* and other publications of Canadian Aboriginal writers suggest that some non-Aboriginal cultural institutions are beginning to understand contemporary work by Aboriginal peoples to be a genuine indigenous expression and to acknowledge the collective ownership of the material culture by indigenous peoples. Earlier this year in conversation with representatives of First Nations organizations in Saskatchewan about cultural policy, I was told explicitly that discussions must take place on a nation-to-nation basis by the appropriate government representatives, and an unconditional transfer of resources was expected. This month the first film produced in the Inuktitut language has been included in the Cannes film festival.

While scholars debate the classification of indigenous arts and culture within a linear and art historical typology, reproductions of the material culture of Aboriginal peoples are being manufactured by Third World peoples around the globe for sale in North America and elsewhere. Computer programmers are creating programs that allow each of us to design our own Northwest Coast compositions based on the U-form, ovoid and form lines of the Haida and other First Nations. If fraudulent reproductions are a form of compliment, then Canada's Aboriginal peoples are widely admired. But it is the work of contemporary Aboriginal artists, work that fits no preconceived mould or theory that will show the way in the twenty-first century.

Playing with Words,
Playing with Identities,
Playing with Politics

Joseph Yvon Thériault[*]

We were invited to discuss the stakes involved to communities, to smaller societies, in the handing down of culture during a time of globalization. But such a question depends on a preliminary assumption. What type of society, what type of culture will we talk about? The handing down of culture, even within what are called "smaller cultures," can be seen very differently depending on, to use sociological jargon, the kinds of societal integration in that smaller culture. In brief, while hoping some light will be shed on that subject in this paper, the handing down of culture should be seen differently when one looks at an ethnic culture, a fragment of a wider culture built around the memory of recent immigration, or a national culture — i.e., the location of an autonomous cultural production pretending to emerge from a society having, or that should have, the attributes which are usually part of "larger" national cultures (history; literature; strong institutionalization, etc.). The stake of the handing down of culture is different here, less on conceptual grounds, but more from the context of the smaller culture. Let us mention here, without necessarily commenting on it, that the stakes of cultural reproduction are not the same when the culture in question — the smaller francophone culture — is largely a minority on this continent

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when compared to — the Anglophone culture — which is an integral part of our continental Anglo American civilization.

These questions of the ways of societal integration are thrown into relief when one pays attention to expressions used for naming oneself or being named. Let us recall, for example, that First Nations peoples were called in turn Savages, Indians and Indigenous. If the word Savage meant mostly the distance between the Amerindian and the European, between the Savage and the Civilized, the word Indian referred to a differentiated and a marginalized kind of social integration — the Indian was living on a reserve whereas the Savage lived in nature. Indigenous is a more autonomous assertion, more nationalitary of the Amerindian culture; this appellation is in agreement with the move toward autonomy by the Amerindian people.

English speaking Canadians were usually called, and called themselves, English, at a time when the reference to English dissociated them from Americans, whom they did not want to be like, or from Canadians who spoke French and were Roman Catholic; some time later they called themselves English Canadians, which defined them as one of the two founding nations of Canada, in reference to French Canadians from whom they wanted to be seen as different; now they call themselves Canadians, which negates the existence of English Canada — only French Canadians, we are told, persist in thinking that there is an English Canada. The non existence of an English Canada implies the existence of a Canadian identity (Canada without an hyphen); this identity aims at being the only possible Canadian identity (an inclusive one).

Following a different path, French speaking Canadians were first called Canadiens, which then meant their hegemonic character in the Canadian political space. Following the defeat of their national claim, around the 1840s, and the fact that they became a minority in the mid-nineteenth century, reveals the use of "French Canadian" as a pejorative title given first by Anglo Montrealers and later by Lord Durham to disparage their claim of a national character and to underline its ethnic character. The words "French Canadian," which they will embrace later on, were used for more than a century, in a bi-national interpretation of Canada. Later on, in the 1960s, the majority of French Canadians, those from Québec, began to call themselves Québécois, which took into account a more political modality of integration to Québec than to French Canada, while asserting from now on the hegemony of French Canadian culture over the Québec culture. As English Canada today negates its existence in the name of a Canada

inclusive of its differences, French Canada — or one should say French Québec, since the name French Canada has again become a pejorative expression for the Franco Québécois, as it was earlier) — French Québec is negating in its turn its own hegemonic project under the cover of a Francophony inclusive of all cultures. Some even invite the Anglo Québécois and the Amerindians to be part of the founding group of a French Québec (provided, of course, that they learn its language).

Let us put a stop here to this short "Canadian" survey with words used by the Anglo Québécois to name themselves. At the beginning, they were English. Later on, they were English Canadians. Today, they hesitate between being simply Canadians, like the rest of Canadians speaking English, or Anglo Québécois. Québec nationalism would prefer to call them only Québécois, preserving their ethnic background only in their private lives or cultural community.

1. WHEN WORDS HESITATE, SO DOES IDENTITY

What about the Francophones who are a minority in Canada? I would like to show how the words used to name them are a symptom of the precariousness of their situation and how it makes their identity reference lack precision. I do not want to give a meaning that is exclusively negative to precariousness and indecision. It is true that this is a situation, whatever the main leaders of those communities might say in echo to federal politicians, in which the handing down of culture, in terms of cultural reproduction from one generation to the next, is not at all secured. I also use here the terms precariousness and indecision as a challenge to be taken on, a "slightness" to be changed into creativity (Paré, 1992). For rendering commonplace the power of such expressions, one can say that precariousness and indecision of identity references are, in a world of globalization, where cultural diversity is challenged, more often the standard situation rather than the exception.

When travelling across the identity vocabulary of French speaking Canada outside Québec (travelling across historical time but also across today's identity space), I would like mostly to reveal two dimensions of their cultural position. A first one, more conceptual, is unfurled along the *nationalitary axis*: between ethnicity and nation; or to put it differently, between dimensions of their cultural reality which integrate them as fragments of a national culture different from their own culture — i.e., which makes them

ethnic — and other dimensions of their cultural reality which integrate them in a more global way, to a national reality. That axis raises the following question: are those communities ethnic communities or are they part of a national community?

A second dimension, which is more contextual, overlaps, not necessarily completely, and unfurls on the French Canadian axis, between Québec and the *Rest of Canada*, between its place as one of the fragments of the Canadian mosaic or as a minority extension of Québec's francophone culture. From this second axis a question arises: are those communities part of the "Canadian" semantic field, to which they are linked through their geopolitical placement, or of the Québec francophone field to which they are linked because they share the same national culture?

I am going to start this exploration with the expression *French Canadian*, because it precedes the others and still haunts francophones who live as minorities, although we tried to change that in the 1960s. Suggesting that francophones living as minorities have been French Canadians asserts two things when considered on two axes we have just defined.

First assertion. As French Canadians, the Francophone communities outside Québec historically have never been called ethnic communities, but were part of a national community, French Canada. This reference to nation is not a mere game, or an historically false pretense carried out by French Canadian leaders as an interpretation of the political pact of 1867. Let us recall it. Beyond the representation, always subjective, French Canada has really been an objective sociological reality, a peculiar modality of social integration that warrants being called a nation. As Fernand Dumont (1993) put it, French Canada has never been, strictly speaking, an ethnic group (as it is too often called in our day to assert more strongly its fading away) but a culture-nation, a grouping of human beings behaving at a second level of culture, with reference to history, literature and institutions, often within a State, and also sometimes within a Church. So, when francophones living as minorities identified themselves as French Canadians, they were effectively sharing a kind of national integration.

Second assertion. The French Canadian nation mentioned above extended itself far beyond the frontiers of the Province of Québec; it included all the French Canadians of Canada (including the Acadians and the French Canadians of the United States). In presenting themselves as French Canadians, francophones living as minorities did not see themselves as minorities and in consequence, did not live on a

daily basis as minorities and even less as ethnic groups. To live as French Canadians meant living in the universe and in the institutional practices of the French Canadian nation — its parishes, its clergy, its institutions — from Baie Sainte-Marie in Nova Scotia to Maillardville in British Columbia. To call oneself French Canadian meant asserting one's belonging to a common culture — *from coast to coast* — but also seeing its integration into Canadian society, not through the lens of a minority culture, but through that of a binational society.

The expression "Francophones outside Québec" took the place of the term French Canadians at the end of the sixties, to identify Francophones living with a minority status. This appellation came from the tearing down of French Canada. We shall not take a long look at the breakdown of French Canada at this point. Let us simply recall that processes of social change combined at that time to compel the French Canadian to acquire an institutional state base and, consequently, to become territorialized. It is in Québec, the historical heart of French Canada and the only place where that group was politically a majority, that were first found a territory and a state. But, all the francophone minorities of Canada were forced to undergo a process that compelled French Canadian institutions — schools, hospitals, colleges — to transit through the… provincial states. French Canada became fragmented into as many French Canadas as there are provincial political entities: Franco-Ontarians; Franco-Manitobans; the Acadians of New Brunswick and of Nova Scotia; Franco-Yukonese; etc.

The expression *Francophones outside Québec* contains simultaneously a denial of the tearing apart of French Canada (the Francophones outside Québec are part of the same national cultural universe as that of Québec, they are simply outside of Québec), as well as, in reference to Québec, something external, an acceptance from now on of the impossible character of that same French Canada. Let us remind ourselves that at the beginning of the 1960s the Government of Québec established a Service of "French Canada Outside the Frontiers." In the expression francophones outside Québec, which is a logical step in the creation, French Canada has disappeared, and the francophones outside Québec are the orphans of a nation which is henceforth inaccessible. The expression francophones outside Québec is in fact a most revealing naming of identity paradoxes peculiar to francophone populations living in Canada in a minority situation. It reminds us simultaneously how these populations have found themselves out of the field of the national reference of the francophones living here (which has become the Québec reference), while sticking somewhere else. Of course, the provincial appellations — Acadians of…, Franco… Ontar-

ians… Manitobans, etc. indicate a sort of shifting from national ambitions to a new location of provincial identity. The example of Acadian nationalism in New Brunswick, which saw the birth, during the 1960s, of an autonomous Acadian party, which rallied the most dynamic elements of young nationalist Acadians, exemplifies that phenomenon. But it must be said that the new territories for unfolding national ambition — the provinces — were too far outside Québec for such an ambition. The idea of reproducing in each province the identity forms and the institutional networks of the former French Canada was an unobtainable goal. Detached from Québec, could the former French Canada outside its boundaries still be part of a nation, or was it just a sort of archipelago of ethnic communities?

There was such a certified fact — the acceptance of its minority status — in the creation in 1991 of the most important organization speaking in the name of Francophone communities living in the situation of minorities: the *Fédération des communautés francophones et acadiennes du Canada* (FCFAC). The expression *Francophone communities of Canada*, plural, does not effectively resonate as a self affirming principle, as French Canada did, or a lack thereof, as did the expression *outside of Québec*. Of course, one could think of this expression as more inclusive and that the Francophones living in a situation of minorities wish to manifest the link uniting them — the French language. Some others will see in that appellation an opening to the henceforth plural and cosmopolitan nature of the identity, against one anchored in a single culture in a given territory. But that plural Francophony no longer has, in that expression, collective dimensions, which is a good thing for the cosmopolitan tenants, but which can be hardly acceptable to those who persist in finding it legitimate — and there are still Franco Canadians of this breed — to pretend that certain identities are comprised of historical communities, in order to be societies.

On the axis from ethnicity to nation, the plural identity is closer to ethnicity than to nation; on the axis of Québec and Canada, it asserts itself irremediably as fragments of Canadian society. This is why one can understand how FCFAC could issue, some time ago, a report by experts, which suggested that francophone communities stop asking for bilingualism on the basis of national duality, a reality which is no longer understood by the younger generation, but on the value that bilingualism could add in the new global economy (PGF Consultants, 1998). This was seen differently when it was understood that it meant treating the French language as a question of value added, and not as a founding element of a national duality, and that under that heading it was more efficient to invest in the Spanish or Chinese languages.

All that is to recall that if Francophone elements living as minorities wish to fully assume their status of minorities within Canadian society (a kind of integration that is closer to ethnic integration than to national integration), several elements of those communities are putting forward the national adventure of the French fact in this country. This was the case already in 1991, when the name of the Federation was changed, from *the Francophones… outside of Québec* to *Francophone Communities of Canada*. The Acadians stated that they did not want to be included in the appellation *Francophone Communities* — plural — *of Canada*, as they were the bearers of a national tradition.

The expression Francophone Communities of Canada has different variables. There is, for example, the *Minority Francophonies of Canada*, which I have used as a title of a study on those matters: *Francophonies minoritaires au Canada: l'état des lieux* (Thériault, Ed., 1999). It is not however said, in such an expression, if the minority refers to the National Francophone minority, the old French Canada… outside the borders (an idea more of nationalitary) or to a minority within English speaking Canada (a more ethnicist conception). We find the same type of ambiguity in the programme of the present colloquium: *official linguistic minorities*. As there are two official linguistic minorities in Canada, one would think that those minorities refer to two majorities, one English-speaking, the other one French-speaking (that was surely the intention of the legislator who invented those expressions). As a Francophone in English Canada, I am part of a minority within English Canada just as I am an integral part of the other majority — the English and French languages being on the same official footing in Canada. That is even clearer for the official linguistic minority, the Anglophones of Québec; the latter is a minority in Québec but part of a majority in the totality of Canada. However, the organizers of this colloquium have brought us together, as if the status of "minorities," Francophones outside Québec and Anglophones outside English Canada, were prevailing upon our cultural group of reference. However, the stake of cultural renewal for minority francophones can be understood as a regional question of cultural renewal within the francophone space in America, of which Québec is the hearth. I have always thought that my studies on francophone minorities are more a part of Québec sociology than that of English Canada. Put differently, I could have presented my paper at this colloquium in workshops on the subject of variables in Québec culture and in others on being a minority in English Canada. In the same way, my colleague from the English minority in Québec would not have been displeased, I presume, to have been included in a workshop dealing with English Canadians living… outside of Canada. At the very least, such an appellation seems to me as good as the term Anglo-Quebecker.

I will end with a last development within the Francophone collectivities living as minorities, which will remind us of the ambivalence of the situation in which that group finds itself. We hear the leaders of those communities talking more and more of a *Canadian Francophony* (I suspect that this expression has been given to them by Heritage Canada). Here is an expression, one might think, which can avoid the trap of the minority label and its ethnic parallel. Here is an expression which, less loaded with meaning than that of "French Canada," would be more acceptable in acknowledging the diverse accents within one of the two national linguistic groups. But it must be said that a Canadian Francophony which does not include Québec, as if it were already sovereign, is in fact a confirmation of the minority status of those groups. But there is something more. In the recent document *Dialogue* of the FCFAC, the working group established by that representative body of those communities invited Québec (francophone I assume) to become part of the Canadian Francophony. We find in this wish and its appellation all the ambivalence of the Canadian Francophony living as a minority: its refusal to be a minority and its difficulty in redefining, after the death of French Canada, its relationship with an irreducible autonomous Québec. Asking Québec to be part of the Canadian Francophony is trying to replay the adventure of French Canada without taking into account the requirement of seeing Québec as a distinct society because of its Francophone majority. The contrary should have been asserted: in order that French Canada be reborn, Francophony must position itself in reference to the Québec fact, otherwise it is doomed to remain a cultural minority, which is something it won't accept. To maintain the ambition of being a national culture, Francophones outside of Québec must accept, in fact, their role as Quebeckers outside the borders.

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Cultural Globalization and Smaller Eastern European Societies: Reflections Based on Québec and Canadian Perspectives

Mircea Vultur[*]

The theme of this colloquium, "The Handing Down of Culture, Smaller Societies and Globalization," reveals profound changes which have occurred throughout the world, and provides an occasion for reflecting on the unprecedented character of the new globalized regime and its relationship with smaller societies. The purpose of this paper is to present an Eastern European perspective on the theme of this colloquium. I have structured my presentation in two parts. The first will deal with conceptual definitions. The second is intended to grasp the cultural aspects of globalization, as seen from Eastern Europe. Drawing on thoughts expressed by researchers during the colloquium, I want to present some considerations that allow us to see how different or similar are the positions of smaller Eastern European societies and Canadian or Québec society.

1. DEFINITIONS OF OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS

On the subject of globalization, culture and smaller societies, one is tempted to paraphrase what Paul

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[*] INRS Urbanisation, Culture et Société.

Valéry wrote about freedom: those words are more loaded with value than with meaning. But first, it seems appropriate to examine the operational concepts at the core of this colloquium.[1]

What I mean by globalization[2] is the expansion of economic and cultural exchanges to take in the whole world, and at the same time, the development of systemic structures that negatively affect ways of living. Globalization in the first sense can be distinguished then from globalization in the second, which is the emergence of a world system, that is "greater than the sum of its parts" (Crochet, 1996: 34). Within this domain of overall definitions, *cultural globalization* is the process through which a local cultural system succeeds in extending its influence to other geographical areas and, in so doing, acquires the capacity of describing other cultural systems as local. In its concrete manifestations, cultural globalization takes two forms. The first one consists of a system of knowledge used to develop information and communication technologies. The second one, which is of more interest to us, especially in its sociological aspect, refers to a mass culture, as defined by Fernand Harvey, that is a culture which gave birth to the mass media, the publication of popular books, magazines and newspapers, cinema, the record industry, and radio and television. It offers *cultural products* (books, films, records, etc.), but also *cultural values* as beliefs and ideological norms, which shape conduct and individuals' attitudes within the cultural sphere. This culture today is mainly American. It represents the greatest factor in the cultural unification of the present world. This cultural globalization can be called *globalized localism*, a concept put forward by Boaventura de Sousa Santos, meaning that the local American cultural phenomenon has succeeded in becoming globalized. For smaller societies, this aspect of cultural globalization shows up as *localized globalism*, that is "a process of arrangement or of appropriation, by local cultures, of objects, codes or signals disseminated throughout the world by modal centres producing material or virtual symbols" (Létourneau, 1998: 420).

That globalized localism can be seen more especially in newer cultural manifestations, the result of the impact of American transnational practices on smaller societies, which restructure and adapt themselves to those practices. In the international cultural sphere, larger societies create globalized cultural localisms, whereas smaller societies have to do with localized cultural globalisms. American society is the

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[1] The conceptual considerations that are to be found here take their inspiration from the reflections of Guy Rocher and of Boaventura de Sousa Santos, at the 16th Congress of the AISLF, held in Québec, July 3-7, 2000. See bibliographical references.

[2] Translator's note: In French, there is a clear difference between "mondialisation" and "globalisation." The author gives both definitions immediately underneath. But there is just one term in English: "globalization."

primary example of a hegemonic larger society, but every other type of society that has a strong cultural influence on others imposes itself by the very same mechanisms.

2. THE INTERFERENCE OF CULTURAL GLOBALIZATION IN EASTERN EUROPE

Among the numerous questions raised by this colloquium, I hold back some which seem congruent with smaller Eastern European societies. I shall privilege some thematic axes of this colloquium, the one evoking interference lines of questions approached with the Eastern European area.

2.1 NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND INFORMATION MEDIAS

As mentioned by Michael Cross, through media and information technologies, globalization generates localism and allows smaller societies be in the forefront of larger ones. One could say that this is a positive influence. Corresponding to the above mentioned definition of cultural globalization, when we deal with globalized localisms, we can see that such a situation makes elements of local culture acquire, at any given moment, international exposure. Gobalization is not only a factor in the homogenization of culture, but it can also favour the emergence of extra-American and extra-Western cultural models which, up to now, were not worth mentioning in terms of a Hegelian conception of the cultural history of the world. A good example of this is what Carole Lévesque mentioned about the visibility gained by aboriginal knowledge in the new globalized order.

The planetary interconnection of information technologies also incites the discovery of other cultures. It is through cultural globalization that the smaller societies of Eastern Europe have come to know and overcome so-called cultural incompatibilities, which in fact are the consequence of mutual ignorance. This is a factor of extreme importance, in a context where the experience of the Balkans shows us how individuals raised in different cultures can behave without respect or compassion for others. Without planetary cultural policies, which could bring smaller societies and nations closer together, it is cultural globalization which today favours reciprocal knowledge. Through it, respect for the cultures of others can become socially useful and a basic condition for a new social contract.

2.2 LINGUISTIC UNIFICATION

In Eastern Europe, the fear of linguistic Americanization and the domination of the English language does not exist as a serious concern. The process of the spreading of the English language is not working to the detriment of other languages of regional or global cultures here, as is the case with the French language. The French language has known popularity in this region since the intensification of cultural exchanges in the actual global world. The French language is well rooted there, and is moving toward an even stronger position. The cultural phenomenon of the French language succeeding is linked to the process of globalization, which resulted in the policies of Francophony not being defensive and inward, but more and more open to cultural riches and diversity.

On the other hand, we can see that the logic of the dissemination of languages is not the same as that of commodities. The way one appropriates a given language is different from the consumption of material goods or of economic integration. The weakening of borders is, for the new Eastern European generations, an incitement to discover and assimilate other languages, out of passion or necessity. Speaking more than one language and moving around in other cultures is now a valuable professional asset. Léon Bernier, in his paper about youth and art, has pinpointed how this encounter arises through free expression, not as the result of a policy of cultural reproduction. I would like to know how many young people today learn French, German, Russian and even the languages of smaller societies like Romanian freely, because of globalization. It is certain that they are numerous; this is a positive development. Globalization, inasmuch as it is spreading cultures and languages all over the world, is the best means of preserving them.

2.3 CULTURAL INDUSTRIES

Regarding cultural industries, there is a tension in Eastern Europe between the supporters of institutional help for culture and the promoters of laissez-faire applied to cultural production. Mistrusting everything that comes from the State, Eastern European cultural producers have turned to the private sector for financing because it seems more likely than State institutions to encourage the expression of individual freedom for artistic creation. This situation is such that the prevailing opinion is that the success or failure of a cultural product depends on the market. This, of course, favours American cultural productions.

In that context we can ask the following question: what are the mechanisms which impose elements of the American culture today on the world, especially in Eastern Europe, in a situation, as Robin Higham has observed, in which the USA has no national diplomatic cultural policy, but only a private one, which is not enclosed in pre-established norms? One of the reasons of course is the fascination of Eastern Europe with America. Apart from that, there is certainly a link between the characteristics of American cultural production and its dissemination. If, during the forty-five years of Soviet domination of Eastern countries, artistic expression was judged through the lens of communist ideology, today judgement is through the market. In a market situation, individual choice prevails. From that point of view, the force of the American cultural production rules world culture. The strength of American culture is based on the fact that it is centered on *promoting not the modes of expression of a given community or a nation, but on the modes of expression of the individual*. American culture represents the unceasing production and destruction of the meaning of life by individuals, not by a collectivity. One can say that America can be found in all the cultures of the world, since the whole world recognizes itself in good measure through its cultural production.

2.4 CULTURAL POLICIES AND THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN THE BUILDING UP OF IDENTITY

More than one author has underlined the fact that smaller societies resist homogenization by promoting identity through cultural policies. What one finds in the views of a number of researchers is that the governments of smaller societies like Canada and Québec have been successful in developing policies for preserving and asserting an identity threatened by the superpower that is the United States. These smaller societies fear becoming a caricature of the American cultural model, which will impose its language, and its ways of thinking and creating. The fact is that today identity is dependent more and more on the State, which has replaced the traditional structures of social regulation.

But in Eastern Europe, cultural policies intended to promoting identity by the State are rejected since they had been largely used by communist regimes to legitimate their power. In smaller Eastern European societies, in order to legitimate its actions, the State has manipulated the feeling of identity. Individuals and social groups were not in a position to define themselves freely. The structures of State power assigned identities to individuals, in conformity with a unifying idea of social organization that was able to impose the logic of domination. Eastern Europeans have lived the terror of *legitimating identity*, instilled by the controlling institutions of the collectivist hegemonic society, in order to extend their domination over individuals.

Under those conditions, American cultural hegemony is seen by the smaller Eastern European societies as an element of de-communization and the result of modernization. The protection of the collective identity is not seen as a positive phenomenon, but as a means of delaying modernity at the price of economic, political and cultural stagnation. The discourse against globalization because of the protection of cultural identity is thought of as lying on a *congealed idea of culture,* based on the principle that no society can remain identical throughout time. When facing a possible institutional offensive to promote identity, Eastern European societies argue that this strategy can crush the individual who stresses his own originality in favour of belonging to a collectivity.

I think it is pertinent to question the intervention of the State to promote cultural identity, in that it ascribes a certain identity to members of a given society. This questioning does not consider the pertinence of State intervention inasmuch as it respects identity elements emerging from the overall social body, as well as, as Diane Saint-Pierre pointed out in her paper, the role and the impact of institutional actors involved in the construction of identity and also the values and the beliefs they convey. I see that wherever we are, the State tends to place special value on some cultural and identity elements but, in so doing, it decontextualizes those elements and places them outside history. However, from a cultural point of view, value is an historical concept; it is subject to a temporal setting. This is why one should re-interpret the meaning of cultural participation and lay new foundations for the relationship of the State to culture based on the recognition of more universal identities and of cultural norms adapted to the context of globalization. One should have a non-paternalistic eye on cultural participation, where individual autonomy is more important, and where the subject is defined more by individual projects rather than by the fact of belonging to a given nation or a particular society. Under those conditions, intellectual discourse about the dislocation of collective cultural values and the condemnation of triumphant individualism, which cultivates the narcissism of the resister, is not relevant any more. Resistance to change is not in itself a moral value, and there is no evidence that some forms of de-setting the relationship to values is the end of any relationships to values. It is only in forsaking the positions of strategists or narcissistic resisters that those responsible for culture in smaller societies can open up space for new settings of culture that the process of globalization has allowed to emerge.

I would say here that the cultures of smaller societies, Canadian, Québécois or Eastern European, are increasingly becoming *cultures of interference* in the context of globalization. They are ruled by the princi-

ple of the search for identity and the integration of contradictory cultural elements. Obsessed by the lack of the possibility of cultural dissemination, and referring to a core they despise or value, those societies see their local creativity stimulated and, as a result, develop a culture that integrates different perspectives that become a shield against homogenization. *Thus margins become as interesting as the core.* Under these conditions, as underscored by John Meisel, a scenario that forces a choice between the folding back of an identity or the hegemony of a globalized culture of the American type becomes totally irrelevant.

3. CONCLUSION

The new cultural order which is emerging from the context of globalization is a real project of civilization where cultures are completing each other without excluding themselves, where they reinforce each other without weakening themselves, where they get together without becoming similar. In a world where cultural diversity is becoming, as Fernand Harvey put it, "the only true way for maintaining humanism at the core of culture," the universal will be implemented through the recognition of particularities. This recognition is also a preliminary condition for setting up a real dialogue among people. From that perspective, globalization can be seen by smaller societies as a political, economic and cultural opening. The citizens of those societies should not be discouraged by that challenge; rather it should prompt them to overcome it with enthusiasm.

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A Far Away Glance at the Canadian World: An Essay

*Tomke Lask**

When I accepted the invitation to this colloquium, I was delighted to get in touch with the Canadian academic world and to take advantage of the occasion to learn about Canada. I already had made up my mind about that country in general and Québec in particular. I had then just to check it out for myself on the spot, to see whether my ideas were correct. Happily, relativizing, descontructing and demystifying are common processes in anthropology. Furthermore, as an anthropologist, and in spite of my preconceptions, I was trained to understand the inherent logic of Canadian society and its approach to the handing down of culture. During my journey in Canada — and especially at the colloquium and the prior reading of its papers — I undertook an exercise that resulted in this essay. The handing down of culture in smaller societies in the context of globalization has become a somewhat trivial theme, following the discussions about economic globalization during the early 1990s. The fear of seeing a similar process which would aim at homogenizing cultures through generalized access to media such as the Internet and cable television was widespread in several countries and, curiously, in several of those — France, for example — supposedly having strong cultural traditions. In spite of those fears and paradoxically, we have seen everywhere in the world a revival of national movements, even nationalist ones.

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Reactions to the possible threat of cultural unification have been numerous and diversified. To return to the process of the handing down of culture in the context of the colloquium was a good occasion for restating that question. A first step, and not the least, was to exchange information and research results between the two linguistic communities of Canada, having to do with the question.

The role the organizer of the colloquium, Jean-Paul Baillargeon, gave to me was that of an outsider. I was supposed to be a European eye — if one speaks of such an eye, since European culture is far from having one eye called European — looking at a context I only knew about through the media and the publications of some Canadian authors. The responsibility Jean-Paul Baillargeon gave me was important and the risk of my blundering was great.

1. THE DISCOVERING OF A NEW WORLD

> Canada, Federal State of North America, member of the Commonwealth, second largest country in the world in terms of geographical area, situated between the Pacific, the Atlantic and the Arctic Oceans and the United States of America (borders: 8 850 km). It is divided into ten provinces and two territories; 9 976 139km²; 25 738 000 inhabitants; federal capital, Ottawa. Type of state: constitutional monarchy (the honorary chief of the State is the British sovereign). Official languages: English and, since 1969, French. Money: Canadian dollar. Religion: Catholicism and Protestantism […]
>
> Economy: […] Canada is a very important economic power, but its development is hampered by the small size of its domestic market […] Also, this country is heavily dependent upon foreign capital, which controls 47 % of the economy […], the United States being the main investor and the first commercial partner (70 % of the exchanges). […] (*Hachette le Dictionnaire de notre temps*, 1991, Paris, Hachette).

Let us summarize: Canada is the second largest country in the world. It is a redoubtable economic nation with a bilingual population and the privileged neighbour of the United States of America (USA). I prematurely reached the conclusion that Canada was a country and a society with very high self-esteem that asserted itself in the world because of its natural resources, its own way of life — everyone knows about

Canada in Europe: Canadians wear only lumberjack shirts and usually travel by canoe. It is a country that occupies a large territory and is socially integrated, despite the fact that its density of population seems incredible (2.6 inhabitants/km²) and that its population is found mainly in large cities. The elements retained by Mauss for defining a nation (Mauss, 1920) are conjoined for speaking of a great nation. But there are false trails which can disconcert an outsider.

1.1 CANADA IS A LARGE COUNTRY AND A VERY GREAT COUNTRY

All this seems obvious to people from outside. Canadians themselves assert something different: "We are a small society," I was told unceasingly by Canadians on both sides of the linguistic barrier. I read about it in more than one of this colloquium's papers — John Meisel's, for example. My reference points did not accord with this assertion. It took me a certain amount of time to catch up with the reality behind that statement.

1.2 CANADIANS ARE BILINGUAL

This assertion is far from being true, as I found out for myself when visiting Toronto, Montréal and Québec City. In fact, the phobia about the English language among Francophone Europeans is reproduced in Canada in exactly the same way. Moreover, the apathetic recognition of the linguistic ignorance of Anglophones, always accompanied with a grimace, is also repeated throughout the world, allowing for Anglophones to be more lazy than those from other places when it comes to the learning of other languages. The possibility of speaking different languages without travelling outside of one's own country is a present dream of many people. In Europe, there are very few countries where multilingualism is on the agenda, which is a way of misconstruing what European identity is partly about, the mastering of several languages. On the other hand, Belgium, the country where I live, although I wasn't not born there, has a poor language policy.

1.3 CANADA IS A COUNTRY LIKE THE USA

Obviously not: life in Canada is more similar to the one in Europe than to the North American lifestyle. Of course, there are regions of the USA where a certain cultural assimilation has done its work, among others, because of religion such as in the Bible Belt, for example. But the values favoured by Canadians seem more in accord with the European quality of life than with the economic values of the Americans. This is the impression this brief visit has left me with. One way Canadians want to remain different from the Americans

is that Canadians contest changes to their social policies. Canadian intellectuals — be they Anglophones or Francophones — are not happy to see the introduction of American logic to those policies.

My short experience of Canadian reality has quickly begun a process of reviewing my Eurocentric point of view.

2. THE CONSTRUCTION AND THE HANDING DOWN OF IDENTITY: INVENTORY AND PERSPECTIVES

The key words found in many of the papers at this colloquium were: the State, language, identity, tradition and modernity. Each time those terms were looked at in a particular Canadian[1] context, it took us back to the handing down of culture and its defence when facing another culture, which appears stronger and supposedly has intentions of hegemony.

It is interesting to note that, in this era of neoliberalism, the belief in more intervention by the State in the field of culture, globally speaking, is unanimous. The expectation of the State is clear: it has to establish conditions that revive culture from its local roots. Proxy cultural policy is on the agenda; the State must get off its pedestal and, instead of sustaining national programmes, should reorganize its politics based on the cultural habits of its citizens. In a way, people are looking for a reversal of hierarchy in the way the state develops policies; instead of a handing down to the people, the rule should be the other way around, as it is the only way in which citizens become conscious of their own responsibility for the handing down of culture (Diane Saint-Pierre, Michel de la Durantaye). The integration in school programmes of visits to museums and art galleries (Léon Bernier) is an important step in the process of making the younger generation conscious of art, and of their local, regional, national and international heritage.[2]

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[1] I am conscious that most of the participants at this colloquium will be displeased with my not very differentiated use of the word "Canadian" in the present essay. But as the presentation of Joseph Yvon Thériault has shown, a proper use of the words Canada, French, English, Francophone and Anglophone is nearly impossible, as every grouping refers to an historical or a political meaning. For an outsider, it is almost impossible not to be at fault. For that reason, I say here that in my essay the term "Canadian" refers only to the nationality of all the citizens of Canada. I differentiate Canadians with the adjectives "Francophone" and "Anglophone" according to their linguistic groups, without meaning anything else. I hope I shall be allowed not to be more precise, given my status as a foreigner!

[2] In the Musée d'art moderne de Montréal, which I visited, there was an exhibition of "works" by pupils in the schools of that city, inspired by First Nations pieces of art exhibited in that museum. This was a very good example of that effort. Acknowledging the value of the First Nations pieces of art through an exhibition in a legitimized locale by the dominating class (Bourdieu, 1984) can contribute to the education of youth. They learn to respect and to appraise the cultural patrimony of their society and they can draw inspiration from it for their own art. Perhaps this was what Fernand Dumont meant when he stated that "to be an adult is to be a good partner" (1995), *Raisons communes*, Montréal, Les Éditions du Boréal: 72).

In that sense, equality between culture and the lifestyle of ethnic minorities in Canada, notably the Inuit, is also a necessity (Joy Cohnstaedt). Why look at Inuit art as an ethnic art, a minor one? This attitude arises from the typical reproduction of colonial relations between a dominated people and its dominator. Evaluating contemporary Inuit art the same way as that of the majority culture would diminish the statutory heterogeneity of competitors in the marketplace of the arts and accord full citizenship to a minority people. Whose art is going to represent a given society abroad is an important question for the politico-cultural institutions of Canada (Robin Higham). Is the art of First Nations as valuable as that of other citizens, or is the tourism that results from the aboriginals and their material culture going to be more important? The traditional knowledge First Nations possess about their environment should be considered complementary knowledge, and not inferior because it is different from scientific knowledge (Carole Lévesque).[3]

Language, or the language option, is an excellent element linked to the building up of Canadian identity, at least as far as Francophone Canadians are concerned. Objectively speaking, Anglophone Canadians find it more difficult to have a sense of their own identity, as neighbours of the Americans, because language is not an element that is as distinguishable as in the case of Francophones. Anglophones, therefore, have to put forward other cultural tools to maintain a cultural frontier with the USA and, in a world of globalized material culture, the domain of an intangible heritage such as lifestyle is more difficult to master. Francophone Canadians do not take mastering into consideration, as they are too caught up with their concern of seeing their cultural specificity recognized in a Canadian context. But is it possible to equate identity only with the use of a given language? Is that not a way of putting oneself into a dead end trap logically? In the past, language as an essential cultural element has been used to justify war. I know what I am talking about having been born in Germany. I could have studied, first at school, and later at university, the history of national socialist Germany. The emotions raised by the evocation of a common culture based on the use of the same language open doors to all types of political radicalism and closes windows to a larger perspective on culture. Of course, there is no such movement in Francophone Canada. I just want to warn about a possible emotional overemphasis, of relying on language as the entire cultural strength of a population.

In the City of Québec, I witnessed different scenes which displeased me because of their implicit vio-

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[3] Perhaps should we include in this discussion the congealed association between the Indigenous and its environment. All the other citizens of a given country can choose their occupation. Why should we systematically restrict Indigenous people to the knowledge of nature?

lence. One day, in a tiny souvenir shop, I overheard a conversation between the owner of the shop and two French tourists. The shopkeeper said with a nice Québécois accent that the worst plague facing Québec was Chinese tourists coming from Canada [sic!]. "What the English were not able to do, the Chinese are going to succeed at!" That is to eradicate the French language from Québec. "Since the younger generation does not love our language any more, after my generation, French will not find any defenders here. We are going to disappear!" This discourse was not only shocking because of its racism toward the Chinese (who bring money to Québec through business and tourism), but also because the French couple seemed in full agreement. The important matter here is to see the weight the French language is given. What did this man mean when he complained about the lack of love of the younger generation for the French language? Is it the fact that they gladly learn the English language? Is the mastering of another language a sign of loss of identity? Is the rest of Québec culture meaningless? And what an expression of resentment toward the English people of Canada, that is to say the fellow-citizens of that man! How could that attitude contribute to the handing down of the culture of a small society such as Québec? Was it not rather a declaration of surrender against a tradition? He who says tradition does not necessarily say no to change, as seems to be the case here with the younger generations (Fernand Harvey).

These generations were at the core of concerns in more than one paper at this colloquium. Serge Proulx's analysis of the use of new technologies as a threat to the primary identity of young Québécois was of particular interest to me. The danger he described in his presentation was the possible loss, or at least reduction, of their linguistic ability by the frequent use of cyberspace — using English for chatting within virtual groups. The "hard core" of Québec identity was under pressure and was in danger of disappearing, or of changing in a radical way.

In that pessimistic context, characterized by the fear of change, one should perhaps relativize the impact of virtual impacts on the building up of a regional or a national identity. Until further notice, reality and daily physical contact are more important for the building up of an individual's identity than any talk through new technologies. Put differently, it is important to ask questions, especially about the influence of the Internet on the building up of identity. If this influence becomes more efficient than those of daily life, one has to question what those responsible for the education of the youth are doing. Of course, school is seen more and more as the only source of education, but is it correct to exempt parents from this task, which has traditionally been theirs? If children and teenagers can devote so much time to the

computer (and it is not a question here of the number of hours they sit in front of the television receiver), it is important to ask ourselves why. Where are the parents who can suggest other leisure time activities? The tumbling down of competence in French, especially in written French, is the result of the lack of a habit of reading on the part of children, whose parents didn't make them interested in that activity. Those who do not read cannot write well.

On the other hand, why is the use of the Internet in English looked on with such disfavour? Mastering of the English language is an essential tool in our world and French speaking children who know how to communicate in English on the Net should be congratulated by their parents. They are ready to face life in a time of globalization, because the world is larger than Québec and larger than all the countries of the Francophonie. The hard European reality has already shown French speaking Belgians[4] — as well as all the citizens of the European Union — that being European means mastering English as a second language.

I come now to a point that struck me at this colloquium. The most well-informed analyses of bilingualism, it seems to me, came from participants who are bilingual. Only a person who masters more than one language is in a position to evaluate the effect of languages on the building up of one's identity.[5] Of course, one can put forward an official translation for the sake of allowing linguistic democracy in a country that has more than one official language. As Michael Dorland demonstrated in his presentation, "if only it were that simple." A good translation requires a perfect mastery, not only of the two languages, but of the two cultures. Being bilingual is an advantage that makes intermediaries unnecessary. An efficient cultural policy would be a policy which entitles citizens to become perfectly bilingual people. In a country like Canada, bilingualism could become purely and simply its distinctive element of identity.[6]

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[4] Belgium is a country where linguistic problems are inversely proportional to its size. Put differently, in a very small territory, there is a Babel of three official languages. The Francophone Wallony has become, after a century of economic and linguistic hegemony, the poor sister of the Flemish. They are still suffering from an inferiority complex because their language has received only recently, after long quarrels, the recognition it deserved in Belgium. The Flemish now take their revenge; Francophone Belgians should speak their language correctly if they wish to work in Flanders. On the other hand, the European market requires multilingual persons. English is the strict minimum today, even for a secretary. I shall not speak here of the German minority, the third official language in Belgium…

[5] I also am "guilty" of that "sin": I am German, though I can speak German. I can speak English, French and Portuguese in its Brazilian version, and also some Japanese.

[6] A European country where bilingualism is a daily reality is Netherlands. The teaching of English at school and the attitude of the media especially television, to foreign languages, contribute to an almost natural learning of English. Foreign feature films are always subtitled in Dutch, but are shown in their original language. The Great Duchy of Luxemburg is another good example. Teaching in primary schools is always done in German, but in French in secondary schools. One must add to that the fact that the Luxemburgese language is the official language. As the Great Duchy receives a good number of immigrants, there are many people there who speak four languages.

It would be useful to relativize the idea of a cultural threat through the transnational regrouping of ideas. Transnational elites, which are built up around common interests and/or the consumption of the same commodities, have always existed (Michael S. Cross). The Internet is just an accelerator in the building up of horizontal and international connections. The difference that is experienced is a requirement for understanding our own identity. The more we are induced to accept a life consisting of homogenized cultural habits, the more we have to be conscious of the cultural impoverishment this leads to.

There is a constant equilibrium between movements toward universalism and toward diversification, following the laws of physics, *action* and *reaction*. Money, for example, has no culture and in consequence can be internationalized and can globalize markets. On the other hand, cultural elements are not easily "globalizable." This is why one should not be afraid of seeing commodities and habits from abroad such as the "hamburger culture." To eat a hamburger does not taint one's cultural system, even less that of one's society. We must distinguish: to eat at a McDonald's in its country of origin is to share a tradition and a way of getting fed. Eating at a McDonald's in a country other than the USA is a different experience, as it is an exceptional way of nourishing oneself, and the ludic aspect of "chain feeding" oneself can contribute to putting one's values in their proper place. How can one discover what is a healthy and balanced diet if one doesn't from time to time do just the contrary? Also, it must be said that eating at "McDo" in Belgium is rather different than at a "McDo" in the USA: the hamburgers have been adapted to local taste and they can be taken with a small beer, whereas alcoholic beverages cannot be found at an American McDonald's. There is no cultural transfer as such. There is an adjustment to the culture of habits and commodities of other people. We should be more confident in people's intelligence and the cultural links people of a given culture make. If education at home, in school and in universities values local and national culture, no one should be afraid of having contacts with other cultures and their cultural expressions (Claude Martin, Donna Cardinal). Americans are great exporters of their cultural products, but they do not try to link them with their own cultural behaviour. They leave them open to others for cultural reappropriation. Looked at that way, the cultural threat of huge economic forces can be seen as less of a nightmare.

Mind imitations! The protection of the French culture of Québec as described by John Meisel as an advantage to Francophone Canadians can become a danger. If Québec wants to see its culture survive as strong and independent, it should not try to imitate someone else's. Even if Québec feels itself culturally close to France, it is not France. An imitation will always remain second rate. It is not a negation of the French ori-

gins of Québec traditions, but a lack of pride the Québécois have in their own culture. The fact of looking for support in another culture weakens the authenticity of one's own. Also, such an attitude can create a relationship of dependency toward France. But, in order to generate a true identity in Québec, France should recognize Québec as an independent culture. If not recognized by others, no country can exist per se.

The distinction between tradition — the past and old-fashioned ways of living — and modernity — the future and progress — cannot be accepted easily. As Fernand Harvey has suggested, there is no breach between them. The present is always nourishing itself from its roots in the past. A clear separation between the two is an "a posteriori" construction. The pluralism of rights that results from the coexistence of different life styles in a given territory is real.

3. THE SITUATION ON THE OLD CONTINENT

Fears of American economic power and its possible effect on "European" culture can be found throughout the European Union. As mentioned before, it is impossible to talk about European culture as an integral entity. The diversity of cultures in Europe — including those of immigrants — is the distinctive mark and exuberance of a political space trying more and more to assert itself on the world of international politics.[7] T. S. Eliot accepted that heterogeneity was the strength of Europe. Cultural homogenization would mean, according to him, cultural impoverishment and, indirectly, the weakening of the political force of a federal Europe (Eliot, 1948).

These are the facts of life. Europe is trying to build up a socio-political-economic space to safeguard cultural diversity by respecting the different languages inside the administrative and political structures of the European Union.[8] In Canada, where such a structure is already present, French Canadians, a

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[7] I am not talking here of the American branch of multiculturalism. Nobody in Europe wants a patchwork where everyone lives in his own sphere without mingling with others, typical of the way found in the USA. Interactions and exchanges are welcome and, in spite of the problems of racism in Europe, ghettoization is something to be avoided.

[8] It cannot be said that this way of doing things contributes to the efficiency of its functioning. The fact of constantly having translators and interpreters for all the combinations of languages leads to a sort of permanent disarray. Respecting the other's language is costly, renders procedures complicated and leads to an enormous production of paper. But, apparently, the EU is not yet ready to choose some languages as *lingua franca* for rapid and less costly communication, as proposals in that sense have all aborted. But, just for having a laugh at the development of a European English, one talks of *Euro-English*, that corresponds to a sort of pidgin allowing transversal communications in the administration of EU. The appearance of a *lingua franca*, in spite of the official resistance seems to me to be a first result of the will of the European populations to become closer to one another. Any identity is a construction and, since Benedict Anderson's book, *Imagined Communities*, everyone knows that any type of community is imaginary (Anderson, 1994). What is important is the fact that all the members believe in it so that it can exist.

minority, remain fearful of losing their identity. It may be a throwback to ideas of evolution that minority cultures are always seen as weaker and that their disappearance is considered inevitable. Colonial policies regarding native populations were based on that idea and are still alive today here and there (for Brazil, see Lima, 1995; for North America, see Pagden, 1993). On the contrary, minority cultures which survived extinction policies, are still there and are experiencing a renaissance. On the other hand, their representatives claim full citizenship in the majority society where they live, but without being assimilated. It is obvious that minority cultures, interacting with other cultures, evolve and change some of their cultural patterns. But these changes do not necessarily affect the core of their cultures, if the changes are the result of a free choice by both partners (Barth, 1969). One does not change one's identity without willing it. This is an experience any immigrant can corroborate.

The key to maintaining an identity is a good education, which allows for one's education to continue over time. This should not be limited to an education which shows to advantage only one's own society and its cultural gains, but one which provides the necessary tools that can be used to compare with a critical mind what is taking place in other cultures. Mastering more than one language is an essential element. On the occasion of my research on the Franco-German frontier, between the Saar and Lorraine, I could see the damage caused by the linguistic policies of the French government over a period of fifty years. The eradication of a transnational German dialect, the Mosellan Francique, which was still in use after the Second World War in Lorraine, in Saar and in the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, was successful on French territory. In order to homogenize French citizens languages other than French had to be dismissed. The Mosellan Francique, which had no recognition as a language, was forbidden at school, as was German. The Germanophone children learned French at school with a colonial mindset: the first child who spoke the dialect or German was given a symbol of shame by the teacher and that child had to denounce another pupil in order to get rid of that symbol. The child who was caught with the symbol at the end of the day was severely punished (Lask, 1994 and 2002). It should be mentioned that the people of Lorraine living near the German border had never spoken French, even during the years when they belonged to France. But this did not weaken their feeling of being French. The relationship between a language and a nationality is not obvious. It should also be said that Mosellan Francique remains the national language of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg. This is a case where a given language can be supported by different values in neighbouring regions (see also Wilson and Donnan, Eds., 1998).

It must be recognized that the will to homogenize is an inherent characteristic of the Nation-State. France is not different from the USA or from Germany in this respect. Every State has a problem with diversity; it makes it more difficult to govern. However, the idea that a nationality based on one language only is easier to govern should be demystified. To survive culturally in our world, learning others' languages is essential. Whoever is incapable of being informed about others is dependent on translation. Whoever has to rely upon intermediaries can be more easily manipulated. History is full of examples of the types of situations that can manipulate citizens.

4. PROPOSALS

A few reflections as a conclusion.

Perhaps it could be more productive in the future to adopt a more positive outlook toward globalization and to relativize its impact on smaller societies and the handing down of their cultures. The spread of ideas and techniques has always been a good thing for progress in art and technology. The fact of change is an integral part of the evolution of tradition; it is a lure to think that to remain authentic, one should cling to one's lifestyle. Even the hard core of Québec identity has changed throughout its existence: first agriculture and religion dominated, and now it is language that is at the forefront. In Europe, the change we expect is the replacement of "pure" national identities with a supranational European identity (Wilson, 1993).

Countries that limit their imperialism to material things only lose control over how these products are re-appropriated. If the refusal to be exposed to intercultural exchange is accompanied by a lessening of information about what is going on in the world, the result is isolation. According to Michael S. Cross, the percentage of international information in American newspapers has gone down from 20% to 2% in the last ten years, and even more in other media. This leaves a potentially dangerous situation, as cultural isolation and cultural self-sufficiency are good grounds for manipulating public opinion; this also applies to international policy. The consequences can be dramatic.

In order to know who we are, we need the Other. If we want to see where we are located in our society we need to be exposed to other ways of living and understanding the world. Interaction through bilingualism

is a good thing. Multilingualism should be seen as a cultural opening, not a loss of identity.

Another important element concerns the responsible citizen who can make his own cultural choices. To develop that type of citizen, not only is a good school system necessary, but also the continual presence and involvement of parents. This is one of the main threats both to our societies and the handing down of culture.

In multicultural societies, each ethnic group has its own socio-economic niche. This guarantees fertile cooperation (Barth, 1969). Diversity is a plus, not an obstacle (John Meisel), if the State plays the role of regulator and intermediary among different communities. This is how social cohesion can be implemented in a society (Clarence Bayne).

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Smaller Societies, Globalization and Handing Down of Culture

William D. Coleman[*]

This chapter returns to the core questions of the colloquium and examines the possible answers to these questions in light of the presentations and discussions that took place. It focuses particularly on two general issues. First, to what extent has globalization destabilized the construction of identities by individuals and by smaller societies as collectivities? If identities are destabilized, what are the implications for the handing down of culture in such societies? Second, does the increasing commodification of cultural forms shrink the range of cultural diversity in the world? What are the possible openings for cultural creativity in such a context, particularly as they relate to smaller societies? In order to address these questions, this chapter begins with a discussion of the meaning of globalization and its relation to information and communication technologies. It then turns to examine the implications of these globalizing processes for identity and for cultural creativity and expression. The chapter ends with an assessment of what role governments might play in promoting and encouraging cultural diversity.

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1. GLOBALIZATION AND INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES

With the round of protests in Seattle, Prague, Washington, Québec, and Genoa among other cities over the past years, there is little need to note that globalization is a highly contested term and phenomenon. Like many core concepts in the social sciences and humanities, it has a variety of meanings in public debates in the mass media and in the academic arena. What is more, there is a constant interaction between these public understandings of the phenomenon and what is going on in the academy. For the purposes of this chapter, however, I will work with an academic definition of the concept. In his book on globalization and culture, John Tomlinson (1999: 2) suggests that we see the phenomenon of globalization as an empirical condition of the modern world that he terms *complex connectivity*: "the rapidly developing and ever densening network of interconnections and interdependences that characterize modern social life."

In their book on *Global Transformations*, Held and his colleagues (1999) help us understand what might be new about "complex connectivity." This assistance is useful because human societies have always been interconnected and interdependent in various ways. They speak first of the *extensity* of connections: to what degree do the connections between individuals and between communities extend across the whole globe? They answer that the global extensiveness of such connections has increased significantly over the past three decades. They also ask about the *intensification* of these connections: are these more globally extensive relationships isolated and random or are they regularized to the point that we can talk about a significant change in their intensity. They reply that these connections are becoming more regularized. The third question they pose concerns the speed of these connections: they may be more globally extensive and more regularized but take place slowly or quickly, one after another. The answer here too is obvious: the velocity of the global diffusion of ideas, products, capital, people and information has risen exponentially over the past two decades.

If you put together then this increase in the global extensiveness of connections, their more regularized and institutionalized character, and the speed at which they take place, we witness a growing enmeshment of the global and the local. The possibility rises that what happens locally somewhere on the globe will have a significant *impact* somewhere else. Hence, Tomlinson's notion of complex interconnectedness is a useful idea.

Many of the presentations at the colloquium emphasized the linkage between this empirical condition and the development of information and communication technologies. Castells (1996) work on the "network society" is helpful here. He argues that some rather special things began to happen in the realm of communications and information technologies in the early 1970s. In a way that is equal to the effect of the industrial revolution, the information and communication technologies revolution is centred on four key technologies that have gradually become more refined, more powerful and more interlinked: the semiconductor transformed into the microprocessor, the computer, the move to digital transmission of information in telecommunications, facilitated by fibre optics, and biotechnology. These kinds of technological changes make the boundaries and imagination of space even more autonomous from location, and time becomes even less of an obstacle to building human relationships in these new spaces. With these technologies, individuals and the communities and organizations to which they belong are highly likely to become more conscious of this compression of space and time and thus situate themselves more in a global context.

What is important here is not only that these technologies have assisted greatly in expanding the global extensiveness of human relations, their regularity and the speed at which they take place, but also that they impose ways of thinking. As Fernand Harvey stresses in his chapter, the culture of the "written," *culture de l'écrit*, is being supplemented if not replaced by a cyberculture based on multimedia images. As many have observed as well, we must add in to this mix, the development of increasing numbers of more transnational corporations interested in the global sale and production of culture. The complex interconnectedness of globalization when coupled with the onset of cyberculture makes possible the deep structuring of commodification into the cultural life of the developed world (Tomlinson, 1999: 87). This development can bring with it a distinct narrowing and convergence of cultural experience.

With these background points established, let me now turn to the questions raised about the relationship between globalization and the construction of identity.

2. IMPLICATIONS FOR IDENTITY

What do we mean when we speak of identity? Identity refers to an ongoing social and cultural practice of defining the self (Castells, 1997; Chambers, 1994). The construction of an identity involves a charting of

continuity through the chaotic, mixed events of one's life and this process of continuity-making is a kind of self-narration. People forge a continuous narrative link across their various interactions and experiences with others, seeking to produce an image of themselves that is consistent, and which, in turn, affects how they engage with others. Globalization is likely to affect this practice in several ways. It offers new opportunities for *imagining* social relationships (Appadurai, 1996). It also can disrupt identities, challenging the continuity individuals have constructed, and thus forcing adaptive behaviour. By introducing turbulence into the usual processes of identity formation, it can affect society so profoundly that it alters the way in which individuals and communities define themselves.

Preliminary evidence suggests that globalization gives rise to identities that are less solid, less definite, and less continuous. Identities can be adopted and discarded more easily than in the past. Identity is formed on the move. For some persons, particularly the young, the identities adopted should not be too tight. They are chosen on the basis of "keeping the game short" and of avoiding long-term commitments. Finally, for reasons that I note below, the potential for conflicting identities may be increasing.

Iain Chambers (1994) observes that these changes in identity formation reflect changing sources of identity. He writes (1994: 19): "Our sense of belonging, our language and the myths we carry in us remain, but no longer as "origins" or signs of "authenticity" capable of guaranteeing the sense of our lives. They now linger on as traces, voices, memories and murmurs that are mixed in with other histories, episodes, encounters." Fernand Harvey makes a similar point in his chapter: the traditional mediators for the transmission of culture and I would include identity — the family, school, civic associations, museums, public libraries — have been brought into question as new mediators — the mass media, advertising, transnational or diaspora communities with global links, the internet — have been added.

Certainly, then these sorts of changes have implications for the handing down of culture, a central question of this volume. If identities are less solid, less definite and less continuous, the capacity of individuals and communities to transmit them across generations may decline. Similarly, these new sources of identity — whether the mass media, transnational communities, or advertising — are themselves fluid and constantly changing. Journalism tends to be short-term in historical focus, often with little evidence of historical memory. Advertising lives on change, on convincing consumers to replace something they have with something new. Some aspects of culture — clothing, foods, music — are less fixed today, changing ever more quickly following the logic of the global market economy. For small societies, where the af-

firmation of a collective identity has been crucial to their survival in the past, these types of changes may be important, even disturbing.

3. IMPLICATIONS FOR CULTURAL CREATIVITY

In his presentation, Professor Meisel quotes Northrop Frye on Canadian identity: "the question of Canadian identity, so far as it affects the creative imagination is not a "Canadian" question at all, but a regional question." In light of the changes to identity just described, I wondered how Frye might have reformulated that quotation if he were writing today. Perhaps it would be the following: "the question of Canadian identity, so far as it affects the creative imagination, is not a "Canadian" question at all, but a series of ever-changing questions tracing plural, floating, border-crossing interactions."

The question that follows then is whether these kinds of changes in identity formation and in the sources of identity hinder cultural creativity in smaller societies. Certainly, there are important obstacles to creative cultural expression in the current globalizing context. With the commodification of culture and its transformation into a contributor to a mass consumerist society, smaller societies face particular obstacles. The market for their products is too small sometimes to be profitable, particularly when faced with the economies of scale and productive power of transnational cultural corporations like Disney or Polygram. To compete, artists in smaller societies have to face the question: "will it sell here and abroad?" In addressing this question, they may have to place constraints on their own creativity, compromise quality and detach the artistic creation from the locality or place where it was developed.

Perhaps these economic constraints may be less important if the support for artists permits them to take advantage of the plural, floating, border-crossing identities that have become increasingly common. For example, some at the colloquium spoke of the possibility of renewing and reinforcing the Québécois identity through the multiplication of new intercultural dialogues with countries situated outside the usual economic circuits of cultural production. In speaking of the conditions for important dialogue and debate, Michael Cross suggested that the horizontal structure of the media in Italy rather than the vertical, monopolistic character found in Canada might be a crucial factor. In this vein, the Internet, particularly as broadband capacity, becomes more widely available may make more possible these kinds

of horizontal, intercultural changes that would seem favourable to creative expression given the changing character of identity.

The question was also raised whether the way in which programmes supporting artistic creation are set up tends to reinforce creative expression along more traditional identity lines, at the expense of marginal communities, whether aboriginal or recent immigrant ones. The idea was raised that systems of peer review, longer-standing commitments to particular institutions, and unions of artists might create barriers to new artists seeking funding. To the extent to which this kind of bias might exist, it is rather disturbing given the analysis of identity that I have just reviewed. Important sources of creativity may be left unrecognized or undernourished at a time when those sources are highly needed if we are to understand well the changes in our identities. Moreover, we may be losing economic opportunities for cultural creativity in the globalizing world in which we live.

It is also important, however, not to overemphasize the dominance of consumption in the cultural field as a result of the commodification and globalization of cultural production. There are many aspects of peoples' cultural relationships and practices that resist some of the commodifying logic, whether these be personal relationships, religious affiliations, a sense of ethnic identity, or attachments to "local" practices and contexts. As Geertz (1973) has stressed, these lived cultures enacted and re-enacted in particular local contexts with their own traditions and histories produce a "thickening of cultures" that are, in turn, potentially resistant to commodification. This assessment is important because it appears consistent with another theme that emerged at the colloquium: local and regional contexts are an increasingly important site of cultural creativity. In Québec, a new emphasis on cultural development has emerged at the local level, while the provincial level has receded in importance. Some municipalities are taking greater responsibility for cultural development. This phenomenon also lends itself to horizontal linkages between cities that cross provincial and national borders, without the direct intermediation of provincial and federal governments.

4. ENCOURAGING CULTURE: THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENTS

Over the past half century, beginning perhaps with the recommendations of the Lévesque-Massey Royal Commission on the Development of the Arts, Letters and Sciences in Canada, the government of Can-

ada has sought to put in place programmes of support for such varied forms of cultural creation as film, television, literature and poetry, magazine publishing, theatre, and the fine arts. In Québec, similar support became increasingly systematic after the creation of the Ministère des Affaires culturelles in Québec after the Parti libéral du Québec came to power in June 1960. Since these early days of the Quiet Revolution, the Gouvernement du Québec has remained quite active in supporting and promoting cultural development in Québec.

With the growing commodification of culture and its integration into mass consumerist culture, however, these kinds of programs have come under external pressure. As cultural production comes under the "discipline" of regional trading regimes like the NAFTA or of the world trading system under the WTO and its compulsory disputes settlement mechanism, government programs have been challenged as providing discriminatory subsidies. Perhaps the most notable example is the striking down of successive attempts by the Government of Canada to support the Canadian magazine industry (Armstrong, 2000). It is increasingly clear that large transnational cultural corporations will use regional and global trading rules to force open markets to their products and to challenge the efforts of governments of smaller societies to save part of those markets for their domestic artists. The market logic has also penetrated these smaller societies in that public corporations like the CBC/SRC and the National Film Board work increasingly in partnership with private sector cultural firms. The market logic tends to dominate ever more in these partnerships.

Do these developments mean that governments are increasingly powerless in smaller states to support cultural creativity and cultural development? The various talks given at the colloquium would suggest not.

1. Governments can clearly continue many of the programs of support offered through such agencies as the Canada Council. Attention must be given, however, to the relative openness of these support programs to members of aboriginal communities and of the growing number of transnational, immigrant communities found in our major cities.

2. Second, it is important to recognize the potential role of contemporary information and communication technologies for cultural development. They are not only shaping identities, but also providing opportunities for cultural creation and the diffusion of cultural products in new ways. We have already noted the growing significance of cities and towns as supporters of cultural development. In recognition

of such developments, many emphasize the need for democratizing much further access to Internet facilities and for government supporting vigorously the widespread installation in Canada of broadband capability. Such infrastructural support by governments would seem key to successful efforts by smaller societies like Québec and Canada to keep cultural creativity flourishing.

3. Finally, international and regional trading rules have nothing to say about educating and training the artists needed for cultural vitality. In the realm of economic and industrial policy, many of the smaller European states have reacted to the disciplines of trading rules by changing policies. Rather than protecting their industries through the use of tariffs, import quotas, and export subsidies, they have turned to re-educating and training workers. In seeking to develop a highly trained work force, they have hoped to increase their productivity and competitiveness in world markets. Perhaps Canada and Québec can take a lesson from this experience. The education and training of persons in the fine arts, in creative writing, and in the use of new multimedia technologies would seem to be crucial to the future of cultural creativity. In putting an increased focus on this aspect of education, questions should also be raised about the practices of some provinces like Ontario that are reducing, if not removing, fine art and music from elementary and secondary school curriculums. Such actions would seem very short-sighted and hardly conducive to artistic creativity. If we wish to have creative cultural works in our smaller societies, we cannot expect it to flourish on barren ground. The soil for creativity must be nourished from the very earliest days of the education of our children.

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The Giddiness of Descending.
Handing Down in Spite of Uncertainty

Guy Mercier[*]

1. ACKNOWLEDGMENT

If I have the honour of addressing you today, it is not because I am a well known expert in the field of Québec and Canadian studies. Nor am I a specialist on the question of globalization and its impacts on the cultural evolution of smaller societies and minorities. I am truly concerned about those questions but I have no special authority about these matters which would result in my being invited to this prestigious gathering. I have accepted the responsibility of talking to you, because I received a friendly request from the former Dean of the Faculty of Literature of Laval University, Jacques Desautels, who was kind enough to wish to see me among you. I think of my presence here as a way of thanking him for all he has done for me.

2. MOTIVATION

If friendship has been a good pretext to be here, this gives me no particular competence on the topics of

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your colloquium. Short of competence, I take the liberty of using personal experience as a basis for making some observations. As a matter of fact, the subject of this colloquium is a central preoccupation, not of my professional life as a geographer, but rather of my family life. So, instead of delivering the commentaries of a specialist, you will hear a rather personal testimony. That testimony will be largely coloured, of course, by the papers presented at this colloquium, but it remains essentially about direct influence of personal experience. I simply hope that my reflections will be interesting enough to be forgiven for having so egoistically taken on this closing speech.

3. POSITION

The roots of my reflection are to be found in my condition as an ordinary citizen living a life that can be called "minority." I was born and I am living in Québec City, where, with my wife who was born in Vancouver, I am raising two small children in French and English. Put differently, living in an environment that is essentially francophone, I experiment in my daily family life with bilingualism and perhaps, as far as it exists, biculturalism, to reuse an expression that was previously used to describe the Canadian project.

I concede that this way of being a minority is somewhat paradoxical, as it permits our children to be, somehow, twice parts of a majority, whether in Québec or in Canada. My wife and I are very conscious that our linguistic choice is an asset that most of our children's friends are deprived of. But this interpretation is challenged, as some people see a danger in raising children this way: the danger of not being sufficiently familiar with either language, the danger of "identity destabilization," to paraphrase an expression of Serge Proulx.

This experience of bilingualism, which is a factor distinguishing us from the majority of people we know, is a constant source of questions, if not doubts. And, in our case, the bilingual handing down of culture (or the culture handing down two languages) is not an obvious thing to do: it is not a "natural" process, to use John Meisel's wording. That was not part of my wife's or my family's traditions, that we would introduce an innovation whose merit we have to convince each other of. This approach to the handing down of culture requires a great deal of rationalization, and an ongoing discussion of the legitimacy and rele-

vance of our decisions about raising our children. In those exchanges, our political convictions, conscious or unconscious, are called upon; there are collations and consolations. An outsider might conclude that our family's choice sounds like an echo of certain political options. For example, some could see it as a way of militating in favour of a "strong Québec in a united Canada," to repeat a well known slogan, or as a means of associating with Trudeau's utopia of a bilingual Canada.

We try in fact to be neutral on the political question, in order to concentrate only on the good of our children. It is possible that, in so doing, we may seem naïve, and that we've succumbed to an illusion. However articificial this exercise may look, we feel it is essential. Without that fiction, how could we make full use of this new way of handing down culture where the French and English languages are on an equal footing? This approach is so important to us that we do not want to jeopardize it through unnecessary exposure to the ups and downs of the Canada-Québec political debate.

4. THE GENEALOGICAL REASON

Why do we insist on educating our children in both languages?

Our decision is based on a very practical consideration. Different from what is unhappily going on in some communities in Canada — as indicated by Frits Pannekoek — we wish our children to be able to communicate as much as possible with all the members of their family, that is, of course, their father and mother, but also their grandparents, their uncles and aunts, their cousins. It seems essential to us that our children be proficient in both languages, to really be part of their *genealogy*, which is the source and foundation of human existence.

As Léon Bernier has said, there is there something both obvious and not commonplace involved: the family, whatever its form and its culture, is the main site for the handing down of conscience and the desire to be a human being. This genealogical handing down of humanity necessitates, or so it seems to me, that the receiver learns that he is part of a generational succession, where he can find a place for himself that is absolutely his own. This is the fundamental condition that will make him conscious of having a *human identity* in which he will recognize himself. How can a child take his place among other humans

if he cannot fully feel the pleasure or the astonishment he gives to those who welcome him or take pains for him? Is it not through that pleasure and those pains that the child experiences the desire that brought him into existence and that, in his turn, he will reproduce?

Perhaps we are here at the very core of transmitting. Before handing down a given culture as a heritage, the purpose of transmittal is reproduction, from one generation to the next, of conscience and the desire of becoming human. If disconnected from the *genealogical* reason, the handing down of culture is in danger of becoming a technical gimmick the State and industry can easily lay their hands on.

5. THE REGISTERS OF CULTURE

Genealogical transmission and the handing down of culture are two different things, but it seems difficult to separate them. That is why I am surprised to see how discreet our colloquium has been on the subject of genealogy, particularly at a time when the traditional family model is being questioned, and "intercultural" families continue to multiply.

The speakers have concentrated on the question of cultural institutions and the shocks they withstand in smaller societies, under the threat of globalization and industrialization of culture. Those matters are, of course, crucial, but in my opinion, they have to be considered in the larger perspective of a broader notion of culture, a definition which establishes a distinction and a hierarchy among the authorities where culture takes shape.

The distinction Fernand Harvey makes about the registries of culture can be highly useful. When distinguishing between identitary culture, institutionalized culture and mass culture, Harvey helps us structure our reflections, taking into account not only the manifestations of culture, but their foundations. This leads me to two observations.

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6. CULTURAL AUTHENTICITY

The first is about the debate on the roles of globalization, politics and industry in the homogenization or diversity of cultures. We see a sort of world culture now emerging. In infancy since the Enlightment, this culture asserts itself in a way that resembles a real revolution. That is so because the sociological material would no longer comprise the community, but rather the individuals who, when added together, become a mass.

There would then be a displacement of where cultural authenticity is to be found. Previously, traditional cultures gave shape to great collective narratives which gave meaning to the behaviour and discourse of individuals. These days, the community seems less and less the source of an authentic culture which can be handed down, through tradition, from one generation to the next.

Tradition has not necessarily vanished, but it is no longer the main source of culture. It is just one source among those presented to one's conscience or to individual consumption. This is why a tradition, in these circumstances, can find a new vigour if it is wise enough to — please excuse the wording — "capture a segment of the market." It is then only a *memory* incorporated or amalgamated in with other cultural traits. But the importance of tradition is declining; the privileged source is no longer the community but the individual.

Given these conditions, one can hope that individuals will really be the benefiaries of a new cultural authenticity. Each individual, in that perspective, is condemned to innovation, otherwise he is left alone or nearly alone, to mass alienation. If globalization is to result in a new and authentic cultural diversity, the individual must be able to tackle the multiplicity of cultural expressions. He must be in a position to *negotiate* his own *cultural identity*, taking into account:

·   the great collective narratives which, willy nilly, perpetuate themselves;

·   institutional culture, which is still resisting the assaults of privatization; and

·   mass culture, where it is often hard to distinguish profit from value.

If this personal choice of culture is implemented fully, it is essential to accept the individiual's basic right to be what he is; the right to build his hopes into a heritage, as Donna Cardinal would say. This is why

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Michael Ignatieff is totally correct in arguing that individual rights, to their fullest extent, are an essential attribute of cultural globalization. Without the privilege of freedom that the rights provide, the individual can only express his cultural authenticity with great difficulty.

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But are individual rights more efficient than the influence of the producers of mass culture? Even if governments are sensitive to cultural diversity and to individual rights, what about the cultural industries, and especially the huge monopolies in that sector?

Until recently — and perhaps even today — the producers of mass culture targeting the world market had to take into account not just national protectionism but more especially the great collective narratives that have links with politics and territories. Those great narratives, to which mass culture had to conform, dictated a political negotiation whose task was the local acculturation of the cultural products or models coming from outside. But won't the trend toward free trade, which is a companion to the present movement of globalization, squeeze the communities, bit by bit, of the right of political negotiation, if clear limits are not drawn up?

Local cultures can, of course, appropriate, as Serge Proulx says, foreign techniques and use them to their own advantage, to eventually penetrate the world market. But what about the political stake? I would say that, in those circumstances, the political task would be less to protect national — or ethnic — identities than to defend the right of the individual to a collective life that is as democratic as possible and as meaningful as can be hoped for. Among those rights, could we not emphasize the right to participate, whatever the level of government, in the shaping of how to live as a community? If so, it is still possible to think that a given community can give itself the political instruments to pursue or safeguard, in one's own milieu, what are seen as cultural singularities. It is essential that the collective rights created for that purpose:

·   are the result of a real democratic process;

·   are not in conflict with individual rights; and

·   are respectful of the rights of other groups.

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Under those conditions, it seems possible to think that a cultural policy can be a factor of social cohesion, while favouring the development of a cultural plurality.

7. THE CASE OF CANADA AND QUÉBEC

My second observation concerns the Canada and Québec question, which I do not usually talk about without some wariness. My position could be to hide myself behind the general principles I have just enunciated. But this would be a gross mistake as, in this case as in any other, the principles must be used to take into account the circumstances and motivations of different peoples and their perceptions of one another. This does not imply that reason should give ground to whim, atavism and preconception. But it is always advantageous to be aware of these matters, if we want to avoid unproductive clashes and put on the table the conditions of a miscarriage. So, what about the question of the handing down of culture in Canada? Can we hope that authentic cultures can blossom over there? Are there particular conditions which are obstacles to that?

The question is highly complex and I am conscious of not having grasped all its components. But I would like to say that I am very sensitive to Michael Dorland's analysis of the incompleteness of the great Canadian narrative. Canada has not yet completed its great narrative, as it is still missing what Dorland calls a *lawful speaker*, a great speaker who would unify the public sphere *a mari usque ad mare*. There is of course a pro-Canadian rhetoric which, since the first days of Confederation, has tried to legitimize Canadian nationalism and federal institutions. This exercise has not been without success — after all Canada is still here — but there is also, as Michel de la Durantaye suggested, the fact that pro-Canadian rhetoric appears constantly as a counterpoint and a counterweight to opposed rhetorics. This creates an impossible unison, a flavour of unachievement. To repeat John Meisel, this is how Canada and Québec constitute another true America; another America, less certain of itself, which would be a counterweight to the confidence of the United States, which is often seen as the essence of its soul.

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The great Canadian narrative has found its unachievement, at least in part, thanks to another great narrative, that of French Canada and Québec. This narrative is in its turn unachieved as Canadian sovereignty and the attachment of residents of Québec to that sovereignty have prevented Québec from completing its own political and territorial agenda. Two unachieved great narratives have been competing with one another for a long time, at a time when, like many others, they are shaken by globalization. They then feel doubly threatened, as a new danger is added to an old frustration. And this is without taking into account that, in this stream, also asserting themselves, are communities which put forward great narratives and, on that basis, claim political and territorial rights: the First Nations, the Francophones living outside the borders of Québec, the Acadians, the Anglophones of Québec, and perhaps others. The new circumstances could give birth, it seems to me, to mutual resentment and a game of dupes. Resentment diverting into irony or indifference is not new. It is the consequence of unachievement and the competition between great narratives of Canada and Québec. Today, this is exacerbated by two factors. First, as already mentioned, there are other great narratives, each a competitor, that one hears more and more. Second, as elsewhere, the legitimacy of those great narratives is compromised simultaneously by the internal forces of individual rights and by the external forces of free trade. As a result, there is a danger of reinforcing the prejudices that haunt the perceptions of communities living within the Canadian territory. A game of dupes is the situation of possibly invading the front scene, if everyone is focusing on his own self image and, in that of the other, those that flatter resentment. Paradoxically, at the same time that Canada moves resolutely toward cultural diversity, it is in danger of sinking into fictions where everyone's culture descends to simplistic and pejorative stereotypes. I think there is a major difficulty for the handing down of culture in Canada. Those two paths are not compatible; it is important to avoid the latter, without necessarily thinking that any criticism is to be condemned. Criticism, on the contrary, is essential, but it must not be confused with anything else. Developing an authentic culture, which respects legitimate individual and collective rights, cannot accept phantasms where the self is an overblown and petty figure, and where the other is reified and provides only an opportunity for psychological release. It is of course hard to believe that this option is now the choice of the majority. But, when reading certain newspapers, in French or English, I fear that these ways of seeing the other still reach large audiences. This is why it is so important that we should all be vigilant, so that the phantasms do not gain ground. I hope my children will be part of this vigilence.

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Postscript

Jean-Paul Baillargeon[*]

Having read the texts of all these authors, can one say that this colloquium has achieved its objective, which was to share among faculty, francophones and anglophones, thoughts on a subject of common concern, i.e., what is the process of the handing down of culture in smaller societies living in a context of globalization, and what type of culture is handed down? We can say "mission accomplished." There is in these papers a goodly supply of ideas to meditate on and to lead us to deeper exchanges. It is clear that it is not only the objects of their study that have influenced the speakers in colouring their thoughts but also, and more importantly, the social and linguistic contexts in which they themselves live. Those factors have not necessarily led them to contradictory or opposed views, but have added accents and nuances to widely shared aspects of the question, but seen more acutely by some, or more lightly emphasized by others. For example, several authors have mentioned the fact that a merchandizing and homogenizing culture co-exists with vibrant local, regional, parallel and marginal cultures.

Some have gone so far as to use the terms "colonialism" and "imperialism" to describe dominating cultures, including within Canada itself, toward minority cultures which have been marginalized, or worse still despised or ignored until recently. Minorities are a reality dealt with in these papers. This confirms what several authors have realized, here and in other studies, that cultural globalization has given rise, as a sort of

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back-fire, to a more and more militant assertion of minority and marginal cultures. But that is not without being steeped in a kind of ambiguity, especially when one speaks of such cultures in Canada. This halo of ambiguity has its roots, we believe, in the blurred way in which, consciously or unconsciously, we use certain terms, including the key words of this colloquium: "culture," "handing down," "smaller society" and "globalization." Some have mentioned this fact, not only about the meaning of those words, but also about other notions like "majority," "minority," "nation," etc. A book was published some time ago, *Pour une morale de l'ambiguité* (de Beauvoir, 1947). Perhaps it would be relevant to publish a book in Canada, about the notions and terms we use in talking about culture, a work called: *Towards an Ambiguous Discourse?* That kind of discourse is not just Canadian. When one is talking, in particular, about globalization, ambiguity is global. This is a theme Guy Rocher has recently tried to demonstrate and rectify (2001).

If the lack of preceiseness in talking about globalization is due in part to the fact it is a relatively new phenomenon, one cannot invoke that reason when talking about Canada (including the Canada-Québec relationship). It's as if, in Canada, because of its diverse cultural aspects, we had deliberately chosen to express ourselves using an *ambiguous discourse*. This discourse is in the process of being clarified insofar as the First Nations are concerned. Even if the approach to it is different for the francophones (Lévesque) and the anglophones (Cohnstaedt, Pannekoek), that sort of process can lead to nothing less than positive results, to a better understanding of certain social and cultural relationships. The fact that other minorities want to be listened to as equal partners, including the positive or negative consequences that their demands may give rise to (Bayne), here too there are necessary clarifications. One would hope that this process would be extended to francophones living outside Québec, as well as to Québec inside the rest of Canada (Thériault).

As for these two linguistic groups, would it not be useful to intensify, if not to inaugurate exchanges of reflections and experiences between equal partners? Anglophones would have something to hand down given their daily and intimate experience of co-habitating with what one of the authors has called "behemots" (Cardinal). On the other hand, francophones, especially those in Québec, have developed a number of strategies, whether at the level of anthropological culture or at the one of institutional culture, for survival and for expressing themselves and being recognized, even in the context of globalization (Harvey; Saint-Pierre; De la Durantaye). There are for sure rich layers of experiences to share. These two baskets of considerations and experience could be made into mutual enrichment in facing cultural

globalization, for influencing each other and for accumulating knowledge and ways of living together, which might contribute to the reinforcement of cultural diversity the world over.

As an echo to that proposal, Fernand Harvey wishes that the reflections put forward in this colloquium result in "research [activities dealing with] the study of cultural practices of individuals and local communities, and also into comparative studies between regions of a given country, or between smaller societies at different stages of cultural development." Those types of studies could do much to clear up ambiguities, if only because it forces us to clarify certain situations, because we would have to compare comparable things. At the founding colloquium of the Canadian Cultural Research Network, in Ottawa, in June 1998, John Meisel, in his usual urbane language, used the expression "linguistic plasticity" (1998), not only about the meaning of the same words in French and in English, but between speakers. If we ever succeed in dissipating some terminological ambiguities, which may focus the light on certain ways of seeing reality, this would surely be a step in helping to appreciate one another, and possibly to deepen our thoughts about the other. All that would be very helpful in rendering more explicit the role of culture today in our own societies.

In reading the papers of the speakers of this colloquium, we can add another general reflection, which can be linked closely with the idea of clarifying terms and concepts. Most of these speakers have used an academic style. This is not surprising as we all come from that world. But some have chosen other ways of expressing themselves, such as an autobiographical narrative (Cohnstaedt), a professional testimony (Cardinal), an almost polemical editorial (Sauvageau), an administrative memorandum (Higham), or else the legitimization of a heartfelt cause with lengthy theoretical considerations (Bayne). If we want to be sure to understand each other, in talking about the stakes involved in the handing down of culture in smaller societies within the context of globalization, it is not forbidden to favour one type of expression over another, if it helps an author to emphasize more dramatically what he wants to say. There are famous authors of the twentieth century who felt they needed to use different forms of writing to express themselves. One thinks, for example, of Sartre (theatre, novels, philosophical, political and polemical essays), of Malraux (novels, literary and aesthetic essays, political writing). Here in Québec, Gérard Bouchard (2002) recently published a novel to tell the story of the builders of the Saguenay region in ways that his works as a sociologist and historian could not express. John Ralston Saul has moved between novels and historical or philosophical works.

This leads us to hope that, in addition to the "objective" studies called for by Fernand Harvey and John Meisel, there would be more personal manifestations, including journalistic essays, like Taras Gresco's (2002), or the literary works of authors called "cultural ferrymen" (Giguère, 2001). Some such works can be found in francophone Québec and in anglophone Canada. But would the "two solitudes" be so irreducible if there were more literary ferrymen between them? Is it possible that, beyond certain limits, cultural exchanges and cross-breeding can no longer co-exist?

From that, we turn to reflections some authors sent following the events of September 11, 2001. Some said that these events were a way of telling the United States that the rest of the world exists (Lask). Others have seen in the attacks a refutation, by a part of the world, of the influence of the western materialism (Meisel). The clash of cultures has also been put forward. But Sophie Bessis (2001) has talked more about a clash between two imaginations, how we in the West perceive the Arab and Muslim world and how that world perceives the Western world. Should there not be a lesson for all small societies which survive and bloom in a context of globalization, of a much feared homogenized culture? How do we perceive each other? There may be interesting exercises to devote ourselves to before entering into "comparative studies between regions of a given country, or between smaller societies" (Harvey), because "linguistic plasticity" is not the only confusing factor. First and foremost, there are all those ambiguous ways of seeing the other. To throw away all those dubious phantoms is a preliminary and fundamental condition for the uniting of smaller societies in order that they survive and bloom in a context of globalization, if we wish to hand down something other than sham cultures and merchandized caricatures of culture. To do so, we suggest, as a reference, a definition of culture taken from one of the late Fernand Dumont's essays (1995: 17-18).

> In its widest sense [culture is] a stock of codes, of ways of being and doing essential to our actions as well as to our being together. Our conscience is shrouded in this secondary universe, where we are pursuing a quest for the meaning of our lives […] Learning renders the world understandable; beliefs suggest what we might want to dedicate our lives to; art and literature populate our imaginations; media confide their mythologies. Thanks to culture, humanity can detach itself from the monotonous repetition our animal condition dooms us to; it can also inscribe itself into a history that leads to an accumulation of works and a foreshadowing of the future.

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